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The phenomenon of corporate crisis represents a permanent component of the modern 
economic system and, as in all market economies, the life of the company takes place with the 
physiological alternation of positive and negative phases. To this end, the concept of creative 
destruction perfectly describes the essential nature of capitalism in its ongoing process by which 
innovation and growth leads new companies to replace outdated ones. Besides, this 
phenomenon goes often beyond the concept of cyclicality since distress originating, for 
instance, from structural issues requires constant attention to adjustments. Therefore, strategic 
objectives and stability, even when they appear firmly achieved, call for a continuous 
restructuring of the company. In fact, firms that do not gradually adapt to the changing 
environment and competition, or do not realize some internal processes of deterioration, could 
degenerate into a pathological stage of crisis.  
To this regard, the management will have the delicate task of promptly identifying any sign of 
financial or operating weaknesses and wisely analyze their underlying causes in order to be in 
the position to design a proper turnaround process. Thus, an early and adequate restructuring 
intervention, when the crisis has not severely affected the business solvency yet, increase both 
the available tools and the probability of success. Taking a step backwards, many scholars have 
attempted to conceptualize the turnaround process through descriptive patterns in order to 
discern its main stages. Despite the different studies conducted, they all share the business going 
concern concept. Indeed, an essential precondition for corporate restructuring shall consist of 
the viability of the business, namely it requires the firm’s going concern value to be 
substantially higher than its liquidation value. Conversely, if the business is not viable, a 
turnaround strategy would only delay the unavoidable demise of the company and absorb 
substantial time and resources. To this end, the efficiency of any bankruptcy system can be 
judged by its ability to adequately identify and provide for the restructuring of companies that 
arguably should be able to survive (Altman et al. 2019).  
In this regard, the Italian insolvency framework ensures a good level of completeness and detail 
in meeting the diverse needs of both the creditors and the company, with instruments 
characterized by an increasing degree of intervention of the legislator, depending on the 
individual case and its severity.  There has been, however, a profound change in the philosophy 
of the Italian corporate restructuring procedures thanks to various legislative reforms which 
have gradually provided for contractual and quasi-contractual agreements, characterized by a 
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reduced role of courts in the management of business distress, a greater orientation towards the 
recovery and maintenance of the firm and an increased involvement of creditors in the 
restructuring process. Furthermore, as regards capital markets, the Italian legislator has invested 
Banca d’Italia and CONSOB with the supervisory authority on markets and financial 
intermediaries in order to improve transparency, protect investors and guarantee the sound 
development of the industrial system and the market itself. In particular, CONSOB carries out 
its role by making use of two specific tools: the black and the grey lists. The inclusion in these 
“watch lists” entails the provision of periodical addition information, namely monthly or 
quarterly, which is triggered by the opinion of external auditors. For the purpose of this study, 
a preliminary analysis will deepen into the overview of companies included in the lists from 
2009 to date, with an eye to shifts from one list to the other and the reasons for their removal 
from the surveillance lists, and then it will focus on the companies currently under observation, 
referring to their fundamental characteristics and providing a thorough analysis of three case 
studies. 
As concerns the structure of this dissertation, the first chapter will cover the main characteristics 
of the corporate distress status, with a particular attention to its symptoms and causes, together 
with an overview of the most common methods to investigate the downturn spiral of the crisis. 
After an initial review of turnaround process models, the second chapter will sift through 
informal, hybrid and formal restructuring procedures, with final focus on Italian legislative 
tools. The third chapter will further investigate the role of CONSOB as a supervision authority 
and, after an overview of companies subject to additional disclosure requirements between 2009 
and 2020, it will introduce the basis of the empirical analysis and will, therefore, present the 
description of each of the companies selected, namely Zucchi, Beghelli and Pininfarina. Finally, 
the fourth chapter will delve into the analysis focusing, for each case study, on the causes of 











CHAPTER 1: CORPORATE CRISIS STATUS 
 
1.1. Introduction 
Over the years, the phenomenon of corporate crisis has attained an even greater relevance in 
economic fields. Indeed, the recent economic and financial crisis has provided evidence of the 
pervasiveness of this topic, which may even affect the most solid business.  
Corporate crisis is considered to be, therefore, a permanent component of the modern 
production system, wherein mature companies are physiologically affected by the alternation 
of positive and negative phases. Conversely, the management should be able to appropriately 
detect the first warning signs of decline in order to prevent a so-called incubation of the crisis 
and its degeneration into a pathological stage. The analysis of the corporate crisis status in all 
its aspects is essential in laying the groundwork for the definition of a proper intervention plan.  
The first chapter of this thesis will cover the main aspects concerning the corporate crisis status 
in order to provide an overview of the phenomenon. First of all, it is necessary to recall how 
the corporate finance literature has commonly defined the crisis. Paragraph 1.2 attempts this 
task by providing a first distinction between decline and crisis or distress and, then, a further 
differentiation between economic and financial distress.  
Corporate crisis will be, subsequently, deepened referring to its symptoms and causes. While 
premonitions represent warning signals internal to the company, the crisis causes have many 
facets. Their investigation will be carried out adopting a subjective and objective approach and, 
on the basis of the latter, a further classification will present internal and external corporate 
crisis causes (Paragraph 1.3). Thus, in practice, what appears is that in most situations a chain 
of interrelated multiple causes can be identified in distressed firms.   
Corporate distress may evolve differently from business to business but, indeed, a common 
developmental path can be delineated. If timely actions have not been implemented, the 
company could get through different phases, moving from a potential to a reversible crisis and, 
lastly, to an irreversible distress (Paragraph 1.4).  
In this context, models on distress risk assessment constitute indispensable tools to prevent and 
investigate the downturn spiral of the crisis. An overview of the most common methods will be 
given in the last paragraph of this chapter (Paragraph 1.5).  
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Corporate crisis identification methods will be grouped into four main categories depending on 
their characteristics and results: methods based on intuition, ratio analysis, models and capital 
markets.  
 
1.2. Definition and concept 
As Guatri (1995) asserts, the organizational literature has just assumed and never given a 
universal and complete definition of the term “crisis”. Until recently, the research focused on 
successful organizations and the identification of their success factors have received far more 
attention with respect to organizational decline (Cater & Schwab 2008). In fact, in relation to 
the crisis theme, the main concern has been the classification of its components, causes, 
consequences and its possible remedies (Sirleo 2009). 
Riva et al. (2008) defined the onset of corporate crisis as the outbreak of imbalances and 
inefficiencies, the reduction of productivity and turnover, a contraction of profits or even the 
incurrence of losses with the consequent and gradual erosion of the available shareholders’ 
equity. More generally, if we attribute to companies the continuous creation of economic value 
as their main purpose (Guatri 1995), the state of crisis may be seen as the situation in which the 
business activity gradually erodes and destroys this value, with negative consequences on all 
corporate stakeholders (Buttignon 2008).  
To get the overall picture of the corporate crisis status, we need to take a step back and 
distinguish the concepts of decline or decay from those of crisis or distress. 
 
1.2.1.Decline 
Decline can manifest itself as a physiological stage in the business life and occurs in terms of 
loss of profitability (which often induces investment reductions), negative cash flows, loss of 
market shares, deterioration of sales and financial structure, loss of highly qualified managers 
and resources, loss of competitive advantages (Guatri 1995). The measurement and the 
developmental path of these income flows is not strictly linked to past performances, but it also, 
and especially, refers to future expected values. The entrance in this phase is due to the 
organization’s failure to anticipate or recognize and effectively neutralize external or internal 
pressures that could affect the long-term survival of the business (Weitzel & Jonsson 1989).  
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Looking at the characteristics that declining firms tend to share, Damodaran (2009) is able to 
summarize and generalize them as follows: 
• stagnant or declining revenues: the company is unable to increase revenues over 
extended periods of time, even if the macroeconomic conditions are positive. Actually, 
flat revenues or revenues which grow less than the inflation rate evince operating 
weaknesses; 
• shrinking or negative margins: the company is losing pricing power and it is decreasing 
prices to prevent a reduction in revenues. As a result, this will lead to a deterioration of 
operating income; 
• asset divestures: in the presence of substantial debt obligations, the firm will more 
frequently divest assets to honor its debt since its existing assets are sometimes more 
valuable to others who may put them to more profitable uses; 
• large payouts in the form of dividends and stock buybacks: if the debt for distress is not 
enough to be a concern, the firm will allot large dividends and buy back stocks with 
cash flows generated by its existing or divested assets, given the fewer growth 
investments; 
• overwhelming financial leverage: in the presence of stagnant earnings, the firm will 
have significant difficulties not only to pay back the debt it has contracted in the past, 
but it will also have troubles to refinance it because of more stringent provisions that 
lenders will require. 
 
1.2.2.Crisis 
When the negative trajectory of the decline condition is not promptly detected and the firm is 
not restored to health, the decay degenerates into crisis. It consists, therefore, of the full-blown 
and outward apparent phase of the decline; where the latter has become generally irreversible 
(Guatri 1995). Hermann (1963) formulates the organizational crisis definition along three 
dimensions affirming that it threatens high-priority values of the firm, it requires a limited 
amount of time in which a response can be made and it is unexpected or unanticipated by the 
company. This phase manifests itself, as a result of economic losses, with severe and growing 
cash flow losses whose direct repercussions will be the erosion of the firm’s credit capacity and 
loss of trust (Fedele & Antonucci 2015). Consequently, the organization will face difficulties 
to renew or assess to bank lending because of its weaker reputation.  
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When the distress comes to a pathologic stage, the condition of insolvency worsens, and the 
value of activities appear insufficient to guarantee debt reimbursements.  
Corporate crisis may be, moreover, studied according to the distinction between economic and 
financial distress. According to Buttignon (2020), a firm is economically distressed when its 
operating cash flows decline as a result of strategic problems such as industry dynamics and 
firm’s competitive positioning or operational inefficiencies in the firm’s processes and business 
model. Without a proper intervention, the company may become not viable anymore and its net 
present value as a going concern may be worth less than the value of its assets, were they to be 
separated from the business and liquidated apart (Crystal & Mokal 2006).   
On the other hand, the troubled company may be dealing only with a financial distress. In this 
case, the firm appears to be cash flow insolvent because of accumulated excess debt not in line 
with its actual and expected performance (Buttignon 2020). A company which is merely 
financially distressed is economically viable and its assets are more valuable as a going concern. 
Conversely, these assets are illiquid and the company’s capital structure is such that it is unable 
to fulfill its financial obligations (Crystal & Mokal 2006). 
According to Damodaran (2009), another side of corporate crisis to be assessed when analyzing 
decaying firms is the reversibility of this condition and the level (low or high) of the financial 
distress. This aspect should be questioned considering, case by case, a firm’s own history as 
well as the state of the other companies in the sector. A company which has faced and overcome 
cycles of positive and negative times is more likely to move back to health. Reasoning alike, a 
firm performing badly in a sector of healthy companies has problems related to its poor 
management. Conversely, a company that is doing badly in a poor performing sector has little 
hope to overturn its condition by changing managers. Depending on the combination of 
reversibility and financial distress, four possible outcomes will be presented: 
• reversible decline, low distress: the firm is facing flat revenues and declining margins 
which are assumed to be overturned with a better management in place, resulting in a 
higher firm value than the status quo one; 
• irreversible decline, low distress: operating improvements will not be sufficient to 
revalue the firm. Because of its low distress and, therefore, the low pressure on asset 
divestures, the firm can liquidate the assets in an orderly manner;  
• reversible decline, high distress: if managed properly, the decline will be reverted, but 
the presence of high distress may harm the firm’s ability to create value and may lead 
to a forced liquidation;  
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• irreversible decline, high distress: the resumption of the firm’s value creation activity is 
irreparably compromised. If the liquidation occurs, the proceeds from the sale will be 
lower than the low distress case. Moreover, equity investors will gain less from this 
option because of the poor-quality assets.  
Ultimately, the concept of crisis may be analyzed from a juridical perspective. In accordance 
with the European Directive on preventive restructuring frameworks and insolvency, the Italian 
legislator has introduced the “Crisis and Insolvency Code”.  
According to art. 2 of the code, a distinction between crisis and insolvency is provided. The 
crisis is defined as the state of economic and financial difficulty which is visible, in enterprises, 
as the inadequacy of the perspective cash flows to regularly meet the obligations planned. 
Insolvency is, instead, the inability of the debtor to regularly honor it financial liabilities.  
What has been discussed so far has had the objective to present in an orderly manner the most 
shared concepts of decline and crisis in the organizational literature. It appears that the threshold 
between the two phases is blurred, since decay and distress are highly correlated to each other 
and is not always convenient to separate the two concepts (Sirleo 2009). Aside from the chosen 
definition, it is commonly shared the distinction between economic and financial distress. The 
former is a consequence of the erosion of the operational performance of the firm which 
generates insufficient cash flows to pay back its liabilities. As a failure of the firm’s proper 
intervention, economic distress may lead to financial distress which is typically the result of a 
high leverage (Weitzel & Jonsson 1989).   
In conclusion, regardless of the definition of decline and crisis, the former can represent a 
relatively physiological passage of the life of a firm (Sirleo 2009), while the latter, when comes 
to a pathological stage as the degeneration of the corporate decay, occurs in terms of economic 
value destruction. The explosion of the crisis, therefore, clearly harms all of the firm’s 
stakeholder (Falini 2011).  
At this point, a detailed analysis of the corporate distress phenomenon in terms of its symptoms 
and causes, its developmental path and the commonly used methods to investigate it, will set 









1.3. Symptoms and causes of crisis 
Following different possible definitions of corporate crisis, it becomes essential to identify 
symptoms and causes at the origin of the deterioration of a firm’s performance and the erosion 
of its economic value over time. Indeed, a timely detection of these warning signs and their 
underlying reasons may interrupt the evolution into the crisis stage through a prompt corporate 
turnaround process.  
When analyzing a condition of corporate crisis, a careful distinction of symptoms and causes 
of distress enables the observer to get an overall picture of the situation. Slatter and Lovett 
(1999) described symptoms as “tell-tale signs” or “danger signals” which an insightful analyst 
outside the firm can discern. These premonitions enable the management to be alerted on what 
might be wrong with the firm and, concisely, it generally comes down to a status of “decadence” 
and “imbalances” (Guatri 1995).  
The possible symptoms indicating distress are numerous and could occur simultaneously in the 
firm. Indeed, their detection strongly depends on the observer’s perspective and his ability to 
retrieve an unbiased opinion. Slatter and Lovett (1999) investigated the trends leading to the 
crisis condition in relation to different groups of stakeholders1, internal and external, and with 
respect to three separate dimensions of the firm: the capital market, the business itself and the 
related financial information. Among the group of stakeholders, the informed reader and the 
shareholder constitute an interesting point of view. Perhaps the clearest and easily 
understandable warning signs are represented by the firm’s financial information. It should be 
noted at the eyes of the shareholder a decline in market share, in sales volume or a worsening 
of the product mix, a loss in terms of profitability and cash flows, a deterioration of the firm’s 
credit score. As a consequence of decline, the firm will attempt to raise new funds (debt of 
equity) from the capital market to plug its losses. Within the business, negative symptoms may 
be represented by the rapid senior management turnover and the loss of highly qualified 
personnel, a repeated failure of new product launches, a weaker reputation and corporate image, 
a worsening of relations with suppliers and the financial community.  
The approach in relation to the negative phase of the crisis status is, often times, preceded by 
these warning signs toward which the management shows a reluctant behavior in making 
themselves aware of the symptoms of distress (Guatri 1995), in supervising threats and taking 
corrective measures (Fedele & Antonucci 2015).  
 




Nevertheless, the main level of analysis is represented by the identification of the causes of 
distress towards which the literature provides comprehensive insights. In particular, Guatri 
(1995) brings forward an interesting analysis discerning between two approaches to define the 
causes of corporate crisis: the subjective approach and the objective approach.  
According to the first approach, the investigation of the causes is addressed towards the 
different categories of stakeholders, with a particular attention to the chief executive and the 
management team. Indeed, the origin of the crisis might be sought in their sheer incompetence 
in taking the best decisions for the company (Sirleo 2009), their lack of interest in the business 
(Slatter & Lovett 1999) and/or their delayed and insufficient interventions in distressed cases. 
According to Falini (2011), the internal composition of the management team affects the firm’s 
ability to react to difficulties. In this context if, on the one hand, a management team which 
shows heterogeneity with respect to cultural background and management skills, appears to be 
more suitable in distressed environments, on the other hand, the homogeneity facilitates the 
decision-making process which is critical in the first hints of decline (Hambrick et al. 1996).  
The subjective approach appears to be neither accurate nor complete to describe a complex 
phenomenon such as the corporate distress causes because many contingencies go beyond the 
control of the management team. Therefore, it appears desirable to apply an objective approach 
in determining the corporate crisis (Guatri 1995). Among the objective approach, a dualistic 
view is deployed by many scholars and academics such as Guatri (1995), Sciarelli (1995), 
Bibeault (1982), Slatter and Lovett (1999), Sirleo (2009), Falini (2011), Fedele and Antonucci 
(2015). Crisis causes have been, in fact, discerned between internal causes (strictly dependent 
on the business itself) and external causes (out of the firm’s control).  
Regarding internal causes of distress, the contribution of the literature may be re-elaborated 
into five main categories: 
1. Inefficiency: one or more business areas operate with lower returns than competitors present 
in the relevant markets for the firm. The productive function, typically, is the one which 
exhibits with more evidence signs of inefficiencies. Different reasons can explain a higher 
level of production costs: obsolescence of all or part of production assets, inadequate 
investments, organizational inefficiencies, the level of preparation and capacity of the 
personnel. Indeed, the commercial inefficiency is characterized by a mismatch between 
marketing costs and their actual performance. In the administrative area, an excessive 
degree of bureaucratization and severe shortcomings of the IT systems may compromise 
the firm’s well-functioning. 
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2. Overcapacity and/or stiffness: overcapacity is accompanied by the failure in quickly 
adapting to fixed costs arising therefrom. This inefficiency is primarily due to:  
a. long-lasting decline in the market demand across the whole industry; 
b. long-lasting market share losses; 
c. actual revenues not in line with the expectations, as a result of fixed investments; 
d. mismatch between the increase in costs and the level of prices subject to public 
control. 
3. Decay of the products: this inefficiency derives from the firm’s weaknesses in facing and 
controlling its own market. In fact, the offered products mix results to be, usually gradually, 
ineffective with respect to the customers’ needs and the level of competition in the market. 
As a result, the firm loses market shares and achieves product margins below the level 
required to guarantee enough profit. Product decadence might be due to an erroneous 
product mix, margin developments related to the product lifecycle, lack or post acquisition 
services, insufficient investments in R&D and fruitless marketing campaigns. 
4. Lack of programming and innovation: substantially, the firm is unable to anticipate, analyze 
and adapt its business management to external environmental changes. There is a strong 
focus on the short term with the consequent ineptitude in establishing well defined 
objectives. The lack of innovation, indeed, lies on the firm’s inability to grow into new 
products, new markets and to, broadly speaking, exploit new opportunities. 
5. Financial imbalances: the firm is characterized by excessive leverage, insufficient liquidity 
reserves, temporal imbalances between sources and uses, a prevalence of short-term debt 
with respect to the other types of indebtedness, missed payments on the agreed dates with 
suppliers.  This inefficiency affects both the profitability of the company, as it generates 
economic losses, and the possibility of accessing the capital market as well as negotiating 
credit conditions. Financial imbalances are amplified when the firm has insufficient capital 
strength which does not allow to cover its operating losses and promptly take remedial 
measures, thus accelerating the downturn spiral of the crisis.  
The external causes of crisis regard, indeed, macro-economic factors and industry factors, 
which consist of the uncontrollable characteristics of the outside environments where the 
company operates. Among the most common exogenous macro-economic factors, it is worth 
mentioning changes in market demand, the lack of an efficient banking system and a proper 
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regulation, the volatility of the interest rate or the exchange rate, adverse movements in 
commodity prices such as raw materials and property prices.  
In addition, Sciarelli (1995) included, among the possible external causes of crisis, 
extraordinary or/and catastrophic events such as natural disasters, among which, for example, 
flood or earthquakes, or health crisis, as the still present global Covid-19 pandemic.    
Instead, factors which impact on the industry dynamic consist of factors affecting the industry 
as a whole, such as changes in customers’ needs, a strong competition, social or technological 
shifts and changes in regulations.  
However, according to a research conducted by Bibeault (1982) on 300 case studies, in 
approximately 4 out of 5 cases decline was due to internal causes. Nevertheless, exogenous 
factors may exacerbate a firm which is already facing inefficiency troubles. In practice, a chain 
of interrelated internal and external multiple causal factors can be identified in most situations 
(Slatter & Lovett 1999) and can affect the company’s survival.  
For this reason, it appears difficult to give a fully comprehensive checklist of all possible causes 
which can affect the corporate stability. What is certain is that the firm’s analysis must be 
conducted adopting both a micro-economic and a macro-economic approach in light of the 
dialectic between the external and internal organizational environment.  
 
 
1.4. Stages of crisis development 
It is not an easy task to precisely identify each stage which a corporation, facing a decline, will 
get through. In fact, each firm is unique in its kind and the level of crisis severity might be 
different and caused by various factors, such as the company’s size and free assets available 
(Smith & Graves 2005).  
Nevertheless, decline can be conceptualized by identifying characteristics that can occur at 
various stages along a decline continuum. This schematization attempt represents a useful tool 
for managers to approximately position the firm’s distress in order to understand and design a 
proper intervention plan to restore the value of the company. 
A first pattern of the stages of corporate crisis development will be hereafter presented in Figure 
1.1, as a personal re-elaboration of the frameworks introduced by Weitzel and Jonsson (1989) 
and Riva et al. (2018). It should be considered that the different stages are indicated as being of 




Figure 1.1 – The stages of corporate crisis development. (Personal elaboration from Weitzel 
and Jonsson (1989), Riva et al. (2018))  
The first stage of corporate crisis development is called “blinded stage”. Firms in the first stage 
of decline are unable to recognize internal and external changes that can threaten their long-
term survival. Every firm has some areas of blindness but the success in recognizing the first 
symptoms of a possible decline depends on the organization’s effectiveness (Hedberg et al. 
1976). Indeed, in this stage, negative pressures do not have a manifestation in financial reports 
yet because of a supportive environment, sufficient resources available or a time lag before the 
actual impact on the business. To avoid the “blinded stage”, a good information flow and 
efficient methods of internal surveillance are needed in order to prevent an incubation of the 
crisis.  
If a management intervention does not occur, the firm faces the second stage denominated 
“inaction stage” where the crisis maturity is visible. A long-lasting inaction can lead the 
corporation towards a deterioration in terms of profits, declining sales and surplus inventories, 
large enough to become observable by organizational members. The lack of action can be due 
to two possible reasons, according to Miller and Friesen (1980): first, the threat may be seen as 
temporary and, second, corrective actions are generally costly and disruptive. 
The “inaction stage” is negatively overcome by the “faulty action stage” when the inattention 
to stage two issues persist long enough. In this phase more significant financial imbalances 
appear and expected cash flows are inadequate to regularly meet planned obligations.      
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Because of the signs of possible insolvencies, the relationship with the financial community is 
fundamental to the firm’s survival. The management must transparently demonstrate the 
existence of business strength factors and substantial reorganizational and restructuring plans 
must be presented in order to revert the crisis (Riva et al. 2018).  
When the organization reaches stage four, the full “crisis stage” or “reversible insolvency”, it 
means the management has unsuccessfully attempted to deal with its inefficiencies and all 
stakeholders become aware of the corporate financial distress. In this phase, the firm is not able 
to honor its debt repayment with its insufficient cash flow generation. The prescription for a 
recovery from the “reversible insolvency” requires a major reorganization and turnaround 
which must be substantive and not simply aimed at short-term survival.  
In the “dissolution stage” the full insolvency of the company become irreversible: financial 
reconstruction goals have not been successfully achieved and sufficient fresh financial 
resources cannot be available anymore. The firm is characterized by a condition of capital 
depletion, loss of market shares and reputation such that, in unforgiving environments, no 
choice but going for assets sale, bankruptcy proceedings or move to the actual dissolution are 
left.   
Another interesting and worth mentioning analysis of the corporate crisis path is the pattern 
presented by Buttignon (2008), which draws the dynamic declination of firms distress with 
respect to the time relation between free cash flows, going concern value, nominal value of debt 
and capital liquidation value in three different stages: potential crisis, reversible crisis and 
irreversible crisis (Figure 1.2).  
Figure 1.2 – The corporate distress stages. (Buttignon 2008) 
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The first stage is characterized by a situation of “potential crisis”, where future operating free 
cash flows are expected to be negative and inertially attended to lose value over time as a result 
of different market and industry specific factors. Nevertheless, in this stage, the firm’s going 
concern value follows a decreasing dynamic, but it is still higher than the nominal value of debt, 
which is expected to increase over time in the light of liquidity needs due to losses in operating 
free cash flows. A timeliness intervention is necessary to reverse course and it includes the 
identification of the structural causes of distress, the further implementation of a business 
turnaround plan and a revision of the financial structure, in terms of debt rescheduling or new 
debt issues. 
If, due to an organizational inertia or/and ineffectiveness of the turnaround plans, the firm 
overcomes the critical point of distress and the “potential crisis” becomes a “reversible crisis”. 
In this scheme, the going concern value has declined until it equalled the nominal value of debt 
but still being higher than the liquidation value: now the crisis manifests itself in an effective 
form. In this phase, the nominal value of debt is assumed increasing, as a result of the worsening 
of the operating performance, and the liquidation value is considered degressive. It firmly 
appears now the need to stop the fall in the going concern value and the increase in the 
indebtedness, intervening through a severe strategic turnaround and financial restructuring. 
This might require a debt rescheduling in the form of debt write-offs for capital rights 
concessions.  
When the liquidation value overcomes the firm’s going concern value, the crisis enters its 
irreversible stage. The use of a liquidation procedure is not only efficient but also justified by 
the need to recover value and it might occur in different forms. The firm can undertake the 
break-up of the business system, deploy separate no-entity specific assets or, taking hybrid 
initiatives, can split separate business units whose potential going concern value is higher than 
the liquidation value.  
Whatever corporate crisis developmental pattern is chosen, what emerges is than an early 
recognition of the warning signs of a distress is essential in implementing an efficient 
turnaround plan which can break the downturn spiral of the crisis, aiming at avoiding a “death 
struggle” phase and the potential failure of the business (Hambrick & D’Aveni 1988). 





1.5. Methods of distress risk assessment 
Companies’ imbalances, as has already been said, can be understood as measures of symptoms 
or negative factors, detectors of critical conditions or instability and, fundamentally, of high 
risk of decline. Thus, what discriminates a distressed company which survives from one which 
results in liquidation is flexibility (Fedele & Antenucci 2015). This concept refers to the ability 
of the governing body to detect the warning signs of decline or distress and quickly adapt and 
reallocate resources in response to external and internal changes in efficiency.  
Above all, managers should be aware of the business performance in order to promptly identify 
any sign of financial or operating weaknesses and wisely analyze their underlying causes in 
order to be in the position to design a proper turnaround process (Guatri 1995).  
An internal business analysis, indeed, also confirms the needs of different stakeholders 
concerned in not seeing their position of interest affected. 
Different methods to identify corporate distress may be implemented and commonly divided 
by the literature between: 
• Methods based on intuition 
• Methods based on ratio analysis 
• Methods based on models 
• Methods based on capital markets 
Specifically, the last set of methods allows to measure the extent of the crisis in terms of 
probability of default.   
 
1.5.1.Methods based on intuition 
According to Guatri (1995), the first approach towards the recognisability and predictability of 
corporate crises is founded on methods based on intuition and approximate estimates. These 
methods rely on the external recognition of symptoms of decay and imbalances, visible in 
different degrees to the overall group of stakeholders.  
Examples of these warning signs are well-known and shall include: belonging to declining 
sectors or in difficulty due to temporary deficiencies in demand, loss of market shares, operating 
or administrative inefficiencies, imbalances regarding the capital structure, profitability and 
sources of financing. 
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Table 1.1 summarizes the most common external factors that are indicators of a crisis and gives 







Belonging to mature or 
declining sectors 
High Low 
Belonging to sectors in distress 
due to declining demand 
High Low 
Loss of market shares Medium Medium 
Production inefficiencies Low High 




Exodus of highly qualified 
personnel 
Medium Medium 
Rigid cost structure Medium Medium 
Lack of planning and innovation Low High 
Low R&D investments Medium High 
Deterioration of relations with 
clients and suppliers 
Medium Medium 
Financial imbalances: 
- High leverage 
- Deterioration of financial 
structure 
- Increasing risk of 
insolvency and consequent 
deterioration of the relations 
with the financial 
community 
High Medium 
Balance sheet imbalances High Medium 
Table 1.1 – Crisis signals, their external recognizability and possibility of resolution. (Personal 
elaboration from Guatri (1995) and Sirleo (2009)) 
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1.5.2.Methods based on ratio analysis  
According to Mears (1966), the analysis of financial statements and the following calculation 
of accounting ratios merely represents an important step in the overall process of a firm’s 
failure2 investigation. In particular, their usefulness is linked to the potential to bring to light 
corporate disequilibrium comparing a firm’s ratios over an extended time horizon or in relation 
to other firms operating in the same industry or sector through a peer analysis.  
In particular, the literature has been able to group the different financial ratios in four main 
categories related to companies’ profitability, liquidity, capital structure and working capital. 
Profitability ratios explore a company’s ability to generate income during a time period in 
response to its revenues, shareholders’ equity, balance sheet assets or operating costs. In these 
cases, a ratio reduction can reflect an initial warning sign of the deterioration in the value 
creation capability of a firm.  
Among profitability ratios, of a significant application are: 
• ROE: it measures the ability to earn returns on equity investments. A particularly high 
ROE may indicate that the firm is able to find very advantageous investment 
opportunities (Berk & DeMarzo 2014). It shall, however, indicate a value creation 
condition only if it is higher than the average return on similar investments, at equal 
risk. Indeed, the main criticism moved to this ratio is referred to its mixture between 
operating performance and capital structure, representing more the value creation for 
shareholders rather than the overall business profitability.   
• ROA: it is measured relative to costs and expenses and compared to total assets to assess 
how effectively a company is deploying assets to generate sales and profits. ROA, as a 
performance index, has the advantage of a lower sensitivity to the indebtedness, 
compared to ROE, but it is sensitive to changes in the working capital. 
• ROS: it evaluates a company’s operational efficiency through the measurement of total 
sales that are converted into net income. It allows to conduct internal business trend 
examinations and, indeed, its enforceability on peer analysis is limited since it requires 
comparisons with firms operating in the same industry, ideally with similar business 
models and annual sales figures.   
 
2 Mears (1966), Beaver (1966) refer to the term failure as the inability of a firm to repay its financial obligations 
at the due date. Regarding a company’s operations, failure materializes in bankruptcy, bond default, an overdrawn 




• ROIC: Koller et al. (2015) asserted than ROIC is the more suitable ratio in qualifying a 
business performance and its profitability trend, given the considerations previously 
made. In particular, value creation occurs when ROIC is higher than the firm’s cost of 
capital. Hence, a ratio which is gradually shrinking below the cost of capital may 
constitute a relevant red flag of operating inefficiencies and corporate distressed. 
Another ratio category, through which to identify the warning signs of the crisis in terms of 
short-term liquidity deficits, investigates the liquidity and solvency of a firm. The ability to 
meet shorter terms debt obligations, with the available liquid or easily disposable assets, is 
examined against the most widespread liquidity ratios: 
• Quick ratio: quick or acid test ratio investigates a company’s near-term financial 
solidity, therefore, its ability to keep up with short-term debt payments. According to 
Johri and Maheshwari (2015), an ideal quick ratio is right around 1:1, meaning that the 
firm has just enough liquid assets to cover its debt repayments. A low ratio causes 
concern with external investors and creditors because of the heavy reliance on efficient 
inventory turnover.  
• Current ratio: it measures the company’s solvency i.e. its ability to pay its current 
liabilities with the current assets available. Commonly, a ratio of 2:1 or higher is 
considered as a safe margin which can represent a good buffer for creditors even in the 
unfortunate event of a moderate margin reduction (Johri & Maheshwari 2015). 
• Operating cash flow ratio: it measures to which extent current liabilities are covered by 
operating cash flows. Differently from the current ratio, this index assumes cash flow 
generated from operations to pay current liabilities, thus, a valid relation in considered 
to be 1:1. 
Capital structure ratios describe the company’s long-term capital and, therefore, its source of 
funding in supporting a proper operation and solvency. Imbalances and unsustainability in the 
capital structure can be the preconditions for a financial distress.  
The strength of a firm’s capital structure is assessed based, among others, on the following 
commonly used ratios: 
• Interest coverage ratio: a commonly used interest coverage ratio is EBIT on interest 
expenses, and it measures the margin of safety a firm has for covering its current interest 
payments with its available earnings. According to Berk and DeMarzo (2014), a ratio 
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below 1,5 may represent a concern for lenders, worried about the company’s ability to 
repay its debts. 
• Debt-to-equity: it measures the extent to which the enterprise makes use of debt as a 
source of financing. An acceptable limit of financial leverage is usually 2:1, with no 
more than one-third of indebtedness in long term. A high ratio entails an aggressive 
recourse to debt as the main source of financing and, thus, high risk in the sustainability 
of the company’s capital structure (Johri & Maheshwari 2015). 
Besides, ratio analysis as a corporate distress investigation method, should explore how 
efficiently the firm is utilizing its net working capital and, specifically, this lays down of the 
measurement of the company’s account receivable days, account payable days and inventory 
days. Even if these ratios can fluctuate seasonally, a significant unexplained increase may 
represent a cause for concern and the first warning signs of decline. For example, the firm could 
be poorly performing or trying to boost sales offering beneficial credit terms (Berk & DeMarzo 
2014). 
Another worth mentioning index is price-earnings ratio (P/E) and it represents the value of 
equity on the firm’s earnings. It is used to appraise if a stock is over or undervalued on the idea 
that the stock price should reflect the level of value it can generate to shareholders. Since it 
considers the firm’s equity, it is sensitive to leverage choices and, accordingly, of a limited 
usefulness when comparing companies with considerably different leverage3. 
The main frequently used ratios when investigating a possible decline or distress are reported 




























3 This limitation is avoidable, indeed, assessing the underlying business market value using valuation ratios based 















𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 (𝑜𝑟 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡)𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
 
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡









𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 =
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒




𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑑𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
 
 
Table 1.2 – Distress risk assessment through financial ratios. (Personal elaboration from Berk 
and DeMarzo (2014), Johri and Maheshwari (2015)) 
As Beaver (1966) asserted, the corporate distress predictive ability of financial ratios, first, lies 
on the accuracy and clearness of the underlying financial statements: in fact, opaque accounting 
documents may lead to misleading results.  
Nevertheless, the usefulness and convenience of financial ratio analysis, as a first detection of 
economic or financial distress, is irrefutable for all of a firm’s stakeholders. In particular, the 
historical trends of financial ratios can be used to make inferences about a firm’s financial 
condition and the efficiency of its operations and, in case of distress, it allows to assess its 













1.5.3.Methods based on models 
The aforementioned studies of Beaver (1966) have shown a definite potential of the analysis of 
financial ratios to detect the foreseeability of a firm’s operating and financial distress. His 
studies, furthermore, have set the basis for an improvement upon traditional techniques in order 
to provide a multivariate profile of companies.  
Of a particular relevance was the study carried out by Altman (1968), who examined the 
reliability of the multiple discriminant model as a predictive technique of a corporate 
bankruptcy4. In this study, five ratios describing firm’s liquidity, profitability, leverage and 
solvency were selected for the goodness of their prediction of corporate bankruptcy and set the 
basis of the so-called Z-score discriminant function, which assigned a score to each publicly 
traded firm considered as a result of historical data analysis (Figure 1.3). 
 
Figure 1.3 – The Z-score model. (Altman 1968) 
As a result, this model has the advantage to select a “cut-off” point and assign a Z-score to each 
firm in order to classify it as economically and financially healthy or under bankruptcy risk. In 
particular, all firms having a Z-score greater than 2,99 fall into the healthy or non-bankrupt 
sector, while those having a score below 1,81 are considered to be bankrupt. Indeed, the 
intermediate score zone (between 1,81 and 2,99) is called “grey area” or “zone of ignorance” 
because results were proved to exhibit ambiguity and the susceptibility to error classification.  
According to the results obtained by Altman (1968), the bankruptcy prediction model was an 
accurate forecaster of failure up to two years prior to bankruptcy and it was a successful tool 
for internal corporate control considerations and a valuable technique for screening out 
unprofitable investments.  
 
4 From Altman’s study (1968), the term bankruptcy was referred to those firms which filed bankruptcy petitions 




Since Altman (1968) implemented this model for publicly traded firms, excluding small and 
very large companies, he decided to deploy a further re-estimation in order to adapt it to 
privately held entities, as displayed in Figure 1.4.  
 
 
Figure 1.4 – The private firm Z-score model. (Altman 1993)  
Given its diffusion and success, the Z-score model has represented the basis for further 
adaptations made by different academicians, for example, in Italy, we had the contributions of 
Alberici (1975), Cascioli and Provasoli (1984), Appetiti (1984), Forestieri and Cifarelli (1985). 
According to Ohlson (1980), previous studies seem to have overstated the forecasting power of 
models developed and, in fact, among the criticisms levelled at the multivariate discriminant 
analysis of Altman (1968), one concerns the output of the model due to the reduced intuitiveness 
of the score obtained, without reference to the bankruptcy probability5.  
The so-called O-score model of Ohlson (1980), indeed, overcame this and other disadvantages 
as it adopted the conditional logit model. Through the adoption of a probabilistic approach, the 
O-score results in a value between 0 and 1 as a representation of a firm’s probability of default. 
Nine statistically significant financial statements indicators are adopted because of their ability 
to capture: the size of the firm, its financial structure and performance, and its current liquidity, 
as follows (Figure 1.5). 
 
5 For the purposes of this thesis, probability of bankruptcy and probability of default are referred to the same 





Figure 1.5 – The O-score model. (Ohlson 1980) 
As asserted by Resti and Sironi (2007), credit scoring models, as those previously proposed, 
can be used for estimating the borrower’s risk level or for a default forecasting, in terms of 
companies’ probability of distress. Despite the wide field of applicability, it is necessary to pay 
attention to few limitations. In fact, the meaningfulness of the independent variables used by 
scoring models may change over time due to different factors such as the effect of the economic 
cycle and financial market variables. Moreover, these models fail to consider qualitative factors, 
including the company’s reputation and management quality, the stage of the economic cycle 
and the outlook of the industry.  
 
1.5.4.Methods based on capital markets 
Capital market models estimate the probability of default with reference to the market 
availability of the price of stocks and bonds as an input (Resti & Sironi 2007). 
A first application of this approach can be found in the estimation of the cumulative probability 
of distress over a specific time horizon. In particular, rating agencies assign a rating class to 
each company and, therefore, associate to each class a specific probability of default based on 
bonds historical data of default. Among others, Altman (2007) has evaluated the cumulative 






Cumulative Probability of Default 















































Table 1.3 – Bond rating and probability of default. (Altman 2007) 
According to Damodaran (2009), this approach presents few limitations as well. In fact, it 
delegates the computation of default probabilities to rating agencies, assuming to trust their 
analysis and considering that ratings standards do not change over time. Additionally, default 
probabilities reported in Table 1.3 are referred to bonds issued but do not furnish information 
on the underlying business.  
A different approach proposed by Damodaran (2009) allows to estimate the probability of 
default from the calculation of a bond price as the discount of its expected cash flows at the 
risk-free rate (𝑟𝑓). Adopting a constant annual probability of default (𝜋𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠) and considering 
a bond with fixed coupons maturing in N years, its price will be: 










𝑡=1   
This method allows to extrapolate the probability of default in conjunction with the price of a 
traded corporate bond, knowing its coupon rate and residual maturity.  
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What we retrieve is an annualized probability of default, ignoring that this probability will be 
higher in the earlier years and decline later.  
Despite its immediateness, this method requires straight listed bonds whose coupon repayments 
are assumed either fully paid or not at all. In addition, the estimated probabilities may be 
different for diverse bonds issued by the same company and, thus, failure in fulfilling debt 
obligations does not always results in operations cessation (Damodaran 2006). 
A second approach based on the information retrieved from capital markets finds its roots in 
the Option Pricing Model developed by Black and Scholes (1973) and first applied to default 
risk by Merton (1974). These models, and their variants, are known as structural models 
because of the focus on the structural characteristics of a company that affect its probability of 
default. 
In the Merton’s model (1974) it is assumed that the firm has just one liability, i.e. a zero-coupon 
bond which requires the repayment of the amount F, at time T, in a lump sum, and has a market 
value of B. Thus, the market value of the firm’s assets (V) fluctuates over time partially 
unpredictably and, thereafter, the following geometric Brownian motion could describe their 
instantaneous percent changes in V (dV/V) (Resti & Sironi 2007): 
𝑑𝑉
𝑉
= 𝜇𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑣𝑑𝑧 = 𝜇𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑣𝜀√𝑑𝑡 
where 𝜇 is the expected instantaneous return on the assets, 𝑑𝑧 is the random noise and 𝜎𝑣 is the 
rate of variability of the geometric Brownian motion.  
Visually, the stochastic evolution of assets returns and the uncertainty regarding their future 
dynamic increases over the time horizon, as shown in Figure 1.6. 
Figure 1.6 – The logic behind the Merton’s model: default probability. (Resti & Sironi 2007) 
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As reported in Figure 1.6, the model is based on the intuition that a firm defaults when the value 
of its assets turns to be lower than the value of its liabilities.  
Graphically, Merton (1974) represents the probability of default as the area under the normal 
distribution which depicts all negative assets yields that are large enough to lead the value of 
assets at maturity T to be lower than the repayment value of the debt: (𝑉𝑇 < 𝐹).  
In this specific case, shareholders make a loss on the risk capital invested in the firm and when 
the capital value is annulled, i.e. 𝑉𝑇 < 𝐹, they already lost everything they could.  
Nevertheless, due to the principle of limited liability, shareholders have the option of handling 
over the firm to their creditors rather than committing to repay the company’s debt. This 
circumstance could be considered as a put option that the firm’s lenders have granted to 
shareholders on the assets value, with a strike price equal to the face value of debt (F) at maturity 
T. Through the model originally developed by Black and Scholes (1973), the put option price 
can be calculated as follows: 
𝑃0 = 𝐹𝑒
−𝑟𝑇𝑁(−𝑑2) − 𝑁(−𝑑1)𝑉0 











𝑑2 = 𝑑1 − 𝜎𝑉√𝑇 
The company’s probability of default can, thereafter, be expressed as the probability that the 
market value of its assets will be lower than the repayment value of debt at maturity T, which 
corresponds to the exercise probability of the put option, which can be computed as: 
𝑝 = Pr(𝑉𝑇 < 𝐹) = 𝑁(−𝑑2) = 1 − 𝑁(−𝑑2) 
The probability of default obtained (𝑝) is a risk-neutral probability of default due to the 
substitution of the expected return on assets (µ) with the risk-free rate (r).  
Ceteris paribus, the probability of default increases as: 
• the beginning market value of assets (𝑉0) decreases; 
• the nominal value of debt (F) increases; 
• the volatility of the market value of assets (𝜎𝑉) increases; 
• the debt maturity (T) increases. 
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The Merton’s model, despite its effectiveness in showing which factors drive a firm’s 
probability of default, have few limitations when shifting from pure theory to the actual practice 
(Resti & Sironi 2007): 
• the too simplistic assumption of the zero-coupon bond liability that requires an interest 
and principal repayment in a lump sum upon maturity. In real life, companies are 
characterized by complex capital structures and default may occur at any time, 
regardless of the maturity of their liabilities; 
• few model’s inputs, particularly the market value of assets and the volatility of assets 
yields, may not be directly observable on the market; 
• the assumption of the standard normal distribution of asset returns may not be realistic; 
• the assumption of constant risk-free interest rates which, moreover, does not allow for 
an investigation of the relation between interest rate risk and equity risk. 
An extension of the Merton’s model has made it possible to overcome few of the 
aforementioned limitations. The so-called KMV6 model, belonging to the structural model 
category, takes a two-step approach in the computation of the probability of default.  
First of all, the process allows to compute the value of the distance point (DP), considered to 
be the critical default threshold and measured as all short-term debt (STD) plus 50% of long-
term debt (LTD): 




This way, the KMV model overcomes the simplistic assumption of the Merton’s model and 
takes into account a more realistic company where activities are financed with a combination 
of both short-term and long-term debt. Although it is important that the assets value remain 
higher than the short-term debt value, the firm does not become insolvent if the value of assets 
falls below the total value of debt, considering that the long-term debt needs to be repaid in a 
more distant future.  
 
 
6 KMV was a California-based firm acquired by Moody’s Investor Services in 2002 and its acronym comes from 




After the computation of the default point, it is possible to calculate the distance to default 
(DD), as the difference between the assets value and the default point, divided by the product 





Thereafter, once the firm’s distance to default is known, the KMV model coverts it into a 
probability of default, defined as the expected default frequency (EDF), according to a database 
of historical data.   
The model developed by KMV has gained great popularity because of its advantages, other 
besides the estimation of a company’s probability of default. In fact, probabilities of default 
quickly adapt to changes in the financial conditions of the company being analyzed primarily 
because expected default frequencies are based on highly forward-looking market data (Resti 
& Sironi 2007). Furthermore, contrary to default rates assigned by rating agencies, expected 
default frequencies do not significantly oscillate with changes in economic cycles. 
Notwithstanding the benefits associated to the adoption of the KMV model, it presents 
limitations common to capital market models. Its applicability does not include the computation 
of probabilities of default of unlisted companies, since their market value and equity volatility 
are unavailable. Secondly, if the assumption that equity markets are informationally efficient is 
lacking, i.e. if capital markets are inefficient, illiquid or unable to properly mirror all available 
information, such data becomes unreliable (Resti & Sironi 2007). 
In conclusion, regardless of the approach chosen for the computation of the probability of 
default, it is clear that there is no infallible method and that each of them is subject to limitations 














During the past decades corporate restructuring has become a staple in the life of companies 
due to the pervasiveness of its role. Thus, once distress has been detected, hopefully early 
enough to guarantee the business going concern assumption, the management will have the key 
task of selecting the proper restructuring instrument. In fact, the turnaround initiatives envisage 
a wide range of actions thanks to different characteristics which, combined, try to meet different 
needs. In this regard, after an initial review of turnaround process models (Paragraph 2.2.1.), 
Chapter II will sift through informal, hybrid and formal restructuring procedures.  
In a first instance, the management will contemplate the availability of out-of-court 
restructurings, also known as private workouts, in respect of the specific business condition in 
terms of crisis severity and restructuring requirements (Paragraph 2.2.). The announcement of 
these tools may have a more or less positive effect on the market depending on the impact they 
have on investors (Paragraph 2.3.) and these strategies are commonly categorized by the 
turnaround literature into four main clusters: managerial, operational, portfolio and financial 
restructuring (Paragraph 2.2.2., 2.2.3., 2.2.4., 2.2.5.). They all share flexibility in negotiation, 
cost savings and limited damages to corporate reputation as compared to court supervised 
proceedings but, nonetheless, they may present challenges in reaching an economically efficient 
outcome. These include, for instance, conflicting incentives of claimants regarding the business 
liquidation or continuation decision, their inability to reach an agreement which may trigger, 
consequently, collective action or holdout issues (Paragraph 2.4.). When these and other 
circumstances make it impossible to implement a contractual solution, the legislator provide for 
legal processes entailing the supervision of the bankruptcy court.  
In this context, Paragraph 2.5. is dedicated to the Italian insolvency system which governs a 
series of crisis mitigation tools, strongly oriented to the conservation and recovery of the 
business through the enhancement of an agreement between the debtor and creditors. The 
choice of the entrepreneur, depending on whether the insolvency is potential or manifest, falls 
mainly on four procedures, namely certificate plan, debt restructuring agreement, composition 
with creditors and bankruptcy, that offer protection to the debtor against the creditor’s actions 
and entail a growing degree of juridical intervention.   
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2.2. Out-of-court turnaround strategies 
By the time the corporate distress manifest itself in terms of performance and income 
deterioration, it becomes imperative to pinpoint and adopt the most suitable solution to deal 
with the crisis and preserve the business value and the interests of all stakeholders.                          
In this regard, different possible paths are accessible to the company, but the proper strategy 
identification requires the adoption of an entity-based approach, given the unique nature of the 
individual firm and the external context in which it operates.  
In this regard, corporate turnaround has become a pillar of management life. According to 
Schendel et al. (1976), this concept refers to the company’s decline and recovery from distress. 
Thus, turnaround strategies concern the reversal of organizational performance (Chowdhury 
2002) and can be defined as the set of directives, consequential and long-term measures targeted 
at the reversal of distress (Cater & Schwab 2008). In particular, turnaround occurs when the 
company has survived through an “existence-threatening” performance distress and has, finally, 
restored its profitability through a sustainable recovery process widely acceptable by its 
stakeholders (Robbins & Pearce 1992, Pretorius 2009). 
Taking a step backwards, in material terms, the choice standing in front of the company falls 
between corporate turnaround and liquidation. An essential precondition for corporate 
restructuring shall consist of the viability of the business, ascertained through an exhaustive 
analysis of the current operating health and financial capabilities of the company (Garrido 
2012). The enforcement of a turnaround process requires the firm’s going concern value to be 
substantially higher than its liquidation value (Hofer 1980). Conversely, if the business is not 
viable, a turnaround strategy would only delay the unavoidable demise of the company and 
absorb substantial time and resources; in this case, the liquidation process would be a more 
efficient alternative (Hofer 1980, Garrido 2012).  
On the other hand, in formal terms, the corporate turnaround decision comes down to an out-
of-court or an in-court restructuring. The latter corporate restructuring mechanism entails the 
formal supervision of the juridical authority and the bankruptcy court, being generally regarded 
as a public solution (Altman et al. 2019). Indeed, the out-of-court restructuring is also known 
as workout or private mechanism because of its lack of juridical intervention. The company 
workout concerns altering the structure of assets and liabilities with the objective to recover 
growth, promote efficiency and minimize the costs associated to the firm’s financial distress 
(Garrido 2012).  
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Secondly, the management choice of the more adequate turnaround strategies should 
encompass three common guiding principles: efficiency, timeliness and fairness (Buttignon 
2008).  Applying the efficiency principle to the crisis management means reflecting on the most 
valuable utilization of the distressed company’s assets. In this regard, the best solution concerns 
the allocation of the firm’s accumulated resources in their most productive configuration, which 
envisages not only the value of individual assets, but also having regard of the value generated 
from their combinatorial proprieties. The principle of timeliness, thereafter, is key in corporate 
distress management and represents a variation of the efficiency concept in a dynamic sense. 
From this perspective, the management should take prompt and timely actions in order to stem 
the deterioration of the economic value of capital, in terms both of enterprise value and 
liquidation value. The postponement of a distressed situation, indeed, may have a negative 
impact on the firm’s reputation, resulting in a decrease in the economic value of the company’s 
assets, especially for the intangible ones, and it may generate more and more important 
difficulties in carrying out the investments necessary for the maintenance and strengthening of 
entity-specific resources and skills. Ultimately, the fairness should support efficiency and 
timeliness principles so as to equitably allocate costs and benefits between the different 
stakeholders. After all, an acceptable combination of efficiency, timeliness and fairness can 
lead to a concretely viable solution for the management of corporate crisis.   
The following paragraphs illustrate the fundamental characteristics of out-of-court turnaround 
strategies, with a focus on its process model and the commonly adopted content taxonomy, 
namely (Schweizer & Nienhaus 2017): 
• Managerial restructuring 
• Operational restructuring 
• Portfolio restructuring 
• Financial restructuring  
Concisely, managerial restructuring provides for the top management team replacement, 
covering a detached category of operational restructuring which, in turn, broadly entails a 
myriad of activities targeting efficiency enhancements. On the other hand, portfolio and 
financial restructuring represent, respectively, a more severe change of the company’s asset and 
capital structure. Although each restructuring strategy will be discussed separately in the 
following paragraphs, it is important to underline how firms generally do not limit themselves 
to adopting a single recovery approach, taking into consideration, indeed, the pervasiveness of 
the corporate crisis phenomenon in relation to its interdependencies.  
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2.2.1.Turnaround process models  
Although most research on corporate turnaround has focused on how companies can move 
away from a debilitating performance deterioration to a sustainable success, it is possible to 
detect the process dimension through few contributions analyzing the different turnaround 
phases. The turnaround process may be investigated as a dynamic sequence of events describing 
internal arrangements aimed at the company’s performance recovery (Van de Ven & Poole 
1995). Despite the attempt to conceptualize the turnaround process through descriptive patterns, 
it is important to keep in mind that different firms may proceed at substantially different rates 
through a phase of turnaround and, therefore, the models presented below should not be lifted 
to universal schemes (Chowdhury 2002). Nevertheless, in all turnarounds almost the same 
stages are discernable and, although they may not be physically distinguishable, different 
turnarounds may be juxtaposed on each phases’ core concepts.  
Among the first contributions to support the multistage approach is that of Bibeault (1982) who, 
as well as various scholars, argued that organizational turnaround is typically achieved through 
a two-phase process. In his view, the primary aims for the economically distressed firm are the 
attainment of a positive cash flow and the business survival. The achievement of this status is 
made possible through an initial phase characterized by an emergency plan, the purpose of 
which is to “stop the bleeding”, and a stabilization plan to improve and speed up firm’s core 
operations. These plans together constitute the business retrenchment stage which is 
predominantly targeted to establish a short-term stability during distress. The second phase 
proposed by Bibeault (1982), the so-called recovery stage, encompasses return to growth and 
development objectives. Thereafter, it is necessary to envision a decision point between the two 
phases, which clarifies the definitive direction of the turnaround process. Specifically, upon 
stabilization, the company must define either to formulate an essentially unaltered strategy, but 
in its “retrenchment-reduced form”, or whether it will pursue a new recovery strategy with an 
emphasis on growth.  Bibeault (1982), along with Hofer (1980), argues that the duration and 
pervasiveness of the retrenchment stage should be consistent with the severity of financial 
distress and the causes which compromised the business profitability, as seen in Paragraph 1.3.  
As stated by Pearce and Robbins (1993), Bibeault’s (1982) major contribution to the turnaround 
process literature was the consideration of retrenchment7 as a standalone concept which should 
set the basis for further recovery activities.  
 
7 The literature support toward this conceptualization of the turnaround process goes so far that, for example, 
Eichner (2010) argues that retrenchment is not only inevitable but, in many cases, firms should consider this stage 
as an obligatory antecedent to an efficient recovery stage.   
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It is in the light of this assessment that the aforementioned two scholars have later developed a 
model for the turnaround process. 
Specifically, Pearce and Robbins (1993) have designed a descriptive model8 which depicts the 
correlations between the turnaround situation, defined in terms of distress causes and severity, 
and turnaround responses, as shown in Figure 2.1.  
 
 
Figure 2.1 – The turnaround process model of Pearce and Robbins. (Pearce & Robbins 1993) 
The flow of the turnaround process model begins with a diagnostic review which has the task 
of assessing the business situation in view of encompassing both the firm’s external and internal 
environment. The analysis and then, the definition of the proper turnaround response relies on 
two entity-based variables: causality and severity. Inter alia, investigating the firm’s distress 
severity entails testing its financial health and, specifically, defining to which extent distress is 
threatening the company’s short-term survival. A lower level of severity can be attributed to 
declining income margins or sales while, extremely severe distress would be proclaimed by 
forthcoming bankruptcy. Speaking of which, in accordance with the studies carried out by 
Hofer (1980) and Bibeault (1982), Pearce and Robbins (1993) have asserted that distress 
magnitude and causality should be the governing factors in drawing up the appropriate 
 
8 The turnaround process model has set its basis on an empirically driven research conducted by Pearce and 
Robbins (1992) to investigate, first, to what extent the degree of retrenchment positively affects the turnaround 
outcome. Their study took as investigation sample 32 US publicly held textile manufacturing companies from 




turnaround response. Thus, they have incorporated and elaborated the two-stage turnaround 
framework of Bibeault (1982), consisting of the retrenchment and recovery phases.  
The retrenchment phase is considered to be the dominant turnaround strategy which many 
companies undertake as the initial response to a survival-threatening corporate crisis. 
Specifically, this stage spans from “the onset of the turnaround situation until asset and cost 
reduction ceases” (Robbins & Pearce 1992) and it is intended to stabilize a company’s current 
financial position and ensure stability (Cater & Schwab 2008). Furthermore, as well as other 
scholars, Pearce and Robbins (1993) differentiate retrenchment activities in two categories, 
namely cost retrenchment and asset retrenchment. The former consists of a reduction in 
operational costs such as process improvements, layoffs, products elimination, and the latter 
implies asset reductions in terms of divestures, liquidations, plant closings (Schmitt & Raisch 
2013). Besides, distress severity plays once again an important role in shaping an adequate 
retrenchment activity. In low severity cases, cost retrenchment alone could be sufficient to reach 
a short-term financial stability. Instead, when the firm is facing a highly deteriorating distress, 
cost reductions should be supported by drastic unproductive asset divestures.  
To such purpose, Pearce and Robbins (2008) have argued that, for diversified businesses, 
retrenchment activities alone could be enough in reaching a stable performance, if undertaken 
aggressively and broadly scoped. Moreover, their empirical research conducted on a sample of 
32 US publicly held textile manufacturing companies found evidence of the highly significant 
interrelationship between the degree of retrenchment practices and the turnaround success 
(Robbins & Pearce 1992). In more severe turnaround conditions, indeed, retrenchers 
considerably overcame non-retrenchers in terms of efficiency, liquidity and debt relief 
measures9.  
However, the results obtained by Sudarsanam and Lai (2001) are not fully in line with what has 
been empirically evidenced by Robbins and Pearce (1992). In fact, the two scholars have 
monitored the turnaround strategies of a sample of 166 UK firms, drawn from 1985 to 1993, 
over a period of three years from the inception of distress. In this study, higher proportions of 
non-recovery corporations have adopted more intensive retrenchment activities of a “fire-
fighting nature”, in contrast with the forward-looking strategies adopted by recovery firms. 
Thus, Sudarsanam and Lai (2001) argue than the intensity in the adoption of restructuring 
 
9 For instance, on average, retrenchers achieved an improvement in ROI of 9.75% relative to 1.39% of the non-




strategies could be due to a failure in promptly recovering in the early years of corporate crisis, 
without prejudice to the effectiveness of retrenchment activities.  
In addition, the results achieved by Robbins and Pearce (1992) has received the criticism of 
Barker and Mone (1994), who argued that it is not straightforward to distinguish between 
retrenchment strategies as a consequence of distress and their deliberate selection as a 
turnaround activity. In fact, what emerged from the later refutation of Pearce and Robbins 
(1994) is that the two scholars have failed to properly replicate the original study, coming to an 
equivocal empirical evidence. 
Nevertheless, despite the demonstrated effectiveness of retrenchment activities, what can be 
inferred is that their intensive adoption alone is insufficient in guaranteeing an acceptable 
performance rehabilitation. Therefore, as visible from Figure 2.1, once the firm has achieved 
more stable performance levels, it approaches to the second stage of the turnaround process, 
namely the recovery phase, which extends from the cessation of retrenchment strategies until 
the company achieves or fails to accomplish turnaround (Robbins & Pearce 1992). Recovery 
activities consist of strategic changes which strive for a sustained growth through the firm’s 
repositioning and transformation (Schmitt & Raisch 2013). This phase can be accomplished 
implementing various strategies such as organizational refocus, investments and acquisitions, 
market penetration and product launch (Schmitt & Raisch 2013, Schweizer & Nienhaus 2017). 
As the model suggests, distress causality affects the choice of the appropriate recovery strategy. 
Thus, internal causality requires more efficiency maintenance and operating recovery activities, 
while the predominance of external causality asks for a strategic intervention, also known as 
entrepreneurial reconfiguration, targeted to a forward-looking market expansion (Pearce & 
Robbins 1993).  
Another interesting and worth mentioning contribution is the turnaround process pattern 
presented by Filatotchev and Toms (2006) who had the merit of extending the model of Robbins 
and Pearce (1992) by introducing an additional turnaround phase, the so-called realignment 
stage. They have argued that the firm’s entry into the retrenchment stage requires, ex ante, the 
consideration of financial constraints and related governance aspects which entail the 
realignment of expectations and strategic interests of internal and external stakeholders, as 





Figure 2.2 – The turnaround process model of Filatotchev and Toms. (Filatotchev & Toms 
2006) 
Specifically, the model requires the retrenchment phase to be undertaken only after the 
successful completion of the realignment stage. In particular, if the rate of return attended (ER) 
from the turnaround strategy does not exceed the one required by investors (R), and the 
expected net realizable value (NRV) of asset disposals is lower than their book value (BV), the 
resulting strategic outcome will be a “do nothing” strategy (as shown in the third layer of Figure 
2.2). Afterwards, an effective finalization of the retrenchment stage necessitates the disposal of 
unprofitable invested capital, where the NRV of assets exceeds their BV. Finally, where the ER 
from the reinvestment of asset disposals is not less than R, the company can attempt the 
recovery stage, the success of which hinges on the expected and actual returns arising from new 
assets investments.    
According to subsequent studies conducted by Schmitt and Raisch (2013), what emerges from 
the prior turnaround models is that retrenchment and recovery have been considered as two 
separate stages to be addressed sequentially. However, adopting a dual perspective, results 
confirm how the “integration of contradictory elements” may be beneficial and positively 
related to the turnaround performance (Schmitt & Raisch 2013).  
In conclusion, whatever process pattern is preferred, it appears indispensable the identification 





The concept of managerial restructuring encompasses, above all, the replacement of the top 
management team and/or the chief executive officer. Especially at the beginning of the 
turnaround process, it is a widely held view that top management change is a precondition and 
a performance enhancing strategy (Schendel et al. 1976, Hofer 1980, Bibeault 1982, Guatri 
1995, Slatter & Lovett 1999). In this regard, a study conducted by Daily and Dalton (1995) 10  
have pointed out how the rate of CEOs turnover is substantially higher in the five-year period 
prior bankruptcy filing that for the control group in the same time span.  
Denis and Kruse (2000) have further supported this result finding that 36% of the sample 
companies analyzed11 have experienced a top executive turnover within the three years 
following the performance decline.  
According to Slatter and Lovett (1999), managerial restructuring is an essential ingredient for 
business recovery on the basis of three main arguments: 
1. In a first instance, poor performance could be due to an inadequate or ineffective 
incumbent management which may have a strong set of preconceptions about how to 
deal with the declining business. 
2. The injection of new managers signals a break with the past and may be beneficial in 
restoring stakeholders’ confidence and credibility in the future viability of the company.  
3. A new business condition requires better suited strategic and organizational skills which 
are not always available in the firm. 
Despite the common view, the empirical evidence has not always been supportive on the 
effectiveness of the managerial restructuring. Indeed, Denis and Denis (1995) have found 
conflicting results depending on whether management replacement was forced, i.e. due to 
external pressures, or attributable to normal retirement. Notably, forced top managers 
dismissals exhibited significant operating performance decline and substantial shareholders’ 
wealth losses prior to the actual management changes. On the contrary, normal retirements have 
not been preceded by unusual performance mutations. Regarding, instead, the performance 
trend subsequent to the top management dismissals, Denis and Denis (1995) have evidenced 
how forced resignations, in contrast to normal retirements, have been followed by significant 
 
10 The sample comprises 57 bankruptcy filing firms and a matched control group of 57 nonbankrupt companies 
during the period 1973-1982 (Daily & Dalton 1995). 
11 Denis and Kruse (2000) sample consisted of 350 companies which have experienced a marked decline in 




improvements in the business performance. In fact, regular dismissals have exhibited small 
increases in performance and, therefore, a limited impact on the business turnaround process.  
In addition, the study conducted by Barker et al. (2001) has uniquely contributed to the 
investigation of top management team replacement at declining firms with an interesting focus 
on the effect of internal and opposite corporate factors, namely inertial and change forces. 
Firstly, the results obtained have supported the understanding of the most significant negative 
association between the level of top executives change and inertial factors. Indeed, the longer 
a company’s strategic orientation is pursued, the lower will be the probability of a top 
management team replacement during the turnaround process and, similarly, larger firms will 
be less prone to such renewals too. On the other hand, an increase of outsiders control on the 
company’s board of directors triggers a higher degree of dismissals. Moreover, in contrast to 
other scholars, Barker et al. (2001) have found that a firm’s closeness to bankruptcy has not a 
significant association with top management changes during a turnaround attempt.     
Another remarkable research is that conducted by Chen and Hambrick (2012) aimed at defining 
under which circumstances the CEO replacement is beneficial to the business turnaround 
process. The two scholars, in formulating their research hypothesis, have drawn from the 
fit/refit model introduced for the first time by Finkelstein et al. (2009). According to the fit/refit 
logic, a troubled firm has greater improvement chances in response to the chief executive officer 
replacement under two premises: 
1. The substantive mismatch between the context-specific skills and capabilities required 
to the incumbent CEO and his actual qualities, as long as the latter is ill-suited in 
handling the firm’s distress. 
2. The appointment of a successor who proves to have well aligned qualifications to the 
new business context.   
Indeed, the empirical research of Chen and Hambrick (2012) has been conducted on a sample 
of 223 firms which have faced a sudden shift from satisfactory profits to losses in the years 
1990 to 2003. The results obtained not merely support the fit/refit model, but rather deepen its 
fundamental aspects. Specifically, Chen and Hambrick (2012) argue how, under severe 
performance decline, the firm will draw the greatest benefit from the combined dismissal of a 
misfit and long-tenured predecessor and the appointment of a well-suited successor. Thus, as 
hypothesized, this sub-sample of companies has achieved a 16% ROE improvement.  
Moreover, it is worth noting how the CEO replacement, in itself, is not efficacious in terms of 
performance enhancement.  
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Therefore, despite the numerous contributions from the turnaround literature, the effectiveness 
of managerial restructuring is not clear cut and different empirical evidence has provided mildly 
conflicting responses. Thus, what is undeniable is the need of a context-specific top 
management team, able to lead a distressed firm in the path of corporate restructuring.    
  
2.2.3.Operational restructuring  
Operational restructuring covers a myriad of strategies targeting profitability restoration, at 
least in the short term, with a view to cash flow generation and efficiency enhancement (Koh 
et al. 2015), which are desirable measures in lender-dominated companies (Lai & Sudarsanam 
1997). These activities focus on operations redesign through the implementation of cost 
reduction and controlling, downsizing of the human capital and revenue generating strategies. 
The main objective, therefore, is not corporate strategy but assumes a fire-fighting nature and 
aims at improving the firm’s operating efficiency (Schweizer & Nienhaus 2017).    
According to Love and Nohria (2005), operational restructuring is often associated with 
downsizing, which is conceptualized as the effort to improve the firm’s performance by 
reducing the so-called organizational slack. Indeed, downsizing is intended to reduce “absorbed 
slack”, which covers excess costs embedded in the organization, and to transform it into 
“unabsorbed slack”, namely uncommitted reservoir of resources.  Furthermore, the analysis 
conducted by Love and Nohria (2005) on a sample of 100 large industrial firms in the United 
States in 1977 has highlighted how the best performance improvement has been achieved by 
high absorbed slack companies which have adopted proactive and broadly scoped downsizing 
strategies. Instead, as a consequence of performance decline, firms were more likely to adopt a 
reactive retrenchment primarily focused on the reduction of the workforce. In fact, post-
downsizing operating performance has turned out to be dependent on the level of absorbed slack 
and the scope of the enacted strategy and, into specifics, widely scoped retrenchment has gained 
an improvement of 2.7% in ROA-Market relative to narrowly scoped downsizing.  
Besides, a common operational restructuring strategy is intended to be the human capital 
restructuring, namely the downsizing of the personnel. Actually, studies focused on the effects 
of corporate layoffs have produced contradictory results in relation to performance changes and 
shareholders’ wealth. Among the first studies carried out in this context, the results achieved 
by Worrell et al. (1991) have revealed a negative market reaction to layoff announcements, with 
a reduction of 1% in shareholder returns during an interval of ten days.  
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Moreover, investors have responded even more negatively to dismissal announcements 
attributable to financial distress. In particular, Worrell et al. (1991) have argued that the adverse 
market reaction has to be mainly attributed to the fact that the majority of the layoffs represents 
the signal of expected lower returns rather than to a dissociation by investors from firms’ 
personnel policy management. 
The research conducted by Chen et al. (2001) on a sample of 349 US firms’ layoff 
announcements during the period 1990 to 1995 has deepened the effects of the latter on 
corporate performance. Their investigation evidenced, on average, a negative stock market 
response with a -1.2% two-day abnormal return. Furthermore, the personnel downsizing was 
accompanied by a temporary reduction in capital expenditure, business segments and an even 
worse market reaction to the extent that layoffs were due to declining demand. Nevertheless, in 
the three years following the dismissals, the sample exhibited an improvement in operating 
performance and profitability, manifested in terms of margin improvements and workforce 
productivity gains.   
Conversely, Amabile and Conti (1999) investigated the impact of operational restructuring, 
namely of personnel downsizing, on the firm’s work environment. In fact, the reduction of the 
workforce has proven to have a significantly negative affect on the creativity level and, 
therefore, the work environment will have to face an increase of obstacles to innovation, which 
is particularly harmful in high-technology companies. Where, instead, the layoff process is 
promptly concluded, the downsizing impact will be less detrimental on the organizational 
creativity.  
To cope with the potential adverse consequences of downsizing, operational restructuring 
entails the implementation of cost cutting activities alongside organic growth. Morrow et al. 
(2007), adopting a resource-based view of the company, have argued that it is crucial to provide 
the firm with valuable and difficult to imitate strategies in order to ensure a favorable position 
in the competitive landscape through the creation of new products, processes or technologies. 
Into specifics, empirical evidence has supported the hypothesis according to which, firms 
valuably recombining their existing resources meet a stronger positive impact on investors’ 
expectations than companies that either acquire or provide access to new assets (Morrow et al. 
2007). Then, it is instrumental to the firm’s corporate restructuring the need to reduce absorbed 




Portfolio restructuring, alternatively known as asset restructuring, entails strategic activities 
concerning the firm’s portfolio reorganization with a view to better manage resources through 
divesture and acquisition transactions (Bowman & Singh 1993). As claimed by Schweizer and 
Nienhaus (2017), portfolio restructuring supports operational restructuring in its role of “source 
of funds” while, at the same time, being in contrast with the latter in its intention to refocus the 
business. The need to intervene on the asset side has proven to be among the first broad 
strategies companies implement and, besides, it is more common in mature firms which seek 
to redeploy proceeds from the sale of detrimental lines of business to better utilizations (Koh et 
al. 2015).  
In this context, Byerly et al. (2003) state that it is possible to distinguish between two 
discernably different types of portfolio restructuring to which diverse performance results are 
associated: refocusing and repositioning. Refocusing, certainly the most common portfolio 
strategy, concerns adjustments and resizing of the organization’s existing form with a specific 
refocus around the firm’s core segments. This restructuring activity typically involves asset 
redeployment to be achieved through divestures of unrelated business segments. On the other 
hand, repositioning reflects an asset rearrangement around a shifted or newly designed core 
business, to be implemented through a combination of divestures followed by acquisitions.  
In addition, the analysis conducted by Byerly et al. (2003) has highlighted a better market 
response in overdiversified companies among the 90 “refocusers” and, analogously, in low-
level diversifiers among 41 firms implementing a repositioning portfolio strategy. Finally, they 
evidenced how the market perceives transforming strategies as more performance enhancing 
than conservative and refocusing strategies.  
Since asset sales represent an alternative source of funds in financially distressed and liquidity-
constrained firms, creditors may influence an early asset liquidation drawing an even greater 
benefit than equity holders (Hotchkiss et al. 2008). A premature asset restructuring oftentimes 
may be inefficient, leading to a decline in the firm’s going concern value and providing a 
liquidation cost. Speaking of which, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) have analyzed its main 
determinants, with a particular focus on market liquidity. They have observed how the 
liquidation price may suffer a discount which do not reflect the value in best use of the asset, 
under two specific conditions: the “non-redeployability” of the asset and the entire industry 
distress. Under a recession, indeed, fire-sale prices could be depressed because of generalized 
credit constraints, triggering both a private and a social loss, which are accentuated in case of 
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growth and cyclical asset sales. In turn, asset illiquidity affects and, specifically, reduces the 
optimal amount of debt in the whole industry’s capital structure. As a result, firms tend to avoid 
highly specific or “non-redeployable” asset sales, until it is strictly necessary under the form of 
forced liquidations (Shleifer & Vishny 1992, Hotchkiss et al. 2008).   
Although transaction prices of assets disposal may not always be efficient, Bowman et al. 
(1999) have envisaged on average a positive performance response relative to portfolio 
restructuring. The greatest enhancement has been achieved through spin-offs which, based on 
a sample of 181 firms, have guaranteed a 5% average gain to the parent company, followed by 
a 2% gain generated through sell-offs. In the latter case, post-restructuring performance is 
further improved if sell-offs are accompanied by price announcements, payouts to shareholders 
or bondholders. Instead, a sample of 169 companies pursuing more general portfolio 
restructuring activities, such as refocusing strategies, has not attained any improvement on 
average (Bowman et al. 1999). This result has been further supported by the analysis conducted 
by Denis and Kruse (2000) on a sample of 350 firms. Thus, it has been investigated that 61% 
of the companies in the sample has undertaken an asset restructuring to which subsequent 
operating improvements have been linked between the onset of a deteriorating performance and 
the following three years. Moreover, portfolio restructuring announcements have encountered, 
on average, a positive stock market reaction with abnormal returns of 1.75% for asset sales, as 
a proof of the value-enhancing characteristic of such strategy (Denis and Kruse 2000).  
In addition, Smith and Graves (2005) have tested which context factors, among the most 
discussed in the turnaround literature, have an effective influence on the success of a business 
restructuring process. First, the two scholars have selected a sample of 123 financially 
distressed companies, which exhibited at least two consecutive years of negative Z-scores, and 
have investigated the role of firms’ distress severity, efficiency-oriented strategies, size, free 
assets available and CEO turnover on failure prediction. Contrary to what is claimed by 
Bowman et al. (1999) and Denis and Kruse (2000), Smith and Graves (2005) have found a 
negative relation between downsizing activities and firms’ recovery, suggesting that a larger 
amount of free assets available positively influence turnaround success. In fact, portfolio 
restructuring could be detrimental to the business recovery if cutbacks are not properly 
addressed toward the less productive segments and if downsizing is not supported by efficiency-
oriented strategies (Smith & Graves 2005).  Indeed, according to Morrow et al. (2007), the 
introduction of new resources through acquisitions is performance enhancing and may exceed 
market expectations whereas existing assets are not sufficient in guaranteeing an adequate level 




Oftentimes, financial restructuring represents the fulcrum of the out-of-court turnaround 
process because of its role in providing relief to severely financially distressed firms. Schweizer 
and Nienhaus (2017) distinguish between liquidity improvement and debt restructuring in order 
to capture the main features of the different financial restructuring strategies.  
Liquidity improvements, also known as equity-based strategies (Sudarsanam & Lai 2001), aim 
at reducing payment pressures through dividend reductions or omissions, working capital 
optimization, or equity issuance (Schweizer & Nienhaus 2017). Thus, capital injection is one 
of the first liquidity improvement strategies firms consider under a condition of moderate 
financial distress since, despite leading to an extensive dilution of current equity holders, it is 
expected to be effective in restoring stability (Altman et al. 2019). Under a severe financial 
distress, instead, some portion of the capital provided will be intended to reduce debt holders’ 
impairment while the excess capital will contribute to the value of equity holders, resulting in 
an “immediate loss of value for the investor”, as asserted by Altman et al. (2019).  
In addition, DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1990) have investigated the dividend policy adjustments 
in 80 NYSE firms which experienced multiple losses during the period 1980-1985. Overall, the 
sample firms have performed a dividend increase in the pre-distress period but, right after 
financial distress has arisen, they have arranged an aggressive dividend reduction for at least 
70%, which leads to multiple dividend cuts in almost half of the sample. Moreover, managers 
of large companies with long dividend histories appeared to be reluctant to payment omissions 
in order to preserve their reputation and the “continuous dividend record” at the eyes of 
stockholders. Finally, DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1990) have found evidence supporting the 
influence of binding debt covenants on dividend policies. Specifically, more than half12 of the 
sample firms which performed a dividend cut had debt constraints in place. On the contrary, 
absent binding debt covenants, managers are less prone to execute dividend cuts or omissions, 
unless the corporate crisis is severe.   
Debt restructuring, indeed, concerns an extensive transaction entailing the renegotiation of the 
firm’s existing debt with a new contract which ensures the support of different categories of 
creditors and adapts to their business perspectives (Hotchkiss et al. 2008).  
 
12 Between 51.4% and 60.6% of the sample companies, depending on the chosen classification for binding debt 




Some of the various contents of debt restructuring may include, inter alia (Garrido 2012, Altman 
et al. 2019): 
• Rescheduling of payments – this measure represents one of the less radical and most 
common strategy firms undertake. It may entail the deferral of specific repayment 
installments, the debt’s maturity extension or the so-called roll-overs, i.e. the 
modification of maturity dates. 
• Alteration of interest rates – under a business crisis condition, debt interest rates (fixed 
or variable) could be unsustainable compared to the cash flow generated by the firm 
and, therefore, a reduction can ease this distress.  
• New loan facilities – the provision of new financing is often carried out by creditors 
with a large exposure who will obtain further securities to cover the additional risk 
involved.  
• Distressed exchange – when capital infusion is not possible, the firm may offer to some 
or all classes of creditors to exchange new debt and new or existing equity instruments 
for the outstanding debt securities. In fact, fair value of those new instruments is most 
probably received at a discount with respect to the face value of the old debt.  
It has been observed that many firms have emerged from financial distress still highly leveraged 
and poorly performing, although a long process of debt restructuring was adopted. Kahl (2002) 
has argued that the long-term nature of financial distress is attributable to creditors’ inability to 
distinguish between an economically viable firm and one that must necessary be liquidated, and 
their bargaining power in the company’s debt restructuring. Therefore, creditors’ preference for 
a “controlled liquidation” is attractive because it preserves their claim in participating in a 
business recovery or liquidate later, whereas the turnaround process would not be effective. 
Moreover, according to Kahl’s (2002) theory, a high pre-restructuring debt level does not only 
have a positive correlation with post-restructuring leverage, but negatively affects the 
attractiveness of a debt-equity swap which, in turn, is less probable if the company’s going 
concern value is quickly deteriorating. Kahl (2002) states that creditors prefer a debt-equity 
swap whereas the firm may ensure advantageous investment opportunities, i.e. a condition 
which is probable in a lower leveraged business following debt restructuring. Again, a debt’s 
maturity extension turns out to not be an interesting option if liquidation value is declining fast.  
The validity of financial restructuring was supported by the analysis of Bowman et al. (1999), 
which reported a mean performance return of 37.5%, with respect to 5.6% of portfolio 
restructuring and -0.21% of organizational restructuring, partly due to the high returns of 
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management buyouts and leveraged buyouts cases. Moreover, with respect to financial 
restructuring, Koh et al. (2015) have observed that decline firms in distress are more likely to 
adopt an aggressive financial restructuring than companies at different stages of their lifecycle. 
Specifically, mature and declining businesses are more prone to reduce or omit dividends and 
issue new debt while, birth and growth companies are more likely to raise new funds through 
equity issuance because of their greater investment opportunities.  
Finally, it has been argued that out-of-court turnaround is positively correlated with business 
recovery if the firm undertakes two or at least three strategies simultaneously, rather than one 
or more than three restructuring measures (Koh et al. 2015)13.  
 
2.3. Market reaction to turnaround announcements  
The different empirical analysis carried out in relation to the response of capital markets, 
following turnaround announcements, have often reached mixed conclusions. Indeed, these 
conflicting results depend on the market perception of the information conveyed, which could 
be more or less favorable for investors, and on the specific restructuring initiative implemented. 
The literature, as will be seen below, has separately investigated each strategy in order to isolate 
the market response resulting from the company’s announcement. 
A first analysis of the investors’ reaction as a consequence of restructuring announcements 
concerns the top management replacement, broadly related to managerial restructuring. The 
turnaround literature has produced conflictual outcomes: announcements have been greeted 
positively (Borokhovich et al. 1996), neutrally (Warner et al. 1988) or negatively (Khanna & 
Poulsen 1995) by the market. Borokhovich et al. (1996) have reported, on average, a significant 
positive abnormal return in response to the takeover of a new CEO. Specifically, the greater 
gain in shareholder value is achieved under the appointment of an external individual, rather 
than internal, in a condition of forced succession (1.64%). Indeed, shareholders perceive the 
CEO replacement to be beneficial to their interests, especially when the latter is external to the 
distressed firm and, therefore, breaks with the previous status quo (Borokhovich et al. 1996).   
On the contrary, while Warner et al. (1988) have found a neutral market reaction, Khanna and 
Poulsen (1995) have detected a negative relation, regardless on the designation of an insider or 
 
13 Specifically, Koh et al. (2015) have taken into analysis the following restructuring measures: CEO replacement, 
more than 15% decrease in investment activities, more than 20% reduction in the number of employees, more than 
15% reduction in total assets, more than 25% drop in total dividends, an excess of net debt of more than 5% of the 




outsider manager, of -0.96% in cumulative abnormal returns. Thus, it is likely that these 
announcements provide to investors additional and negative information about the company’s 
crisis, suggesting that financial distress is most probably due to causes outside the management 
control (Khanna & Poulsen 1995).     
Secondly, with regard to corporate restructuring strategies based on personnel downsizing, the 
literature seems to share the same current of thought that associates to layoff announcements a 
negative market reaction (Worrell et al. 1991, Chen et al. 2001, Nixon et al. 2004). Human 
capital expenses, despite being easily reducible, represent embedded knowledge and, in turn, a 
possible critical competitive advantage. In particular, the study conducted by Nixon et al. (2004) 
on a sample of 364 announcements, has identified a negative relationship between market 
valuation and the level of downsizing, that can be represented with a negative slope which 
becomes steeper as the degree of intervention increases. In fact, investors negatively perceive 
personnel reductions since it is unlikely to solve the major company’s issues and, furthermore, 
it may worsen them because of the possible loss in valuable human capital. Therefore, if layoffs 
are necessary, they should be properly and carefully planned.   
The turnaround literature focused on portfolio restructuring, as mentioned in Paragraph 2.2.4., 
has generally highlighted a positive market reaction following an asset reorganization 
announcement. In this regard, Schönhaar et al. (2014) have stated that stock market reactions, 
while being averagely positive, seem to be more dependent on firm specific-circumstances, 
such as the relatedness between business units, the mode of divestures and the disclosure of 
information, rather than accounting results. Actually, the investigation of John and Ofek (1995) 
on a sample consisting of 321 divestures has evidenced an average cumulative return of 1.5% 
for the seller and 0.4% for the buyer. The study underlined, indeed, how the elimination of 
negative synergies, namely a “focus-increasing” divesture, is beneficial not only in terms of 
positive abnormal returns but enhances the cash flow performance of the seller’s remaining 
assets. Another analysis supporting this hypothesis of refocusing announcements is that of 
Markides (1992). He has observed an average positive impact of 1.67% in returns, as a 
consequence of refocusing announcements, with the highest return of 4.91% in highly 
diversified underperforming firms, because of the expectation of investors who are confident 
in a boosting performance.  
Ultimately, the literature seems to agree on the impact that a financial restructuring 
announcement has on the market, regarding the specific strategy pursued. Indeed, the 
announcement of the most common financial initiative, namely dividend cuts or omissions, 
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typically triggers negative long-term abnormal returns. Thus, the well-known reluctance of 
managers to pursue such strategies leads investors to arguably perceive dividend related 
announcements as a negative expectation about the company’s future earnings performance 
(Liu et al. 2008). The analysis conducted by Liu et al. (2008) over the first post-announcement 
year on a sample of 2337 dividend reductions or omissions during the period 1927-1999, has 
further confirmed this result, performing statistically significant abnormal returns in a range 
between -5.89% and -14.52%. Furthermore, resorting to agency theory, Brown et al. (1993) 
have investigated the market reaction following distressed exchange offers. The result achieved, 
indeed, depends on the composition of exchange offers and the information conveyed about the 
value of the firm’s assets.  Specifically, when equity offering is executed in favor of well-
informed private lenders there is a positive share price reaction of 9.134% while, contrarily, 
when public debtholders are offered these instruments, the average abnormal return to equity is 
-7.40% (Brown et al. 1993). In fact, the prevailing effect is dependent on the information 
available to investors with regard to the company’s condition.  
To wrap up, it is not possible to state with certainty what will be the response of stock prices in 
the face of an announcement of corporate turnaround. As seen in this paragraph, each 
restructuring strategy has its own peculiarities and conveys information to the market in relation 
to the expected business performance. Therefore, each announcement depends on a variety of 















2.4. In-court turnaround strategies 
Out-of-court turnaround strategies have many desirable features for the debtor and, as a result, 
they are often preferable as compared to in-court proceedings. Specifically, an informal 
workout procedure provides much more flexibility since it allows the firm to privately intervene 
in a declining business with the implementation of a restructuring plan which “binds the debtor 
vis-à-vis the creditors and binds the creditors inter se” (Garrido 2012). Flexibility also manifests 
itself in terms of costs: out-of-court workout allows to save more direct14 and indirect15 costs 
compared to bankruptcy procedures, which may be quite onerous for large companies.  
In fact, Gilson et al. (1990) have observed that restructuring of publicly traded debt, under a 
private workout, very often occurs as an exchange offer and takes averagely 6.6 months to 
complete. In particular, they have estimated that direct costs of 18 exchange offers, out of a 
sample of 169 large public companies, appear to be economically insignificant and amount to 
0.65% of the company’s book value of total assets (Gilson et al. 1990). Regarding, instead, in-
court turnaround strategies, there is a significant cost difference between small and large 
companies. Speaking of which, Bris et al. (2006) have investigated a sample of 225 Chapter 11 
reorganizations and 61 Chapter 7 liquidations, all of which consisting of large companies from 
two bankruptcy courts: Arizona and Southern District of New York. For Chapter 11 cases, 
direct costs amounted averagely to 16.9%, as a fraction of prebankruptcy assets, with a median 
expense of 1.9%. While Chapter 7 liquidations presented a mean expense ratio of 8.1%, with a 
slightly higher median of about 2.5%. Conversely, Lawless et al. (1994) have analysed the 
impact of in-court procedures’ direct costs on 57 small Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 cases. They 
have found that, for Chapter 7 cases, direct costs averaged approximately 43% of firm value, 
while Chapter 11 cases accounted for about 22% (Lawless et al. 1994).  
Overall, it may be argued that the magnitude of direct costs is particularly high for small firms 
compared to larger ones and, as a consequence, the former could struggle to survive an in-court 
turnaround process (Altman et al. 2019).  
In addition to cost savings, it is worth recalling other advantages of out-of-court procedures 
such as the better articulation of a timely response and the lower reputational damages (Garrido 
 
14 Direct costs entail out-of-pocket expenses necessary to undertake a restructuring process, such as the cost of 
accountants, lawyers, turnaround specialists and advisors, and other professionals (Altman et al. 2019).  
15 Indirect costs cover all unobservable opportunity costs. For instance, the distressed company may suffer from 
lost sales, higher costs of doing business, loss of specialized employees and investment opportunities. As such, 




2012). Thus, the firm’s stakeholders generally perceive more favourably the business viability 
under an out-of-court restructuring rather than an in-court process (Altman et al. 2019). 
Despite the aforementioned advantages, a private restructuring is not always implementable 
and presents different challenges such as: information asymmetries, holdout problems and 
various conflict of interests. In particular, information asymmetries arise between informed 
firm’s managers and poorly informed creditors and they may damage the proper functioning of 
the business turnaround process. Mooradian (1994) and Altman et al. (2019) state that this can 
happen because debtholders would rather prefer to rely on a more costly turnaround alternative 
than place their trust in the management and shareholders, whereas information is not 
symmetric. Secondly, the presence of different classes of creditors, i.e. the complexity of the 
debt structure, often makes it challenging to achieve coordination and may lead to material 
conflict of interests among debtholders, which is particularly the case of companies with both 
unsecured public debt and secured private debt (Gilson et al. 1990, Hotchkiss et al. 2008).   
Furthermore, another common impediment to private workouts is the holdout problem. A 
holdout occurs when one or more dissenting creditors disregard the out-of-court restructuring 
in order to obtain the full contractual payment from the debtor. Actually, dissenting creditors 
trigger a collective action problem since they strive to “take a free ride on the collective efforts 
of the creditors participating in the workout” (Garrido 2012). Despite, in the event that the 
restructuring process fails, holdout creditors would probably gain less than in a negotiated 
private workout and, as a consequence, the firm would be forced into a formal liquidation 
procedure.   
For this reasoning, an out-of-court procedure may represent an effective solution especially for 
small businesses which typically negotiate with a restricted number of creditors. Large firms, 
indeed, face more challenges when dealing with the holders of different classes of debt because 
of the many issues discussed above. Therefore, under these circumstances, firms resort to a 
court-supervised bankruptcy which features depend on the jurisdiction to which the business is 
subject. As argued by Garrido (2012), in many insolvency systems the distinction between an 
informal and a formal bankruptcy proceeding appears blurred because of different mechanisms 
which try to combine the benefits of both, i.e., the cost, speed, efficiency of a private workout 
with the binding effect of an in-court procedure. Thus, an efficient legal system should foresee 
a continuum of procedures for the treatment of financial distress based on the level of juridical 
intervention and the level of “formality” involved (Garrido 2012). With these warnings noted, 
the following paragraph will treat the fundamental aspects of the Italian legislative framework 
with regard to the legal system adopted in the management of the business turnaround. 
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2.5. The Italian legislative framework 
Where the firm is in a context of severe financial distress, the role of the legislator is essential 
in providing consistency in the management of the in-court procedure. Under these 
circumstances, the company will probably not be able to fully repay its creditors and, therefore, 
the bankruptcy law of the jurisdiction under which it operates should provide adequate tools to 
protect creditors and, where possible, preserve the going concern value of the business. On the 
other hand, if the firm is subject to a slight decline in performance, nowadays, many legislators 
support managers with informal procedures, without having to resort to costly in-court tools.  
In this context, the Italian insolvency framework ensures a good level of completeness and 
detail in meeting the diverse needs of both the creditors and the company, with instruments 
characterized by an increasing degree of intervention of the legislator depending on the 
individual case and its severity (Stanghellini 2015). Thus, the Italian Bankruptcy Law has been 
the result of different reforms which base their roots on the Royal Decree no. 267 of 16 March 
1942. The objective of the original discipline has been strongly focused on the principle of 
fairness, that is on the protection of creditors, at the expense of timeliness and efficiency 
(Buttignon 2008), leading to a jurisdiction based on liquidation purposes of the insolvent 
company.  
There has been, however, a profound change in the philosophy and in the basic aspects of the 
Italian business recovery procedures thanks to various legislative reforms, among which, the 
major insolvency law has been no. 80 of 2005 which initiated additional subsequent legislative 
initiatives16. The new discipline has introduced contractual and quasi-contractual agreements, 
characterized by a reduced role of courts in the management of business distress, a greater 
orientation towards the recovery and maintenance of the firm and an increased involvement of 
creditors in the restructuring process (Provasi & Riva 2013).  In fact, parties involved in a 
business turnaround process are reluctant to resort to a formal bankruptcy procedure because 
of the social bias associated with insolvency and structural issues affecting the Italian juridical 
 
16 Over the past years, the Italian insolvency framework has been extensively revised: 
- The Law no. 122/2010 from the Decree no. 78/2010; 
- The Law no. 134/2012 from the Decree no. 83/2012, with an extensive regulation; 
- The Law no. 98/2012 from the Decree no. 69/2013, with more limited rules aimed at the preservation of 
the going concern value of firms; 
- The Law no. 132/2015 from the Decree no. 83/2015; 
- The Law no. 119/2016 from the Decree no. 59/2016; 
- The Legislative Decree no. 14/2019, with the new Business Crisis and Insolvency Code, whose entry into 





system17 (Danovi et al. 2020). Therefore, the Italian legislator has provided for the possibility 
of adopting more flexible tools with a lower level of procedural formalities, as long as the 
company is pre-insolvent, namely Certificate Plans (Piani attestati di risanamento, ex art. 67, 
co. 3, lett. d, Legge Fallimentare – l. f.), Debt Restructuring Agreements (Accordi di 
ristrutturazione dei debiti, ex art. 182-bis, l. f.) and Compositions with Creditors (Concordati 
preventivi, ex art. 160, l. f.). Restructuring and reorganization instruments are meant to grant 
the debtor some breathing room in order to recover from a temporary or more permanent 
liquidity constraint and, where necessary, restructure the firm’s debt (Provasi & Riva 2013). 
On the other hand, generally creditors will accept this turnaround path whenever the going 
concern value of the company enhances their claims’ value. The composition with creditors, 
indeed, is a flexible instrument which is suitable for more severe crisis conditions, characterized 
by a more invasive intervention of the bankruptcy court. In addition, the Italian legislator has 
updated the conditions of applicability of the tools, other than bankruptcy (fallimento), 
envisaging a broad concept of “crisis”, which is not only the “insolvency” stage, but also entails 
conditions where the crisis is not manifest but “potential”.  
As stated by Pollio (2010), the company’s legislative choices can be placed on a descending 
scale where the procedures, both out-of-court and in-court, are placed according to their degree 
of utility to the conservation of the business integrity, as proposed in Figure 2.3.  
 
Figure 2.3 – Italian legal tools for the crisis resolution. (Adapted from Pollio (2010)) 
 
17 According to a research of the Italian Ministry of Justice, it is estimated that the average duration of a bankruptcy 
procedure (fallimento) in 2018 has been between 5.2 and 16.1 years, in the best and worst performing Italian court, 
respectively. Moreover, an analysis conducted on insolvency procedures occurred between 2000 and 2007, has 




In fact, corporate restructuring has to be intended as a process aimed at the recovery of trust at 
the eyes of the environment in which the firm operates, with particular attention to the 
restoration of relations with creditors (Pollio 2010). In this regard, as visible from Figure 2.3, 
the key element for the choice of the most appropriate legal tool is the severity/knowability of 
the corporate crisis by third parties. In fact, the selection of a wrong instrument could 
irreversibly jeopardize the permanence of the business on the market since the loss of 
confidence by stakeholders could harm the concrete restoration of the business. Thus, certificate 
plan (ex art. 67, co. 3, lett. d, l. f.) is the most appropriate instruments for restoring the firm’s 
credibility while avoiding the previously mentioned unpleasant side-effect of stakeholders’ 
confidence loss. Descending the scale and at higher levels of crisis knowability, Pollio (2010) 
positioned debt restructuring agreement (ex art. 182-bis, l. f.) and composition with creditors 
(ex art. 160, l. f.). Under these tools, the riskiness of the firm is disclosed to external 
stakeholders too and their confidence in the business viability is compromised. The final step 
is characterized by an irreversible and externally manifest crisis in which the only 
implementable instruments are bankruptcy (Title II, Chapter I, l. f.) and in-bankruptcy 
composition (ex art. 124, l. f.), aimed at the liquidation of the company. 
 
2.5.1.Certificate plan  
The certificate recovery plan (Piano attestato di risanamento; ex art. 67, co. 3, lett. d, l. f.) is 
commonly intended as an “informal restructuring procedure” under which the legislator grants 
a considerable freedom of initiative to the debtor. In fact, it deviates both from the “procedural 
restructuring” envisioned by the composition with creditors and from the “markedly private 
reorganization” provided for in the debt restructuring agreement (Pollio 2010).  
The implementation of this juridical tool presupposes a situation of transitional crisis 
considered to be surmountable in the sight of the entrepreneur of the distressed business. The 
legislator, pursuant art. 67 co. 3 lett. d), provides for the possibility to submit a unilateral plan 
addressed to creditors, in practice a formalized turnaround plan, which should be appropriate 
for the dual objective of enabling the restructuring of the company’s debt exposure and ensuring 
the rebalancing of its financial condition. Moreover, the plan is not subject to prior examination 
of the court nor does it necessarily require the approval of creditors. Specifically, the certificate 
plan may be based on agreements with the firm’s main creditors, typically key capital providers 
62 
 
and suppliers, targeting debt restructuring and, thus, requiring the acceptance of the contracts 
underlying the plan. 
In the first place, according to the Italian Corporate Crisis Code (ex art. 56, co. 2), the content 
of the certificate plan shall disclose: 
• the company’s economic and financial condition, with regard to its current and historical 
data, and the main causes of its distress;  
• the intervention strategies and the time needed to ensure financial stability, with a focus 
on creditors involved in the plan and the amount of claims for which the renegotiation 
is proposed; 
• a forecast of the interventions’ results carried out in order to allow the verification of 
their implementation, as well as the instruments to be adopted in the event of a deviation 
between the objectives of the certificate plan and the business ongoing performance. 
Secondly, in the event of failure and as a protective initiative towards who have trusted the good 
result of the certificate plan, the Italian legislator states that “the acts, the payments and the 
guarantees on the assets of the debtor” are exempt from claw-back actions, provided that an 
adequate certificate plan is implemented. In fact, the law guarantees this form of protection 
when the reliability of the accounting data and the feasibility of the certificate recovery plan is 
attested by an external registered auditor, appointed by the debtor, who is, moreover, eligible 
for the role of insolvency administrator. The expert’s positive assessment of the plan triggers 
the judgement of merit of the initiatives set out in the plan that resist even in the event of failure 
and bankruptcy (in which the acts in question will therefore remain unassailable and the persons 
who performed them will, in principle, be exempt from any liability).  
Compared to other legal tools envisaged by the Bankruptcy Law, the certificate plan is not 
subject to public disclosure, unless the debtor requests its publication in the Companies’ 







2.5.2.Debt restructuring agreement  
The debt restructuring agreement (Accordo di ristrutturazione del debito; ex art. 182-bis, l. f.) 
represents a para-juridical (or hybrid) crisis resolution plan-based instrument of a private-
contractual nature. In fact, the legislator lays down an out-of-court phase in which the distressed 
entrepreneur must negotiate with creditors, followed by an in-court phase under which the 
agreement is validated and deposited at the Companies’ Register. Debt restructuring 
agreements shall necessarily require an active participation of creditors and provide for an 
anticipated intervention of the judge, compared to what happens under the hypothesis of a 
certificate plan, in which the control is only possible following its failure.  
First of all, art. 182-bis stipulates that the debt restructuring agreement must be submitted to 
creditors accounting for at least 60% of their debt exposure and it also provides for the regular 
and full satisfaction of those who do not adhere to the plan. These creditors must be paid in full, 
that is, for the amount of principal and interest, within a period of 120 days from the agreement’s 
validation date, in the case of claims already past due at that date or credits not yet expired at 
the date of approval. Furthermore, also in this case, the external expert plays the key role of 
attesting the truthfulness of the accounting data and the viability of the agreement, with 
particular reference to its suitability in assuring the full payment of the uninvolved creditors. 
This implies that the auditor is called, again, to express both a judgement of the abstract 
suitability of the agreement (and the underlying plan) in ensuring the restoration of normal 
solvency of the debtor, and a judgment of feasibility in concrete, which requires the data to be 
accurate and the predictive assumptions to be rationale.  
In terms of content, these agreements concern the usual debt restructuring strategies, presented 
in Paragraph 2.2.5., such as deferral of payments, debt-equity swaps, total or partial waiver of 
interests due, debt issuance, new financing. From the firm’s point of view, the plan could 
provide for the continuation of the business activity by the debtor himself, the entrustment to a 
third party, the transfer of all or a part of assets to creditors or the company’s liquidation.  
Once the debt restructuring agreement has been validated and deposited at the Companies’ 
Register, for 60 days from its publication no creditor may pursue or prosecute individual 
executive and precautionary actions against the debtor, nor acquire pre-emption rights unless 
agreed. Secondly, within 30 days from the publication of the agreement, creditors may submit 
a statement of opposition. The court, once having decided on oppositions, approves the debt 
restructuring agreement with a validation decree (decreto di omologazione) claimable within 
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15 days of its publication in the Companies’ Register. Thereafter, the legislator does not provide 
any further court supervision in the debt restructuring agreement implementation.   
Despite a certain court control, this legal instrument grants advantages and a considerable 
freedom of initiative to debtors who may realize debt restructuring agreements tailored on their 
needs and, in turn, maximize the plan’s probability of approval and its effective enforcement 
(Danovi et al. 2020).  
 
2.5.3.Composition with creditors  
In recent years, the composition with creditors (Concordato preventivo; ex art. 160, l. f.) has 
been the most revisited legal instrument by the legislator, becoming the main alternative to 
bankruptcy, as an insolvency procedure available to a commercial entrepreneur who is in a state 
of crisis or insolvency. Thus, according to the law (ex art. 160, l. f.), its primary focus is debt 
restructuring and the satisfaction of creditors to be pursued, at the discretion of the debtor, “by 
any means”. The previous sentence indicates that the ultimate aim of the agreement is not 
necessarily the continuation of the business activity, but it may also entail the payment of claims 
though a corporate liquidation procedure.   
First of all, the admission to the procedure requires a petition to the court by the debtor, together 
with a specific documentation. In particular, according to art. 161, the debtor must submit to 
the court an updated report with respect to the economic and financial condition of the business, 
an analysis and estimation of the assets, the list of creditors and their specifications, and a 
precise description of the plan. The documentation shall also be accompanied by the report of 
an external auditor, appointed by the debtor, who must attest the truthfulness of the accounting 
data and material feasibility of the plan. In the case of a composition with creditors aimed at 
the business continuity, the external professional must certify that the pursuit of the going 
concern hypothesis is functional to the best satisfaction of the creditors. Furthermore, the 
legislator provides for the entrepreneur the possibility to file the application for the composition 
with creditors by providing the last three financial statements and the firm’s list of creditors 
with the indication of their respective claims, reserving the right to submit the rest of the 
documentation within a term set by the court, between 60 and 120 days (concordato in bianco).  
Then, after the court has analyzed and verified the documentation received and the feasibility 
of the agreement, the procedure provides for the appointment of a delegate judge, a legal 
commissioner and the scheduling of the creditors’ vote expression which must take place within 
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120 days. The composition with creditors has to be approved by creditors representing the 
majority of the outstanding total claims or, if creditors have been divided into classes by the 
debtor, the agreement has to be accepted by the majority of creditors in the majority of classes. 
Once approved, the composition with creditors has to be validated by the court within six 
months from the presentation of the petition (ex art. 180, l. f.), and the company’s management 
activity has to be supervised by the legal commissioner, in relation to the correct application of 
the agreement.  
In addition, where the proposal is approved by the majority, as stated before, the bindingness 
of the agreement applies to dissenting creditors as well and, according to art. 168, the 
publication of the deal in the Companies’ Register denies creditors the possibility of initiating 
or continuing executive and precautionary actions against the debtor’s assets, nor allow them 
the acquisition of pre-emption rights unless agreed.  
As stated in art. 84 of the Corporate Crisis Code, the discipline related to the composition with 
creditors intends to facilitate the recovery of the business activity and, therefore, the going 
concern assumption. The law specifies that business continuity (concordato in continuità) can 
be either direct when the company remains in the hands of the entrepreneur who presented the 
agreement request, or indirect when the management of the company in operation or the 
resumption of the activity is entrusted to a subject other than the debtor. The legislator, thus, 
specifies the admissibility of the application for liquidation (concordato liquidatorio) which 
provides for the satisfaction creditors’ claims through the proceeds of assets’ dismissals.  
Finally, each creditor may advance the request for the termination of the composition with 









2.5.4.Filing for bankruptcy 
Bankruptcy (Dichiarazione di fallimento; Title II, Chapter I, l. f.) is an in-court procedure 
provided by the Italian legislator as a resolution instrument for corporate distress. According to 
art. 5, the state of insolvency of the entrepreneur is manifest when he is declared bankrupt 
because of the inability to meet his obligations regularly and this declaration may be submitted 
by the debtor, by one or more creditors or at the request of the Public Prosecutor (ex art. 6, l. 
f.). In particular, when the entrepreneur files for a bankruptcy procedure he must deposit at the 
Registry of the Court the specification of the company’s accounting and taxation data of the 
latest three financial years accompanied by a detailed list of creditors and their corresponding 
claims (ex art. 15, l. f.).   
Once the documentation and the application have been received, the court verifies the existence 
of the bankruptcy assumptions, i.e. the business state of insolvency, and if so, a bankruptcy 
declaration judgement is delivered: from now on the legal procedure is open. Thus, the 
bankruptcy court represents the authority invested with the entire bankruptcy procedure, that 
is, the appointment, revocation and replacement of the other bodies of the process, namely the 
bankruptcy judge and the official receiver.  
The bankruptcy procedure provides for three stages: (1) the analysis of the company’s liability 
side, with a verification of its creditors and their specific claims; (2) the forced liquidation of 
assets; (3) the allocation of the resulting resources to creditors on the basis of the project 
submitted by the insolvency administrator and declared enforceable by the court.  
In this regard, the official receiver is entrusted with the task of providing for the administration 
of the debtor’s assets and carrying out all the operations envisaged by this legal tool under the 
supervision of the bankruptcy judge and the creditors committee. In fact, he is in charge of 
conducting the inventory process, providing an analytical description and an estimate of the 
assets’ value, on the basis of which a liquidation plan shall be prepared and submitted for the 
approval of the creditors committee within 60 days from the drafting of this document. 
According to art. 104-ter, the plan must lay down the terms and the conditions of the assets 
arrangement which, in addition to their piecemeal disposal, contemplate the possibility of the 
business continuity, even in respect of specific branches, where its interruption may provide 
severe damage to the firm and provided that it does not adversely affect creditors (ex art. 104, 
l. f.). Under this circumstance, the official receiver is responsible for the management of the 
company’s provisional administration, also having the task of convening the creditors 
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committee at least every three months in order to provide information about the performance 
trend and to decide on the advisability of continuing the operations.  
Moreover, the Italian legislator provides for an alternative in-court end of the bankruptcy 
proceedings, aimed at its early closure, namely the bankruptcy agreement (concordato 
fallimentare, ex art. 124, l. f.). The law requires one or more creditors, the debtor18, or a third 
party to submit the proposal for an agreement oriented at the partial or total satisfaction of 
creditors themselves. The proposal may entail the division of creditors into classes, each of 
them characterized by a different treatment, the restructuring of debt and the repayment of 
claimants, through whichever form, and enters into force if approved by the majority of 
creditors. The bankruptcy agreement, then, ceases when all the obligations assumed are fulfilled 
or in case of its invalidity or resolution. To wrap up, the bankruptcy arrangement could be 
beneficial for both the debtor, who gets rid of his liabilities, and creditors, who will receive a 
faster and higher payment than they would with the liquidation of assets under a bankruptcy 
procedure.   
From this brief overview, it is evident the contribution of the Italian Bankruptcy Law in coping 
with corporate distress in order to safeguard the business continuity. Thus, the few legal tools 
provided, each of them with different features, enhance the use of contractual and quasi-
contractual agreements as a prompt response to the downward spiral of crisis.  
In fact, time is key in the management of corporate decline: the probability of business recovery 
will be higher as the debtor tackle distress at its early phases (Danovi et al. 2020). To meet this 
need, the Italian legislator has recently introduced a legal procedure to support firms in 
identifying the very first warning signs of distress. In particular, the supervisory board of 
auditors will have both the right and the duty to start an early warning procedure on the basis 








18 Provided that one year has passed from the date of bankruptcy declaration and demonstrated that it has not 








After having discussed in the previous chapters the fundamental characteristics of the corporate 
crisis condition, in particular in terms of causes and solutions, it will now be possible to delve 
into the empirical analysis of the phenomenon with regard to the Italian stock market.  
Indeed, the extent of the impact of the corporate distress requires its external disclosure to 
ensure investors’ protection and awareness in relation to their portfolio choices and, in this 
context, it becomes key for the legislator to guarantee an adequate level of information 
transparency. As regards the Italian system, Banca d’Italia and CONSOB are the main 
institutions invested with the supervisory authority on markets and financial intermediaries.  
In particular, CONSOB carries out its role by making use of two specific tools: the black and 
the grey lists. The inclusion in these “watch lists” entails the provision of periodical addition 
information, namely monthly or quarterly, which is triggered by the opinion of auditors based 
on financial statements of listed companies in distress.   
For the purpose of the empirical analysis, this chapter will first cover the regulatory framework 
which allows CONSOB to require additional information disclosure and the main features of 
its supervisory role (Paragraph 3.2). Afterwards, Paragraph 3.3 will deepen into an overview 
of companies included in the lists from 2009 to today, with an eye to shifts from one list to the 
other and the reasons for their removal from the surveillance lists. Then, the analysis will focus 
on the companies currently under observation, referring to their fundamental characteristics.  
The chapter will then present the rationale and methodology underlying the empirical analysis 
carried out in this dissertation. In fact, the main purpose is the investigation of what 
differentiates a successful turnaround process from strategic measures that are not sufficiently 
adequate. To answer this question, it was deemed interesting to compare three different 
companies, namely one in the black list, one in the grey list and one recovered, over a 
comparative period of 5 years, from 2015 to 2019. In this context, Paragraph 3.4 will introduce 
the basis of the empirical analysis and will, therefore, present the description of each of the 




3.2. CONSOB and the supervision of listed companies  
Listed companies, i.e. those whose shares are traded on a regulated market, are subject to 
substantial transparency obligations aimed at protecting investors and guaranteeing the sound 
development of the industrial system and the market itself. Indeed, the economic environment 
is characterized by agency problems, specifically information asymmetries, which hinder the 
proper functioning of the markets and the correct investor’s portfolio allocation. In this context, 
the promotion of external information flows mitigates these issues and provides benefits for 
both current and potential shareholders, and the ones leading the firm, namely directors and 
managers. In fact, the availability of up-to-date and sound information allows investors to take 
a proper investment decision and enables the firm to lure outer investments, which represent 
financial inflows necessary for its viability. In light of this, the role of control authorities is vital 
in improving market transparency by imposing additional reporting requirements on financial 
actors who are, therefore, subject both to corporate law and capital markets law. 
With attention to the Italian system and according to art. 2325-bis (Italian Civil Code), 
companies which shares are listed on regulated markets, or widely distributed among the public, 
are subject to the dispositions of Title V, Book V of the Civil Code. Furthermore, issuers of 
financial instruments are disciplined by the Consolidated Law on Finance (Testo Unico della 
Finanza or T.U.F.) introduced in 1998 by the Legislative Decree n. 58. The latter represents the 
main body of the Italian legislation in the fields of financial markets and intermediaries since it 
reunites and rationalizes a large part of provisions issued in recent decades, making it 
compatible with the entire spectrum of the EU legislation on regulated markets.  
Thus, the T.U.F. invests Banca d’Italia and CONSOB (Commissione Nazionale per la Società 
e la Borsa) with the supervisory authority on markets and financial intermediaries, enshrining 
their roles and responsibilities. In addition, issuers of financial instruments are also disciplined 
by regulations and codes of conduct of Borsa Italiana.  
In detail, Part IV of the Consolidated Law on Finance concerns general and specific dispositions 
regarding the guidelines to which share issuers operating in regulated markets are subordinated. 
In particular, CONSOB is an independent administrative authority established with the law n. 
216/1974 and, according to art. 91 (T.U.F.), it exercises its powers “having regard to the 
protection of investors as well as the efficiency and transparency” of capital markets, aiming at 
the reduction of information asymmetries and market failures. To this end, it is the competent 
authority for ensuring the transparent behavior of all market participants and the accuracy and 
completeness of information disclosed in financial prospectus.  Therefore, CONSOB enforces 
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a regulatory supervision since it governs the reporting obligations addressed to listed companies 
and the provision of investment activities and services by intermediaries. The essential tools at 
its disposal are formal communications, opinions and recommendations. Furthermore, it also 
plays the role of sanctioning supervisor referring to supplementary and interdiction function. 
Thus, CONSOB has the authority of temporarily or permanently delisting a company from the 
capital market in case it envisages irregularities and for the protection of investors.  
According to art. 115, part 1, letter c (T.U.F.), CONSOB may carry out inspections at listed 
firms in order to check accounting data and the truthfulness of information provided. 
Concerning its informative supervision and whenever it is deemed necessary to the transparency 
aim, CONSOB may also oblige issuers to provide publicly and without delay privileged and 
price sensitive information (art. 114, T.U.F.), also establishing the methods and terms of 
communication, without prejudice to the need for information publication in national daily 
newspapers (art. 115, T.U.F.).  
In fact, for the purpose of the analysis carried out in this dissertation, paragraph 1 and 5 of art. 
114 (T.U.F.) provides the legal basis for the control and surveillance instruments at the 
disposition of CONSOB, known as “black list” and “grey list”19, envisaging the request of 
periodical information to a group of listed companies, under specific circumstances. In 
particular, the introduction in the two frequently updated “warning lists” is triggered by the 
auditors’ opinion with regard to uncertainties about the going concern of listed firms and upon 
the analysis of their annual or interim financial statements. 
In 2002, the black list has been the first surveillance tool to be introduced, as a result of the role 
of transparency guarantor and investors’ protector represented by CONSOB. In fact, in force 
of art. 114 of the T.U.F. and at a note issued by CONSOB, a listed firm showing financial 
strains may be introduced in the black list and, thereafter, will have the duty to provide a specific 
informative set on a monthly basis.  
Specifically, the inclusion in the black list is decided by CONSOB on the basis of two elements:  
• When the listed company has revealed losses that account for more than 1/3 of the 
statutory capital and it is in the case referred to in art. 2446 of the Italian Civil Code; 
• When auditors do not certify financial statements or report concern about the business 
going concern. 
 
19 The new companies that join the black and grey list are periodically reported in the CONSOB website, even if 




Under these circumstances, it appears evident the investors’ need to be regularly informed about 
the performance of critical management profiles of listed companies under surveillance. With 
regard to the information content, blacklisted firms have the duty to provide a monthly press 
release containing the following information: 
• Net financial position of the Parent company and the Group, highlighting short-term 
and medium-long term items separately; 
• Updates regarding the economic situation, bank amount and deviations from the budget; 
• Related party transactions of the Group and of the Parent company; 
• Overdue borrowing positions specified by type, namely the analysis of financial, 
commercial, tax and social securities; 
• Cross default clauses; 
• The description of covenants, the failure to comply with them and enforcement actions 
undertaken by creditors. 
Therefore, the press release should contain any information deemed relevant to the assessment 
of the development of the company’s financial condition. Moreover, should the reasons for the 
inclusion in the black list disappear, listed companies may ask for their removal from the 
monthly surveillance and, in such cases, CONSOB generally insert them in the grey list, as a 
precautionary act.  
Indeed, the grey list has been introduced in 2009 as a response to the need to monitor companies 
for which auditors have certified the budget but have expressed doubts about their possibility 
to survive in the market over time, representing a less precarious financial condition than 
blacklisted firms. As well, these companies are subject to disclosure obligations similar to those 
set out above, but with a different frequency, i.e. on a quarterly basis.  
Grey listed firms are required to integrate annual and half-yearly financial reports with relevant 
information and press releases in order to alert investors about the business performance. 
However, according to the Legislative Decree n. 25 of the 15th February 2016, the obligation to 
publish the interim management report related to the first and third quarter lapses. Despite this, 
firms may still voluntarily fulfil these information disclosures by issuing the interim 
management report via a press release.  
The permanence in the black and grey list may be subject to events which constitute a reason 
for the exit. Specifically, there are three possibilities to exit from the warning lists: 
• The firm’s stocks are delisted from the Stock Exchange; 
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• The auditor expresses an unqualified opinion on the firm’s financial statements; 
• The company files for liquidation or bankruptcy and ceases its activities. 
From this brief analysis of the Italian legislation in support of warning lists under CONSOBS’s 
supervision, the purpose of protection and information transparency towards investors is 
evident. Actually, these surveillance instruments represent a bridge between the pool of 
investors and listed companies by potentially reducing bankruptcies due to inadequate market 
information. As seen, the degree of concern decreases as firms included in the black list 
“retrocede” in the grey list. Thus, despite being under surveillance and financially unstable, 
these companies now have a lower degree of risk and a slightly improved reputation than before. 
 
3.3. Overview of the black list and grey list monitored by 
CONSOB 2009-2020 
Following the review of the relevant legislation on regulated market surveillance carried out by 
CONSOB, in the following paragraph it will be possible to undertake an overview of the 
evolution of the black and grey lists in the period from 2009 to 2020, focusing then on the main 
characteristics of listed companies included in these “warning lists” to date, i.e. December 2020.  
Before going into an analysis strictly focused on the firms under observation, it is necessary to 
briefly define the fundamental aspects of the Italian equity trading system, managed by Borsa 
Italiana. Indeed, it is characterized by three main markets: the market for investment vehicles 
(MIV), the alternative investment market (AIM) and the electronic stock market, also known 
as the main Italian market (MTA). MIV is the regulated market dedicated to the listing of 
vehicles that invest in the real economy, while AIM has been introduced more recently and 
regards small and medium Italian companies with high growth potential. Conversely, MTA 
represents the main regulated Italian market and it is intended for large and medium-sized 
companies. In turn, MTA is divided into Blue Chip, Star and Standard, depending on the 
business size and specific requirements to which they are subject. In particular, the Star segment 
is characterized by medium companies with capitalization between €40 million and €1 billion 
which undertake to comply with particular commitments in terms of transparency, liquidity and 
corporate governance.  
The analysis conducted on the companies under CONSOB’s observation has emphasized how, 
until today, “warning lists” have only involved firms regulated under the MTA. Into specifics, 
73 
 
the overview concerns 88 listed companies which were subject to periodical additional 
information (either monthly or quarterly) according to art. 114 (T.U.F.), covering the period 
between December 2009 until December 2020. This review aims to outline and focus on the 
dynamics regarding the evolution of the black and grey list over the last 12 years, having regard 
to dwell on their composition year by year and highlighting companies’ most relevant 
movements in terms of shifts from one list to the other, failure or exit due to recovery or 
delisting from the market. Furthermore, it should be noted that the analysis concerns an 
overview as at 31/12, as reported in detail in Appendix 1.  
 
Figure 3.1 – Evolution in the composition of CONSOB Black list and Grey list, 2009-2020. 
(Personal elaboration from CONSOB) 
As it can be noticed from Figure 3.1, the number of companies under observation has 
undergone limited variations from one year to the other, although 2012 and 2013 saw the largest 
number of supervised firms under the black list. Specifically, 2012, compared to the previous 
year, was characterized by an increase of 7 supervised firms split as follows: 6 new companies 
in the black list, 2 new companies in the grey list, offset by the exit of one recovered company. 
With respect to internal movements, it is worth mentioning that 2012 has also reported the 
largest number of companies which have shifted from the grey into the black list: in particular, 
6 companies shifted from the grey into the black list and just one company moved from the 
black into the grey list.  
Regarding 2013, the absolute increase of firms under observation is relative to 3 units but, as 
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and 9 new entries (3 in the black and 6 in the grey list) counterbalanced, contrary to 2012, by 6 
companies leaving because of bankruptcy.  
Indeed, it can be assumed that the greater number of listed companies subject to monthly 
reporting in the years between 2011 and 2013 is due not only to more extensive controls by 
auditors but, above all, to the crisis which hit the economy in those years and has worsen the 
most precarious business conditions. 
Furthermore, another interesting aspect of this overview regards listed companies stuck within 
one of the two lists for more than six years. This is, actually, the case of Bialetti S.p.A., 
Biancamano S.p.A., Eems Italia S.p.A., Gabetti Property Solutions S.p.A., Gequity S.p.A., 
Netweek S.p.A., Olidata S.p.A., Seri Industrial S.p.A., Titanmet S.p.A. and Zucchi S.p.A., 
blocked in the black list for at least seven years, which indicates their precarious situation in 
terms of economic and financial results, for which auditors have been unable to see an 
improvement such as to allow a shift into the grey list. 
On the other hand, Aedes S.p.A., Bastogi S.p.A., Beghelli S.p.A. and Eukedos S.p.A. have been 
subject to quarterly information disclosure for at least six years, constituting a better condition 
than the previous cases but still unstable to guarantee a turnaround. 
In fact, it is possible to envisage a more detailed dynamic path through the comparison between 
the composition of the two “warning lists” and the partition of companies leaving the black and 
grey lists, as displayed in Figure 3.2, differentiated according to the exit reason. 
 
Figure 3.2 – Composition of companies leaving CONSOB’s supervision, 2009-2020. (Personal 

































As reported in Figure 3.2, over the 12 years between 2009 and 2020, 50 companies have left 
the black and the grey lists. Among these, 24 (48%) were unable to effectively manage the crisis 
and, therefore, have been liquidated. Moreover, as can be seen in more detail from Appendix 1, 
almost all of the bankrupt firms, with the exception of Cobra S.p.A., were part of the black list, 
thus proving the financial distress blacklisted companies face.  
Indeed, it is interesting to note that the majority of failed firms are concentrated in the period 
between 2013 and 2015. In fact, there seems to be a correlation between the highest number of 
companies newly entering the black list, firms shifting from the grey into the black list in the 
period 2011-2013 (as displayed in Figure 3.1), and the number of failed firms in the following 
years, i.e. between 2013 and 2015. This could mean that turnaround measures taken to 
safeguard business continuity were not sufficient or were delayed with respect to the onset of 
the first signs of decline and economic crisis. 
As for the companies that were able to successfully overcome the crisis, it should be noted that 
all of them were previously included in the grey list. Although they represent the 28% (14) of 
the companies leaving the CONSOB supervision, they indicate that it is possible to carry out 
winning turnaround strategies capable of improving the financial and economic condition of 
the business. Among recovered companies, the case of Eems Italia S.p.A. and Bioera S.p.A. are 
remarkable. Thus, these two companies successfully emerged from the grey list in 2010 and 
2014 respectively, but then returned under CONSOB surveillance in the following years. In 
particular, Eems Italia S.p.A. returned to the black list in 2012 and, as well, Bioera S.p.A. in 
2020. 
Finally, 12 companies are still active but no longer under CONSOB observation due to their 
delisting from the regulated market. The most recent case is of October 2020, namely the 
suspension of Stefanel S.p.A. from Borsa Italiana for the admission to insolvency proceedings, 
although still resulting under the black list in December 2020.  
 
Following the overview regarding the evolution of the black and grey lists from 2009 to 2020, 
hereafter follows an analysis of the main characteristics concerning the two “watch lists” at the 
time this dissertation has been elaborated, i.e. December 2020. This preliminary analysis aims 
to present the situation of the last CONSOB bulletin in order to have a picture of the companies 
currently under observation, divided into black and grey lists, in terms of business dimension, 
profitability, indebtedness, liquidity condition, market capitalization and the main procedures 
undertaken, before going into the empirical analysis. In particular, data on which the analysis 
is based are taken from companies’ annual financial statements, AIDA database published by 
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Bureau van Dijk, Borsa Italiana and Thomson Reuters Eikon, with reference to the latest 
financial statements available to the public.  
Below are the lists of companies subject to periodical disclosure obligations (ex art. 114, 
T.U.F.) updated at 31/12/2020 and accompanied by the date of CONSOB request and the 
industry to which they belong (Table 3.1 and Table 3.2). 
 
Black List Companies 
Date of CONSOB 
request 
Industry 
ACOTEL GROUP S.p.A. 08 November 2016 Telecommunications 
ALGOWATT S.p.A. 12 June 2018 Utilities 
A. S. ROMA S.p.A. 21 September 2020 Media 
BIALETTI INDUSTRIE S.p.A. 27 October 2011 Consumer Products and Services 
BIANCAMANO S.p.A. 12 July 2013 Utilities 
BIOERA S.p.A. 08 May 2020 Food, Beverage and Tobacco 
CHL-CENTRO HL DISTRIBUZIONE S.p.A. 08 November 2016 Retail 
CLASS EDITORI S.p.A. 06 November 2020 Media 
EEMS ITALIA S.p.A. 13 September 2012 Technology 
EPRICE S.p.A. 26 June 2020 Consumer Products and Services 
FIDIA S.p.A. 06 November 2020 Industrial Goods and Services 
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Construction and Materials 
Consumer Products and Services 
Table 3.1 – Black List: Companies under CONSOB supervision – December 2020. (Personal 
elaboration from CONSOB and Thomson Reuters Eikon) 
 
Grey List Companies 
Date of CONSOB 
request 
Industry 
AEDES S.p.A. 08 October 2015 Real Estate 
ASTALDI S.p.A. 15 May 2018 Construction and Materials 
ATLANTIA S.p.A. 08 May 2020 Industrial Goods and Services 
AUTOSTRADE MERIDIONALI S.p.A. 02 April 2020 Industrial Goods and Services 
BANCA CARIGE S.p.A. 15 March 2017 Banks 
BANCA INTERMOBILIARE DI 
INVESTIMENTI E GESTIONI S.p.A. 
27 April 2017 Financial services 
BANCA MONTE DEI PASCHI DI SIENA 
S.p.A. 
08 November 2016 Banks 
BASTOGI S.p.A. 12 July 2013 Industrial Goods and Services 
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BEGHELLI S.p.A. 13 February 2015 Industrial Goods and Services 
BORGOSESIA S.p.A. 23 June 2017 Industrial Goods and Services 
BRIOSCHI SVILUPPO IMMOBILIARE S.p.A. 01 August 2019 Real Estate 
EUKEDOS S.p.A. 17 July 2014 Health Care 
GABETTI PROPERTY SOLUTIONS S.p.A. 06 August 2018 Real Estate 
IL SOLE 24 ORE S.p.A. 19 December 2019 Media 
LVENTURE GROUP S.p.A. 12 July 2013 Financial services 
PIERREL S.p.A. 
PLC S.p.A. 
23 May 2019 
06 August 2018 
Health Care 
Construction and Materials 
Table 3.2 – Grey List: Companies under CONSOB supervision – December 2020. (Personal 
elaboration from CONSOB and Thomson Reuters Eikon) 
To date, 23 companies belong to the black list and 17 to the grey list, but there have been several 
movements that took place during the year. Indeed, two companies have shifted from the grey 
into the black list, namely Eprice S.p.A. and A.S. Roma S.p.A., due to the increase in the 
indebtedness and the worsening of the net financial position. Furthermore, in November, the 
black list has seen the entry of two new companies immediately subject to monthly reporting, 
i.e. Class Editori S.p.A. and Fidia S.p.A. In fact, the deteriorating results were affected by the 
Covid-19 emergency which has caused the reduction of some activities of Class Editori S.p.A., 
and a negative market impact, in the case of Fidia S.p.A., that has worsened the crisis that hit 
the Automotive and Aerospace sectors in 2019.  
As well, two new companies have entered the grey list, i.e. Atlantia S.p.A. and Autostrade 
Meridionali S.p.A., showing a more moderate indebtedness but to be kept under surveillance. 
Moreover, Tas S.p.A., under quarterly disclosure obligations since July 2017, has successfully 
overcome financial distress thanks to the economic and financial improvement, leaving the grey 
list in May 2020. 
Moreover, it is also interesting to observe the breakdown of companies in terms of industries, 
as presented in Table 3.1 and Table 3.2. What is evident is that the sector with the largest 
number of companies is that of industrial goods and services, which counts 7 companies out of 
a total sample of 40. This is followed by technology, real estate and financial services sectors, 
each of them represented by 4 companies. Although these numbers are not such as to draw 
conclusions, it can reasonably be assumed that the probability of entering the black or grey list 
also depends on the dynamics of the sector in which a company operates.  
Below, with the aim of giving a schematic outline of the different characteristics of the 
companies included in the “warning lists”, it was deemed necessary to exclude those belonging 
to the financial sector because of their different business model and the preparation of financial 
statements, typical to financial institutions, that make them not comparable to the other 
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companies in the lists. Into specifics, from the black list have been excluded Gequity S.p.A. and 
Titanmet S.p.A., while from the grey list have been excluded Banca Carige S.p.A., Banca 
Intermobiliare S.p.A., Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena S.p.A. and Lventure Group S.p.A.  
Regarding the companies’ dimensionality, Figures 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 break down firms in terms 
of number of employees, total revenues and market capitalization. 
 
 
Figure 3.3 – Number of companies by number of employees. (Personal elaboration from 
Annual Financial Statements and AIDA database) 
 
 
Figure 3.4 – Number of companies according to total revenues clusters (M€). (Personal 
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Figure 3.5 – Number of companies according to market capitalization clusters (M€). (Personal 
elaboration from Thomson Reuters Eikon) 
Companies of the black and grey lists do not appear totally homogeneous according to the 
characteristics chosen to describe their size. In terms of number of employees (Figure 3.3), the 
majority (71%) of blacklisted companies have less than 500, 3 have between 500 and 1000 and 
3 more than 1000 employees. Thus, firms in the black list present an average of 641 employees, 
with a median of 297. On the other hand, the grey list appears more inhomogeneous with 4 
companies respectively in the clusters of 0-100, 100-500 and with more than 1000 employees, 
presenting a mean number of 3098 and a median of 332 employees.  
With respect to revenues partition (Figure 3.4), companies in the black and grey lists present a 
greater cohesion. The vast majority (68%) have accounted for total revenues of less than €100 
million in the last publicly available financial statement, while companies with a turnover 
between €100 and €500 million are 8 out of 34. Indeed, companies in the black list present 
average revenues for €92.39 million while those in the grey list have accounted for €1.13 
billion, value which appears inflated because of Atlantia S.p.A. which reported a turnover of 
€12.61 billion.  
Taking into consideration the market capitalization in December 2020 (Figure 3.5), almost the 
whole sample’s20 companies (94%) can be attributed to the small cap market segment, i.e. the 
segment relative to listed firms with a range of capitalization generally between €50 and €250 
million. Furthermore, the sample presents an average market value of €425.15 million, which 
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is not particularly representative of the sample because of the €12.10 billion capitalization of 
Atlantia S.p.A., but provides a more accurate median of €25.37 million.  
On the one hand, data just presented give an initial overview of listed companies currently 
included by CONSOB in the black and grey lists and, on the other hand, they appear 
representative of the Italian state of affairs, namely composed of firms characterized by smaller 
size.  
Referring now to the operating profitability of companies included in the “watch lists”, the 
following graphs (Figure 3.6 and 3.7) will give representation of EBITDA of the latest financial 
statements available.  
 
Figure 3.6 – Black list: EBITDA of companies from the last publicly available financial 




















































Figure 3.7 – Grey list: EBITDA of companies from the last publicly available financial 
statement (M€). (Personal elaboration from AIDA database and Thomson Reuters Eikon) 
Although the sample is not large enough to detect a specific pattern, Figure 3.6 and 3.7 denote 
a worse performance in relation to the blacklisted companies. Of the latter, in fact, 11 present a 
negative EBITDA, reporting therefore losses at the level of the characteristic business activity. 
This result appears in line with the severe distress these companies are facing, thus reporting an 
average EBITDA of - €1.17 million, with a median of - €0.92 million. On the other hand, 
companies of the grey list have performed better in terms of profitability, reporting a generally 
positive EBITDA. Without considering the incomparable result of Atlantia S.p.A., the sample 
has observed a positive average value in EBITDA of €8 million, consistent with the specificities 
of the grey list.  
Moreover, by comparing the total debt to the EBITDA of the latest financial statements, it is 
possible to investigate companies’ ability to pay off their incurred debt. Thus, this ratio 
measures the firm’s total obligations to the actual profitability the business brings in, and it is 
commonly used by credit rating agencies. A low ratio indicates a level of debt that allows the 
company a greater ability to honor it, while a high ratio generates concern about the 
indebtedness position. Despite this, the ideal total debt on EBITDA ratio is highly dependent 
on the specific sector in which the business operates and, consequently, varies with respect to 
the average capital requirements. Therefore, it is not possible to define ex ante the proper ratio 
threshold but, generally, a ratio greater than 5 is considered a cause for concern.  
Furthermore, negative values in terms of EBITDA reduce the comprehensibility of the ratio 
































Figure 3.8 – Black list: total debt/EBITDA. (Personal elaboration from Annual Financial 
Statements and AIDA database) 
Among the companies on the black list, Tiscali S.p.A., Zucchi S.p.A., Class Editori S.p.A., 
Trevi S.p.A., Biancamano S.p.A. and Algowatt S.p.A. generate the greatest concern with a ratio 
higher than 10, representing a high amount of debt compared to the operating result of the latest 
financial statements. On the other hand, the indebtedness condition of Olidata S.p.A., Itway 
S.p.A. and Seri Industrial S.p.A. appears sustainable.  
Similarly, as shown in Figure 3.9, there are few companies with a ratio below the ideal level of 
5, namely Il Sole 24 Ore S.p.A., Pierrel S.p.A. and Beghelli S.p.A., while the spotlight is on 
Gabetti S.p.A., Autostrade Meridionali S.p.A., Atlantia S.p.A., Eukedos S.p.A., Brioschi 
S.p.A., PLC S.p.A., Bastogi S.p.A. and Astaldi S.p.A., the latter presented a ratio of 392.54 due 
















































Table 3.9 – Grey list: total debt/EBITDA. (Personal elaboration from Annual Financial 
Statements and AIDA database) 
As regards the liquidity and the near-term financial solidity of the black and grey lists, the 
following graphs (Figure 3.10 and 3.11) investigate the companies’ ability to keep up with 
short-term payments in terms of quick ratio.  
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Figure 3.11 – Grey list: quick ratio. (Personal elaboration from AIDA database) 
Into specifics, a value of the quick ratio lower than 0.8 will be considered as the critical 
threshold.  
As regards the black list, 17 out of 21 companies have a quick ratio lower than the threshold 
value, thus performing an average value of 0.56 and, therefore, demonstrating a general 
criticality and concern in terms of solvency. The grey list, on the other hand, performs better 
and shows a greater ability to cope with short-term payments. In fact, the sample has an average 
quick ratio of 1.02 (0.74 excluding the specific case of Borgosesia S.p.A.), with 7 companies 
out of 13 characterized by a value lower than 0.8. 
 
Most of the companies currently involved in the suveillance lists, as can be seen from Table 3.1 
and 3.2, have been subject to CONSOB supervision for at least 3 years. Thus, the prolongation 
of financial distress has made it necessary to implement more or less invasive resolutive 
measures. As discussed in Chapter II, if out-of-court turnaroud strategies are not sufficient to 
recover from the downward spiral of the crisis, the legislator provides for restructuring 
processes which can occur under the protection of the legal instruments offered by the 
Bankruptcy Law. As Tables 3.3 and 3.4 show, most of the companies have adopted measures 
requiring an absent or limited intervention of the court, i.e. certificate plans (ex art. 67, l.f.) and 
































Black List Companies Insolvency proceeding 
ACOTEL GROUP S.p.A. 
ALGOWATT S.p.A. 
A. S. ROMA S.p.A. 




CLASS EDITORI S.p.A. 














Certificate plan ex art. 67 
Out-of-court restructuring 
Debt restructuring agreement ex art. 182 
Debt restructuring agreement ex art. 182 
Out-of-court restructuring 
Bankruptcy request from the court 
Out-of-court restructuring 
Debt restructuring agreement ex art. 182 
Out-of-court restructuring 
Admission to composition with creditors ex art. 160 
Out-of-court restructuring 
Out-of-court restructuring 
Composition with creditors ex art. 160 




Debt restructuring agreement ex art. 182 
Debt restructuring agreement ex art. 182 
Debt restructuring agreement ex art. 182 
Table 3.3 – Black list: Insolvency proceedings adopted. (Personal elaboration based from 
Annual Financial Statements and CONSOB) 
 








BRIOSCHI SVILUPPO IMMOBILIARE S.p.A. 
EUKEDOS S.p.A. 
GABETTI PROPERTY SOLUTIONS S.p.A. 
IL SOLE 24 ORE S.p.A. 
PIERREL S.p.A. 
PLC S.p.A. 
Debt restructuring agreement ex art. 182 




Certificate plan ex art. 67 
Debt restructuring agreement ex art. 182 
Certificate plan ex art. 67 
Composition with creditors ex art. 160 
Debt restructuring agreement ex art. 182 
Out-of-court restructuring 
Out-of-court restructuring 
Debt restructuring agreement ex art. 182 
Table 3.4 – Grey list: Insolvency proceedings adopted. (Personal elaboration based on Annual 





Few companies have, instead, adopted more invasive strategies: Fidia S.p.A., Netweek S.p.A., 
Astaldi S.p.A. and Eukedos S.p.A. have implemented a composition with creditors (ex art. 160, 
l.f.), Stefanel S.p.A. is currently facing an extraordinary administration while for CHL S.p.A. 
the court has filed for bankruptcy.  
Indeed, what can be observed is that companies subject to prolonged surveillance have gone 
beyond the certificate plan (ex art. 67, l.f.) and have primarily intervened on their debt 
structures. Actually, among the most common contents of the financial plan emerge: 
commitment to equity injections, rescheduling of existing long-term debt, request for new 
financing and redetermination of covenants.  
 
3.4. Empirical analysis: rationale and methodology 
The analysis conducted in the previous paragraph concerning all the companies that have been 
part of the black and grey lists of CONSOB from 2009 to today is considered preparatory to the 
empirical analysis that will be performed in Chapter IV. In fact, it has given way to identify the 
fundamental characteristics of the firms currently under observation, especially in terms of 
resolutive measures undertaken, and to point out the companies that left the lists following the 
resolution of the crisis.  
Therefore, the objective of this dissertation is to analyze the causes that led to the outbreak of 
the corporate crisis and the related measures implemented in three different business conditions. 
In fact, it was deemed necessary and interesting to compare three companies, namely one of the 
black list, one of the grey list and one currently recovered and out of surveillance, with the aim 
of investigating what unites and what distinguishes the turnaround measures adopted by the two 
companies in the “watch lists” with respect to the company out of the crisis.  
In order to fulfill this research question, the selection has fallen on companies belonging to the 
manufacturing sector with a long history of surveillance by the CONSOB in order to be able to 
grasp the impact of the resolutive strategies adopted over a time horizon of 5 years, from 2015 
to 2019. The choice of the time period allows to neutralize the direct impact of the global crisis 
of 2008 and the current crisis condition due to the spread of the covid-19 pandemic, which had 
an important impact on most of the production sectors in 2020.  
Zucchi S.p.A., a company under observation since June 2010, has been selected for the black 
list. Beghelli S.p.A. has been considered representative of the grey list because of its inclusion 
in it since February 2015. Instead, among recovered companies, it is interesting to observe the 
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Pininfarina S.p.A. case: a company under surveillance in the grey list (since July 2009) and 
recently considered no longer of concern by CONSOB.  
The data on which the analysis is based are obtained from the AIDA database published by 
Bureau Van Djik and are also integrated by the periodical information issued to the market and 
by the annual financial statements of the companies. Furthermore, annual financial statements 
have been reclassified in such a way to highlight the relevant margins and measures to better 
investigate the company’s performance and financial position, as will be seen in the Appendix. 
Furthermore, each company has been compared with a comparable firm belonging to the same 
sector in order to better appreciate the results. 
Each company will be presented in the paragraphs below in relation to its scope of business, 
group structure and history.  
 
3.4.1 Zucchi: structure and history 
Zucchi is the largest Italian group of home textiles and an international reference in the 
production and distribution of linen. The business units of the Group constitute an organic 
complex of manufacturing, creative and distributive structures, operating both at the level of 
finished and semi-finished products and finishing processes for third parties.  
The range of products offered by the Group includes: 
• Bedroom products: such as sheets, pillowcases, duvets, bedspreads 
• Livingroom products: such as curtains, carpets, sofa covers, table services, kitchen items 
• Bathroom products: such as towels, bathrobes, bathmats  
• Semi-finished products: cotton yarns and raw fabrics 
• Dyeing and print work services on behalf of third parties  
Furthermore, the corporate structure of the Zucchi Group on the 31st December 2019 is 





 Business unit Zucchi and subsidiaries 
 Business unit hospitality 
 Other services 
 Related company 
 
Figure 3.12 – The structure of Zucchi Group. (Consolidated non-financial report 2019) 
Among its strengths, the Group boats the strong competitive positioning of the two owned-
brands, namely Zucchi and Bassetti, which guarantee a substantial share of the Italian 
household linen market and an international presence. In fact, the former is positioned on the 
premium segment, while the latter serves the medium-high segment, thus characterizing the 
first business unit of the Group, which is also licensee of some highly appealing brands. 
Moreover, in recent years, this market positioning has allowed Zucchi to satisfy a wide clientele 
through a varied range of products, also completed in terms of style and quality with products 
dedicated to high-end hotels, managed by the hospitality business unit.  
The current structure is the result of a strong revision process of the entire Group’s organization 




























to be realized through the rationalization of the offer, the repositioning of the brands with a 
view to greater complementarity and the conversion of the point of sale into a double-brand 
(Zucchi and Bassetti). In this respect, the supply chain management represents a key aspect for 
the Group’s business activities, even more so following the restructuring in progress and the 
industrial plan currently being implemented, as will be seen in Chapter IV. The Zucchi Group 
avails of a complete outsourced production through which it has the opportunity to build long-
term collaborative relationships and partnerships with its suppliers, but with a constant 
supervision in order to guarantee a good level of quality and service. In detail, it should be noted 
that the suppliers of raw materials are located for the most part in Asia (73%), as are the 
suppliers of finished goods (70%), while the suppliers of third-party processing are mainly 
located in Italy (88%). Currently, the Group is present in 20 countries making use of a capillary 
distribution network characterized by three types of channels. First of all, Zucchi manages the 
direct channel represented by the stores located in large cities and in the so-called premium 
locations. The indirect channel, instead, oversees the peripheral areas with stores managed by 
independent and franchise partners. In 2019, the commercial network comprises 214 stores: 71 
to oversee the direct channel and 143 for the indirect. As a whole, they were divided as follows: 
71 in Italy, 64 in Germany, 60 in Switzerland and 19 in Spain.  
Taking a step back, the story of the Zucchi Group begins in 1920, when Vincenzo Zucchi and 
his business partner founded their first textile business thanks to the acquisition of the 
Casorezzo facility. A few years later, in 1953, the company Vincenzo Zucchi S.p.A. was 
established. Then, 60s and 70s were characterized by an expansion process in terms of 
acquisitions and mergers, aiming at the vertical integration of Zucchi and, among the acquired 
companies, there emerge B.C.A. F.lli Tosi and Manspugna, both specialized in the sponge 
industry. In 1982, Vincenzo Zucchi S.p.A. was listed in the Milan Stock Exchange. Moreover, 
the expansion process did not stop and culminated in the acquisition of Bassetti in 1986, direct 
competitor of Zucchi on the household linen industry, through which the company acquired the 
indirect control of Mascioni S.p.A. ad Bera SA in 1988 and of Jalla SAS and Descamps SAS.   
The 2000s, on the other hand, were characterized by the first signals of decline, mainly 
following the acquisition processes from which the company was not able to retrieve synergies 
and, therefore, properly integrate with target companies. Furthermore, the lack of flexibility of 
the business structure and the growing competition of the markets in which it was operating 
made the crisis manifest. As a consequence, from 2005, the Group initiated a process of 
industrial and corporate rationalization and restructuring, aimed at the streamlining of the 
corporate structure and at the regaining of its competitive foothold. In this context, numerous 
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turnaround measures took place, such as production plans closure, workforce reduction, the 
incorporation of Bassetti and Standartela in the parent company Vincenzo Zucchi S.p.A. in 
2006 and the sale of 80% of the share capital of Descamps SAS in 2011, ad part of its 
restructuring procedure. Despite this, in 2008, the financial crisis hit heavily the household 
products industry, exacerbating the distress condition of the Group and necessitating its entry 
into the black list of CONSOB in June 2010. This made it necessary the implementation of 
several strategic plans, which culminated, in more recent years, in a debt restructuring 
agreement signed in 2015 on the basis of the industrial plan 2015-2020, as will be seen in more 
detail in Chapter IV.      
 
 
3.4.2 Beghelli: structure and history 
Beghelli is an Italian company, as well as the country’s leader in the emergency lighting sector. 
It designs, manufactures and distributes appliances for professional-technical lighting, also 
creating electronic systems for home automation, industrial and home security.  
The current areas of activity can be divided into the following two sectors: 
• Lighting: it includes products relating to emergency lighting and ordinary lighting. The 
former, divided into industrial and domestic, includes devices that allow lighting in the 
event of a power failure. The latter, on the other hand, includes lighting devices and 
light sources (bulbs) intended for industrial, tertiary and domestic applications, with 
technological solutions also aimed at the achievement of high energy savings and 
equipped with measurement and remote-control systems;  
• Other activities:  this segment encompasses consumer electronic devices, such as cells 
and batteries, household products, products with plug power, as well as electronic 
systems designed to satisfy the general need for safety, both in the domestic and 
industrial sectors, with the supply of remote assistance providers, generic anti-intrusion 
and security devices.  




Figure 3.13 – The structure of Beghelli Group. (Consolidated non-financial report 2019) 
Beghelli's business model is divided into a plurality of phases and functions which include the 
research and development, planning and purchasing, logistical coordination of goods 
production, as well as quality control of each phase, marketing, distribution and sale of 
components and services matched to the products. Specifically, the R&D activity is considered 
key in the process of market demand analysis, allowing the Group to acquire a certain know-
how and a significant competitive advantage in the lighting market. This, together with the 
activities relating to the definition of strategies and industrial, commercial and financial 
coordination, are the responsibility of the parent company Beghelli S.p.A.  
Indeed, the manufacturing activity is mainly carried out by companies belonging to the Group 
based in the Czech Republic, Germany and China, reserving however the production of 
components and products with high added value to the Italian factories.  
The Group is also active in the field of industrial and domestic safety and energy saving services 
through its own company Beghelli Servizi S.r.l. It offers complementary services to the sale of 
products and, in particular, the replacement or new installation of lighting devices.  
Finally, the finished products are sold to wholesalers of electrical equipment, appliance stores, 
large-scale distribution, large contractors and other sales channels, through the Group’s 
companies located in Europe and abroad. 
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The history of Beghelli began in 1982 following the construction of the first fixed-installation 
emergency lamp that gave way to the company operating in the production of lighting 
equipment. In the following years, the company was able to expand its business, from 
emergency lighting up to electronic systems for home and industrial security, thanks to huge 
investments and R&D activities. Then, in 1988, Beghelli S.p.A. was listed on the Italian stock 
exchange. Together with the introduction of new products, between 1999 and 2000, the 
company also began the expansion abroad. Among the activities undertaken, it emerges the 
acquisition of Elplast in the Czech Republic, specialized in the production of metal ceiling 
lights, the acquisition of the Canadian Luxnet (which will later become Beghelli Canada) 
manufacturer of lighting and emergency luminaires, and that of German Praezisa, manufacturer 
of centralized emergency systems and second operator on the German emergency lighting 
market. Furthermore, the Beghelli Group have also established few branches abroad, from the 
United States to China.  
Short before the crisis of 2009, the Group launched a service for the municipalities that included 
the installation of the new generation of lighting systems at zero cost, to be paid with the energy 
savings obtained over a period of 7-8 years. As a result of the crisis, the banks decided to froze 
credits and the Beghelli Group found itself with a high level of indebtedness and a negative net 
financial position. Then, the worsening of the company’s financial condition led to the inclusion 
of the Group into the black list of CONSOB in 2013. In the same year, the Group embarked on 
a recovery plan (ex art. 67, l.f.) to obtain the rescheduling of the exposures to banks. The 
turnaround activity has involved the downsizing of the production in China and Czech Republic 
and the internalization of part of the productions back in Italy. The plan, which became effective 
in 2014, reported good results in the following two years, guaranteeing to the Group the shift 
into the grey list of CONSOB in February 2015. Thanks to the positive management trend, in 
December 2016 the Beghelli Group has requested the early termination of the agreement with 









3.4.3 Pininfarina: structure and history 
Pininfarina is an Italian leading player in the automobile sector. Indeed, the company acts as an 
international partner, offering a complete contribution to the development of a new product 
through the design, planning, industrialization and construction phases of small series, 
providing these different capacities also separately and with great flexibility. Pininfarina’s 
business is moved by values of elegance, purity and innovation, leveraging on the luxury of the 
made in Italy.  
Its core business is design and engineering services, where the company can boat on its strong 
brand name and its indisputable reputation as a car designer, its excellent technical know-how, 
also in specific segments of the industrial engineering services value chain. 
The corporate structure of Pininfarina at 31 December 2019 is presented in Figure 3.14. 
 
 
Figure 3.14 – The structure of Pininfarina Group. (Consolidated non-financial report 2019) 
In order to better focus on the two souls of its business, with effect from 1st January 2019, the 
Group has changed its structure. Thus, Pininfarina Extra merged by incorporation into the 
parent company Pininfarina, allowing the confluence of industrial design, transformation 
design, architecture and interior design into a single company. At the same time, the Group 
decided to set up Pininfarina Engineering S.r.l., with the aim of guaranteeing the highest 

























strategy favors the shortening of the design control chain and the centralization of commercial 
strategies, allowing the Group to focus its efforts more effectively.  
The Group is located in Italy, Germany, China and the United States, selling mainly to Italy 
and Germany, with a growth strategy also in China and the United States. From Germany, the 
subsidiary controls and coordinates its German customers and provides the first point of contact 
for all core areas from the development competence at system level to small series 
manufacturing in Italy.  
Moreover, in 2006 it has established Pininfarina of America subsidiary, working within the US, 
Canada and Latin America markets. The company’s design scope includes transportation 
design (yacht and aircraft), industrial design (equipment and machinery, furnishings, consumer 
goods), architecture and interior design (residential projects, hospitality, sports and commercial 
structures). Furthermore, the establishment of Pininfarina Shangai Co. Ltd. in 2010 allows to 
benefit from the steady growth of the Chinese automotive market through the development of 
partnerships with local car manufacturers.  
The history of Pininfarina begins in 1930 when Battista Farina founded Carrozzeria Pinin 
Farina as a joint-stock company. Since then, the concept of the company and its attention to the 
elegance of the made in Italy was clear. Actually, in 1946 the Cisitalia was the first car to be 
included in the permanent collection of a modern art museum, the MoMa in New York. Thanks 
to the publicity received, the following years were characterized by high industrial growth and 
by the cooperation with Nash Motors, which resulted in high-volume production of Pininfarina 
designs and, accordingly, to the major entry into the US market.  
In the 1950s, the historic collaboration with the Ferrari Group also began, with the creation of 
more than 100 iconic models to date, guaranteeing the exploitation and acquisition of ever 
greater know-how and synergies. In the 1960s, the Group moved towards large-scale 
manufacturing thanks to the opening of new facilities and investments in the science of 
automotive design aimed at the modernization and differentiation of the company from the 
other Italian coachbuilders. In the 1980s and 1990s, the Pininfarina Group expanded abroad 
with the incorporation of Pininfarina Deutschland to best serve the German automotive sector. 
In 1986, furthermore, the Group has been listed on the Italian stock exchange.  
The Pininfarina Group’s good results were halted few years before the 2008 global crisis 
because of the significant debt level of the company, aggravated by the crisis of the automobile 
sector which led to a sharp reduction in production volumes by all major manufactures. As a 
consequence, the CONSOB deemed it necessary to surveil the Group under the grey list since 
July 2009. Financial difficulties continued until the debt restructuring agreement of 2015 and 
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the following entrance into the Mahindra Group. Indeed, the latter, owner of the Indian 
automobile company Mahindra&Mahindra, agreed to acquire 76% stake in the Pininfarina 
Group from the holding company Pincar. Subsequently, the Pininfarina Group has been able to 
recover from the long period of crisis, also boosted by the new Group’s strong international 





























CHAPTER 4: EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
4.1. Introduction 
After having explored the definition of companies in distress and the turnaround measures 
generally implemented to overcome the crisis, in this chapter we will get to the heart of the 
empirical analysis. Into specifics, it will deal with three different case studies, each of them 
attributable to different business conditions: Zucchi, currently under the black list, Beghelli, 
belonging to the grey list, and Pininfarina, which managed to exit from CONSOB’s “watch 
lists” in 2019. Therefore, the objective of this dissertation is to analyze the causes that led to 
the outbreak of the corporate crisis, with specific attention to the restructuring measures 
implemented, and assess if each company has managed to improve its performance in terms of 
profitability, indebtedness level and financial solidity. To do so, the investigation will cover a 
5-year period from 2015 to 2019 in order to catch the company’s evolution under the main 
performance metrics. Furthermore, each case study will be accompanied by the comparison 
with a peer company belonging to the sector of the firm under investigation, with the aim of 
conducting a comparison in relation to specific measures of value. Indeed, current performance 
developments, namely of 2020, will be discussed in order to capture the evolution of the 
company under a distressed market condition, consequence of the covid-19 pandemic outbreak. 
Ultimately, each case study will be followed by considerations on its trend and the effectiveness 
of turnaround measures implemented.  
 
4.2. Zucchi 
Zucchi, which has been on the black list since 2010, will be the first company to be analyzed 
over the selected time horizon, i.e. 2015-2019. Into specifics, the analysis of its income 
performance and its capital structure will refer to the reclassified financial statements reported 
in Appendix 2. Moreover, to make the data more understandable, it was considered appropriate 
to compare specific measures of value with those of a peer company operating in the same 
reference market, namely the Italian household linen sector. To this regard, the choice fell on 
Caleffi due to the specific characteristics of the company. Despite its minor state of affairs, 
Caleffi operates in the same markets of Zucchi and makes use of analogous distribution 
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channels. Furthermore, compared to other peer companies, it has been affected to a lesser extent 
by the crisis that hit Zucchi in the early 2000s.  
Briefly, Caleffi has a large and balanced portfolio of its own and licensed brands, such as 
Disney, Roberto Cavalli Home Collection, Trussardi Home Linen, Diesel Home Linen and 
Marvel. Moreover, thanks to an extensive distribution network, both in the retail and wholesale 
business, it is widely present in Italy and abroad.  
 
4.2.1. Causes of distress and financial manoeuvre 
Decline 
The crisis of Zucchi established its roots at the beginning of the new decade following the 
company’s expansion process implemented over the years, as seen in Paragraph 3.4.1. In fact, 
among the underlying causes of distress is the inability of the Group to effectively integrate and 
realize the full synergies’ value from the acquired companies and to adapt their production 
structures to the household linen market specificities and, in particular, to the need and 
characteristics of the existing business. As a consequence, the company found itself operating 
as a market leader in Italy but with a very rigid corporate structure which, over the years, has 
proved unsuitable for the changes occurred in the external competitive environment. Indeed, at 
the beginning of 2000s, the subjects operating in Zucchi’s competitive context of reference had 
undertaken a process of outsourcing with the aim of resorting to labor at a lower wage, thus 
reducing production costs and increasing margins. On the other hand, Zucchi made use of 
production facilities located mainly in Italy and France, consequently losing competitiveness. 
When, following the early 2000s, Zucchi recorded its first negative net income in 2004 (- €17 
million), a business turnaround intervention became more than necessary in order to avoid the 
downward spiral of the crisis. In fact, from the first signs of decline, the company has 
undertaken a business transformation process aimed at recovering a competitive position in the 
reference market and streamlining its cost structure. In this context, disposals of non-strategic 
assets and the outsourcing of process phases were undertaken with the aim of reducing 
operating costs, to be followed then by the development of an international image of the brand. 
At first glance, the company reorganization measures slowed down the negative trend of the 
Group, but this was not enough in the face of the serious global crisis that hit the markets in 
2008, also bringing the Italian household linen sector to its knees and, in turn, aggravating the 
fragile condition of Zucchi.  
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Zucchi's difficulties were consequently reflected in the performance of its share price on the 
Italian stock exchange, leading to significant fluctuations in the period between the early 2000s 
and the outbreak of the global crisis. As it can be noticed from Figure 4.1, the share price 
declined from a mean value of €155 per share (2000) to a minimum of €89 in 2003, year of 
manifestation of the first important reductions in terms of revenues and operating margins. The 
company's condition further worsened in 2005 and 2006, leading to strongly reduced 
contribution margins, with revenues almost equal to operating costs. As a consequence, the 
market proved to be cautious and uncertain about the Group's performance, as reflected in the 
minimum price per share of €76 in 2006. Again, as mentioned above, the situation worsened 




















Zucchi’s industrial transformation undertaken in the last years of the first decade of the 21st 
century was not enough to stop the negative trend performance of the company and the impact 
of the crisis. In fact, the clear worsening of the firm’s condition and the financial difficulties in 
meeting its obligations, led to CONSOB’s intervention and the consequent Zucchi’s inclusion 
under the black list in 2010.  
The following years were characterized by turnaround efforts and objectives supported by 
various strategic and restructuring plans and, more specifically, by three different debt 
restructuring agreements pursuant to art. 182-bis (l.f.). In particular, the first two agreements, 
of 2011 and 2013, did not lead to the results called for by the respective business plans.  
Into specifics, the 2011 debt restructuring agreement provided for the share capital increase, the 
consolidation and the rescheduling of the long-term debt (€44.3 million), the renewal of short-
term credit lines and the revision of interest rates. The agreement was based on a business plan 
concerning the period 2011-2015 and providing for the company’s cost structure redefinition, 
the brand repositioning and internationalization, and the focusing on wholesale channels.  
Despite the actions undertaken, the group failed to fulfill the forecasted results, thus, requiring 
the implementation of the renewal of the debt restructuring agreement in 2013, on the basis of 
the 2013-2017 strategic plan.  
However, once again, Zucchi was not able to achieve performance improvements and it 
required a new deal with banks aimed at preserving the business continuity, thus signing the 
third debt restructuring agreement in 2015. The preparation of the new financial manoeuvre is 
supported by business and financial initiatives that have found expression in a new business 
plan for the period 2015-2020, aimed at relaunching the company in the domestic and 
international environment. As we will see in the following paragraphs, the company’s 
restructuring attempt will lead to the results hoped for by the Group and, above all, to the early 
resolution of the agreement in October 2020, thanks to a refinancing operation.  
Again, the market kept on with its declining path in relation to Zucchi’s share price (Figure 
4.2). In particular, investors showed great uncertainty in 2011 because of the first debt 
restructuring agreement implementation. In this period, the price reached two peaks of €44.8 
and €42, respectively in May 2011 and November 2011, but then assessed on a slightly 









Figure 4.2 – Zucchi: price per share (2008-2020). (Morningstar) 
 
For the sake of this dissertation, the focus will be on the last business plan (2015-2020) on 
which the respective debt restructuring agreement (2015) is based. 
Into specific, among the strategic measures implemented, the common denominator is 
represented by the objective of increase in the efficiency of the Group’s cost structure and 
profitability recover. Indeed, the business plan envisages the rationalization of the offer, the 
repositioning of the brands with a view to greater complementarity (in a “power of one” logic) 
and the conversion of the points of sale into the two brands Zucchi and Bassetti, to be articulated 
in two successive phases: 
• The turnaround phase (2015-2017) entails the simplification of the offer, the 
rationalization of the points of sale supported by initiatives aimed at the stable reduction 
of costs, as well as the closure of the Brazilian branch;   
• The development phase (2017-2020), then, should be achieved through the 
implementation of activities targeted at the strengthening of the complementarity among 
the Group’s brands (eliminating, therefore, possible overlaps) and Zucchi repositioning 
among the companies operating in the high end of the reference sector, leveraging on 

















These turnaround actions have been integrated with a financial manoeuvre endorsed in the debt 
restructuring agreement signed in December 2015 (ex art. 182-bis, l.f.) which has been 
negotiated with banks and supported by the French private equity fund Astrance Capital SAS.  
In fact, the agreement has involved, other than Astrance, a pool of creditor banks made up of 
Unicredit, Intesa Sanpaolo, Banca Popolare di Milano, Banca Popolare di Bergamo, as well as 
Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, GB Holding and Gianluigi Buffon. Therefore, the financial 
manoeuvre has the objective of easing the debt obligation constraints of the Group while 
improving its profitability performance, through the enforcement of the following measures: 
• The establishment of a special purpose vehicle (SPV) to which the company will 
transfer the business branch constituted by €30 million of the Group’s debt (transferred 
debt), the properties located in Isca Pantanelle, Notaresco, Casorezzo, Vimercate and 
Rescaldina and the relations with five employees. Alternatively, the Group may decide 
to transfer these properties to a real estate investment fund, together with any obligation 
related to the transferred debt. Then, as part of the operation, the SPV will enter into a 
rental contract with the Group for the property located in Rescaldina, against which the 
company will pay an annual rent of €1 million; 
• An earn-out real estate provision thanks to which the SPV will grant the pool of banks 
an amount equal to 75% of the net proceeds arising from the properties’ sale and 
exceeding the transferred debt; 
• A debt waiver in favor of Zucchi Group of the transferred debt portion than has not been 
repaid though asset disposals;  
• A debt waiver in favor of the Group corresponding to the residual debt amounting to 
€49.6 million, namely the difference between the overall exposure toward the pool of 
banks and the transferred debt. Furthermore, the banks will be paid an earn-out 
calculated on the basis of the internal rate of return earned by Astrance on its €10 million 
investment; 
• The granting or confirmation by banks of self-liquidating credit lines amounting to a 
maximum of €17.538.000 subject to the stipulation by the company of insurance 
policies to guarantee the validity and collectability of its trade receivables; 
• A capital increase in Zucchi equal to €10 million reserved to GB Holding (at the time 
the majority shareholder with a stake equal to 33.7%) and transferred to the newly 
established Newco, with the simultaneous commitment by Astrance to provide a cash 











Figure 4.3 – Zucchi: main provisions of the restructuring plan (2015-2020). (Personal 
elaboration from Zucchi website) 
Taking into account the overview of the initiatives undertaken for the period 2015-2020 (Figure 
4.3), it will be possible to investigate in the following paragraphs the actual results obtained by 
the Group for the considered period of analysis and possibly see the effects of the debt 
restructuring agreement in place. The analysis will retrace the performance of the company in 
the period 2015-201921, also in relation to the movements of its invested capital and financial 
structure, only to draw conclusions in relation to Zucchi’s ability to meet the provisions called 






21 2019 is referred to the year of the last publicly available annual financial statements. In addition, the choice of 
the analysis period excludes the further negative impacts which the advent of the covid-19 pandemic had on 




Turnaround phase (2015-2017) 
• Reduction of operating and 
structural costs 
• Closure of 18 stores operating 
with negative EBITDA 
• Product offering simplification 
 
Development phase (2017-2020) 
• Strengthening of brands 
complementarity 
• Internationalization process 




➢ Establishment of an SPV with the 
transfer of a business branch made 
up by: 
• €30 million debt 
• Properties  
• Contracts with 5 employees 
 
➢ Debt waiver corresponding to a 
total amount of €49.6 million 
➢ Self-liquidating credit lines up to a 
maximum amount of €17.5 million 
➢ Capital increase of €10 million 
Business Plan Debt Restructuring Agreement 
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4.2.2. Sales trend and operating profitability 
In the analysis period 2015-2019, the amount of total revenues of Zucchi shows a slightly 
fluctuating trend with the highest volume recorded in 2015, as is evident from Figure 4.4. In 
fact, compared to previous years, total sales have never exceeded the value of €100 million for 
reasons linked not only to the household linen market trends but also to the strategic measures 
undertaken. Indeed, in the turnaround phase (2015-2017), the business plan has envisaged the 
reduction of costs also through stores closure operating with significant losses, specifically 
involving 18 retailers and, therefore, impacting on the volume of total revenues.  
 
 
Figure 4.4 – Zucchi: total revenues (M€) and revenues growth rate. (Personal elaboration from 
AIDA database and Annual Financial Statements) 
In 2015, Zucchi has accounted a reduction of -6.6% in total revenues compared to the previous 
year (€102.2 million) as a consequence of the negative economic situation that affected in 
particular the Italian market and for the state of difficulty under which the company operated 
following the admission to the bankruptcy procedure. Thus, this reduction has involved both 
the sales of the Group’s companies operating in Italy and abroad.  
The shrinking turnover also continued in the following two years for few specific reasons. First 
of all, the delays in production launches recorded in the last quarter of 2015, due to the ongoing 
restructuring, led to procurement problems which negatively influenced sales’ volume in the 
first half of 2016. Secondly, 2015 has been characterized by a retail policy made up of high 
commercial discounts which have affected sell-out sales of both 2016 (-14.0%) and 2017 (-
95,4  
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2.0%).  Furthermore, the reduction in the volume of business has been primarily recorded by 
the parent company due to the declining household linen sector and has involved the domestic 
reference market and some foreign markets. Nevertheless, both 2016 and 2017 have recorded 
an increase in European sales due to the higher turnover achieved by the Bassetti Deutschland 
subsidiary, as provided for by the business plan.  
As shown in Figure 4.4, 2018 has presented a reversal in sales trend with a revenue growth rate 
of 11.1% (€89.3 million) compared to 2017 but, despite this, the total volume has returned to a 
value of €75.6 million in 2019. Indeed, the increase in sales in 2018 was due to an important 
order relative to the parent’s company promotional channel in Italy, hence returning to a 
decrease in sales in 2019. Overall, the company achieved an increase in the total volumes of 
affairs in foreign markets, totally in line with its internationalization objective. 
By analyzing revenues growth rates experienced by the comparable Caleffi, a slight volatility 
emerges also in the total sales of the latter in the 2015-2019 time period (Figure 4.5). 
 
 
Figure 4.5 – Zucchi: total revenues growth rate comparison. (Personal elaboration from AIDA 
database and Annual Financial Statements) 
What appears interesting is the inverse trend performed by Caleffi with respect to Zucchi. In 
fact, the comparable firm presented increasing revenues in the two-year period 2015-2016, 
followed by an inverted path in the three following years. This dynamic is explained by the 
limited financial difficulties encountered by the competitor in the first two years of analysis 
followed, then, by the slowing course of the household linen market in later years. Actually, as 
























namely a relatively large order accounted by the Group. Apart from this, the comparison 
highlights the contractual impact that Zucchi’s debt restructuring agreement had on sales. 
As displayed in Figure 4.6, it is also interesting to examine the amount of total revenues per 
employee. In fact, the graph makes it possible to highlight a stable pattern in the Zucchi’s ratio, 
but a general lower profitability compared to the competitor, despite the personnel reduction 
implemented during the turnaround phase.  
 
 
Figure 4.6 – Zucchi: revenues per employee comparison. (T€) (Personal elaboration from 
AIDA database and Annual Financial Statements) 
 
Zucchi’s ability to comply with the turnaround measures undertaken is more visible from the 






















Figure 4.7 – Zucchi: EBITDA (M€) and EBITDA margin. (Personal elaboration from AIDA 
database and Annual Financial Statements) 
The EBITDA trend appears relatively positive and growing, both in terms of absolute value and 
in relation to the amount of total revenues. However, 2015 was characterized by a negative 
EBITDA of - €10.8 million, with a -11.3% in EBITDA margin, despite being the year with the 
highest sales volume compared to the time horizon considered. This result is due to the high 
cost of sales and structural expenses, accounting for - €106.2 million, on which the Group 
strongly intervened on the following years. In fact, the implementation of strategic measures is 
visible from the u-turn obtained since 2016. Thus, the positive values accounted in terms of 
EBITDA were largely due to the reduction in raw materials, consumables and goods expenses, 
as a consequence of the lower volumes of sales and the rationalization of the number of variants 
of the supply structure, aiming at the achievement of higher contribution margins. Furthermore, 
the progressive implementation of the reorganization and cost containment activities of the 
Group has led to a further decrease of operating expenses. In fact, the reduction of the workforce 
is primarily visible from the decline of the personnel expenses by -26.6% between 2015 and 
2016, while accounting for limited fluctuations the following years. On the other hand, a further 
reduction in structural costs was essentially due to the decrease in direct management charges 
of shops and outlets, as well as the reduction of points of sale managed by the parent company. 
Thanks to these strategic manoeuvres, indeed, the reduction in total sales was offset in 2019 by 
a reduction in the cost of goods and raw materials (-23.6%) and operating expenses (-20.5%). 
Moreover, the results obtained in the last two years support the idea that the company has 
managed to achieve the objectives set by the turnaround phase, thus entering the subsequent 
development phase. 
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Taking into account also the non-monetary line items, i.e. depreciation and amortization, it is 
possible to confirm the slightly positive path of the operating activities (Figure 4.8). 
 
 
Figure 4.8 – Zucchi: EBIT (M€) and EBIT margin. (Personal elaboration from AIDA database 
and Annual Financial Statements) 
The greatest impact in terms of amortization and depreciation is envisaged in 2015 and 2019 
while, for the intermediate years, the reduction in EBITDA results quite stable in relative terms. 
Actually, in 2015 the company reported write-downs for €2.45 million and total A&D for €2.6 
million, mainly referred to the fixed assets of the stores for which the closure has been 
envisaged, reporting therefore a negative EBIT margin of -16.6%. Instead, the impact of non-
monetary costs accounted for quite constant amounts, for a mean of €1.7 million, but decreasing 
in the value of depreciation due to the aforementioned policy of asset disposals. On the other 
hand, in 2019 Zucchi presented an EBIT% of 5.4% which was greatly reduced compared to the 
EBITDA% of 12.0%. However, this result is attributable to the accounting of higher 
depreciation (- €5 million) due to the application of the new standard IFRS 16. 
In addition, from the comparison between the EBITDA% of the Zucchi Group and the 
competitor Caleffi, it is possible to confirm the slightly positive effect of the strategic plan 
currently in place (Figure 4.9). While Caleffi’s EBITDA margin results rather stable (despite 
the reduction recorded in 2018), Zucchi’s margin is mildly growing primarily due to the positive 
impact of the structural changes undertaken in terms of cost containment. 
-15,8  2,9  


























Figure 4.9 – Zucchi: EBITDA margin comparison. (Personal elaboration from AIDA database 
and Annual Financial Statements) 
Finally, as regards operating performance, it is interesting to also assess the company’s net 
income trend over the analysis period (Figure 4.10). 
 
 
Figure 4.10 – Zucchi: net income (M€). (Personal elaboration from AIDA database and Annual 
Financial Statements) 
What is visible is how Zucchi managed, not only, to overturn the strongly negative performance 
of 2015 (- €19.5), the year of the first application of the business plan, but also succeeded in 
obtaining positive income results over the years relating to the turnaround and development 
phases. In fact, this breakthrough was made possible, first of all, by a sharp cut in operating 

































development with particular attention to the international level, as evidenced by the growth in 
revenues related to the German subsidiary Bassetti. 
 
4.2.3. Invested capital 
Following the analysis of Zucchi’s performance in terms of turnover and its margins, in this 
paragraph it will be possible to investigate the main characteristics of the total funds invested 
by the company, with a view to their composition and the relevant changes occurred in the 
analysis period.  
From a preliminary outline of the composition in percentage terms of total funds invested 
(Figure 4.11), there is a net prevalence relating to net working capital. In particular, the latter 
assumes a reduced weight in the last four years, as compared to 2015, due to the gradual 
reduction in other operating and non-operating assets and liabilities, declining, therefore, from 
a value of 115.6% in 2015 to 71.2% in 2016. In addition, the net working capital together with 
fixed assets represent the predominant and almost equally divided components of total funds 
invested by the Group.  
 
 
Figure 4.11 – Zucchi: composition of total funds invested. (Personal elaboration from AIDA 
database and Annual Financial Statements) 
Before delving into the analysis, it is interesting to point out a concept relative to the dynamic 
pattern of the net working capital in companies. In fact, in a corporate condition of financial 
24,2%
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distress and reduced debt capacity, firms generally rely on different forms of indebtedness in 
order to be able to guarantee the business continuity, namely trade payables. Consequently, a 
reduction in net working capital in companies in decline represents a negative signal. 
Nevertheless, this does not appear to be the case with Zucchi as the company has not shown 
significant increase in trade payables, as displayed in Figure 4.12 and 4.13. 
 
 
Figure 4.12 – Zucchi: composition of net working capital. (M€) (Personal elaboration from 
AIDA database and Annual Financial Statements) 
 
 
Figure 4.13 – Zucchi: net working capital. (M€) (Personal elaboration from AIDA database 
and Annual Financial Statements) 
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From the analysis of the changes that took place during the examination period, first of all, the 
contained value of the net working capital in the first year (€7.4 million), compared to the 
amounts recorded in subsequent years, stands out. Thus, the lower value in net working capital 
is primarily due to the lowering effect of net other operating and non-operating items, 
accounting for - €37.4 million in 2015. This amount essentially includes tax, social security and 
personnel payables existing at the date of the filing for the admission to the composition with 
creditors procedure (ex art. 160, l.f.), declared inadmissible by the court in October 2015. On 
the other hand, the following four years of analysis have been characterized by a limited impact 
of other debts on the volume of current assets thanks to the granting of a rescheduling plan for 
the due debt and its progressive reimbursement by Zucchi.  
Indeed, between 2015 and 2016 the company accounted a first increase in net working capital 
for €19.2 million to be attributable, as discussed, not only to the reduction in other payables but 
also to a significant decline in trade payables, which more than offsets the reduced volumes of 
inventory and trade receivables. In particular, this important decline in trade payables is due to 
the payment of overdue payables of the parent company dating back to the filing of the 
application for admission pursuant to art. 161 (l.f.). Thus, following the change between the 
first two years, trade payables remain vaguely constant in their amount over the remaining 
analysis period.  
As regards the trend in inventory, the 2015-2020 industrial plan had set the objective of 
reducing its volume in order to optimize the incidence of net working capital on sales though a 
de-stocking strategy. What is evident from Figure 4.12, however, is the fluctuating trend in 
inventory with an average amount of €22.1 million, with the first visible result in 2019.  
Then, with respect to trade receivables, their value initially decreased, recording a volume of 
€22.5 million in 2016 compared to €23.4 million in 2015, only to keep increasing from 2017, 
reaching a total value of €23.8 million in 2019. This is considered to be mainly attributable to 
an increase in receivables from customers of the parent company belonging to the large-scale 
distribution channel, as a result of a different delivery plan requested by operators compared to 
that implemented in previous years. On the other hand, Zucchi has a credit of €6.5 million 
against Descamps SAS, for which a rescheduling plan has been granted in 2018 because of the 
latter’s difficulties in honoring its debt. 
As regards the incidence of net working capital on total sales (Figure 4.13), the pattern is quite 
variable with a mean percentage of 31.1%. In fact, considering the de-stocking objective of the 
Group and the accounted turnover below the expectations, it can be assumed that there is still 
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room for an improvement of the ratio and, therefore, a reduced percentage of it with the aim of 
a better utilization of current assets of Zucchi.  
Considering now the comparison with the peer Caleffi (Figure 4.14), it is possible to envisage 
a common path of the ratio, except for 2015. Caleffi, indeed, performs a stable net working 
capital ratio due to the stability of both its current assets and liabilities and total sales achieved. 
What should be noticed is that, despite the lower volumes of affairs of the competitor as 
compared to Zucchi, a similar management can be assumed between the two companies in 
terms of inventory, trade payables and receivables which, over the limited time horizon 
considered, can also be traced back to being subjected to similar market dynamics. 
 
 
Figure 4.14 – Zucchi: net working capital comparison. (M€) (Personal elaboration from AIDA 
database and Annual Financial Statements) 
 
Considering now the short-term financial solidity of the Group with regard to total current assets 
and liabilities, Figure 4.15 will give representation to the quick ratio and the current ratio in 
respect of the competitor’s results. Taking into account a quick ratio of 0.8 as a threshold value 
below which the company could face difficulties in coping with its imminent payments, it is 
evident how Zucchi presents for each year lower values. On the contrary, Caleffi accounts for 
a declining quick ratio but still non-concerning. With respect to the current ratio, a reasonable 
limit value appears to be 1.2. Also, in this case Zucchi presents lower values with a mean current 
ratio of 0.6, while Caleffi demonstrates a certain current solidity thanks to its mean ratio of 1.7.  
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fulfilling its short-term obligations and the absence of a visible improvement during the 5-year 
analysis period.  
 
 
Figure 4.15 – Zucchi: quick ratio and current ratio comparison. (Personal elaboration from 
AIDA database and Annual Financial Statements) 
 
With respect to total fixed assets, it was considered appropriate not to give a graphic 
representation due to the clear predominance of tangible fixed assets compared to the other 
categories of investments, as displayed in Table 4.1. 
 
 
Table 4.1 – Zucchi: composition of total fixed assets. (T€) (Personal elaboration from AIDA 
database and Annual Financial Statements) 
As it can be noticed, goodwill presents a null amount for each accounting year due to its 
inclusion among intangible assets. Into specifics, the latter are composed for the most part by 
industrial patent rights and rights to use intellectual property. Moreover, in 2016 there was a 
reduction in the item by - €176 thousands due to the elimination of the gross values and related 
depreciation of assets that have reached the completion of amortization. Conversely, since 2017 
there has been an increase in intangible assets due to the purchases of computer software mainly 
0,3 0,4 0,4 0,3
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2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Current ratio
Zucchi Caleffi
(‘000€) 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Goodwill 0 0 0 0 0
Intangible assets 536 360 714 1.243 1.551
Tangible assets 34.478 32.919 31.910 56.219 49.167
Equity investments 114 114 114 114 114
Total operating fixed capital 35.128 33.393 32.738 57.576 50.832
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referred to the upgrade and the implementation of the IT system used by Zucchi, and with an 
eye to the development phase of the business plan which, among others, provided for the 
strengthening of the e-commerce channel. 
With respect to tangible assets, the first three years of analysis entail a reduction of investment 
volumes due to the disposal and scrapping of plants, machinery and equipment no longer used 
in the various plants of the Group, as well as other assets and plants of some stores which have 
been closed by the parent company and of the subsidiary Basitalia S.r.l.  
In 2018 and 2019, conversely, Zucchi’s tangible assets are greater due to the intervention of a 
supplementary agreement signed in August 2018. Into specifics, Zucchi decided to submit to 
the lending banks the request for a different provision from the one initially envisaged by the 
2015 debt restructuring agreement. Indeed, the company has decided to renounce to the transfer 
of the business branch (constituted by specific properties and €30 million of transferred debt) 
to the establishment of an SPV. Acknowledged that this modification is aimed at achieving the 
same negotiating effect initially envisaged by the agreement, the lawyer has granted Zucchi the 
allocation of these properties to separated assets (Patrimonio Destinato). With respect to fixed 
assets, this provision led to a total increase respectively of €25.08 million in 2018 and €24.05 
million in 2019. Furthermore, the supplementary agreement had an impact also on the capital 
structure. 
 As compared to Caleffi, the Group’s invested capital appears higher both in absolute and 
relative terms, as visible from Figure 4.16. Caleffi reported stable volumes of invested capital 
during the five years of analysis. On the contrary, the invested capital of Zucchi appears to be 
growing and, as discussed above, this growth is primarily due to the increase in the net working 
capital in the first three years and in the fixed capital in the last two. Therefore, its invested 
capital structure appears quite rigid and not proportionate with respect to sales generated and 




 Figure 4.16 – Zucchi: invested capital comparison. (M€) (Personal elaboration from AIDA 
database and Annual Financial Statements) 
Considering now the company’s dynamics in terms of operating profitability and efficiency in 
investments allocation, it will be possible to investigate Zucchi’s ROA and ROIC as compared 
to the peer company (Figure 4.17). With respect to Caleffi, the Group has performed better 
under the considered time horizon both in terms of operating activities and return on invested 
capital. In fact, despite the negative EBIT achieved in 2015 which makes non-meaningful the 
ROIC calculation due to the simultaneous negativity of the denominator, it presents an average 
return of 6.2% in the last four years of analysis, with respect to the 1.6% obtained by Caleffi. 
As regards the ROA performance, the Zucchi Group has achieved an average value of 4.3% as 
compared to the 1% of the competitor. 
 
Figure 4.17 – Zucchi: ROA and ROIC comparison. (Personal elaboration from AIDA database 
and Annual Financial Statements) 
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4.2.4. Capital structure  
After analyzing the main characteristics of total funds invested, the following paragraph will 
investigate the composition of the Zucchi Group’s capital structure, with specific regard to its 
equity and net financial position specificities. As it is represented in Figure 4.18, the company 
relies on total source of financing which entails negative but declining portions of shareholders’ 
equity. In particular, the Group has been operating in this condition since 2014 due to 
considerable amounts of net losses, accounting for - €39.4 million in 2014, which led to a 
gradual reduction of reserves and share capital. This corporate circumstance, however, appears 
to be acceptable by the legislator when the phenomenon of financial crisis leads to a necessary 
debt restructuring, as long as the company is able to guarantee profitability flows over a 
perspective horizon in such a way to allow the business going concern, despite the negative 
equity. This would seem to be the case of Zucchi which, on the basis of the measures envisaged 
by the debt restructuring agreement and the industrial plan developed for the 2015-2020 period, 
provides for the generation of positive and increasing profitability flows, despite the temporary 
negative equity. 
As regards the dynamic of total source of financing, the erosion in shareholders’ equity seems 
to be decreasing, while still maintaining a negative value. On the other hand, the portion of net 
financial position represents the main source of financing, accounting for a mean weight of 
154.9% (Figure 4.18).  
 
Figure 4.18 – Zucchi: composition total source of financing. (Personal elaboration from AIDA 
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Referring now to shareholders’ equity, it is possible to investigate the reasons which led to its 
gradual reduction over the 5-years period. To this regard, Table 4.2 gives representation of line 
items which compose this measure of value. 
 
 
Table 4.2 – Zucchi: composition of shareholders’ equity. (T€) (Personal elaboration from 
AIDA database and Annual Financial Statements) 
First of all, a change of direction has occurred as a direct consequence of the strategic measures’ 
introduction aimed at reducing structural costs, which have thus produced positive net income 
since 2016, resulting in an increasing equity. The Zucchi Group, in fact, has been accounting 
for negative net income since 2004, strongly affecting its equity volumes over a 12-years’ time 
period up to 2016. Therefore, 2016 has registered a first equity rise of 36% also assisted by the 
capital increase by €10 million. Indeed, the share capital has been fully paid up in September 
2016, as resolved by the shareholders’ meeting on the basis of the deal provided for by the debt 
restructuring agreement, through the issuance of 2.000.000.000 of Zucchi’s ordinary shares.  
As regards reserves, it can be noted that their negative value represents the greatest impact on 
total equity. Nevertheless, the reserves’ reduction intervened in 2019 has led to the higher 
absolute amount in total equity of - €15.7 million, with respect to the overall analysis period.  
Nevertheless, the Zucchi Group is optimistic about its prospective operational capabilities, also 
supporting the positive impact that the debt waiver of €49.6 million provided for in the 
restructuring agreement, legally effective since 2016 but not yet implemented, would have on 
the business. 
 
Moreover, the composition of the net financial position reflects the variations in the company’s 
net debt, highlighting its ability to meet short and long-term repayments with the liquidity 
generated. Indeed, Figure 4.19 and 4.20 displays this measure of value in absolute terms and in 
relation to the EBITDA performed, in order to give representation to the indebtedness of the 
Group. 
 
(‘000€) 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Net income -19.531 4.464 3.555 4.264 2.472
Share capital 7.547 17.547 17.547 17.547 17.547
Reserves -27.620 -47.264 -42.861 -44.024 -35.754




Figure 4.19 – Zucchi: composition of net financial position. (M€) (Personal elaboration from 
AIDA database and Annual Financial Statements) 
 
 
Figure 4.20 – Zucchi: net financial position (M€) and NFP/EBITDA. (Personal elaboration 
from AIDA database and Annual Financial Statements) 
First of all, as it can be noticed from Figure 4.19, almost all of the Group's bank debt (except 
for €15.6 million portion in 2019) is short-term due to the restructuring agreement in place. 
Moreover, it concerns both the €49.6 million debt subject to waiver, pending completion of the 
implementation of the restructuring deal, and the €30 million current bank debt which would 
have been transferred with the business unit to an SPV or real estate fund and would have been 
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Actually, in 2018 Zucchi envisaged an integrative deal concerning the renunciation of the 
business branch transfer to an SPV and, on the contrary, it provided for the establishment of 
separated assets (Patrimonio Destinato) to which assigning the properties and transferred debt.  
Furthermore, the difference of €21.15 million between the 2018 and 2017 net financial position 
refers to payables relative to the separated assets that have been reclassified to other lenders, as 
a result of the acquisition pro soluto by DEA Capital Alternative Founds Sgr of the receivables 
and related rights from Banca Intesa, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, UniCredit e UBI Banca.  
Finally, as regards 2019, long-term debt of €15.6 million is referred to payables to other lenders 
for leased assets deriving from the rental contracts of the buildings where the Group's points of 
sale are located and for the long-term rental of cars. 
From the net financial position analysis, it can be highlighted how the high indebtedness results 
unsustainable also in light of the liquid assets owned by the Group. This condition is also visible 
from the NFP/EBITDA ratio (Figure 4.20), which assumes a high mean value of 11.9x over 
the last four years of investigation. Under absolute terms, these results represent an 
underperforming company with a questionable going concern probability. However, in 
consideration of the credit lines guaranteed by the lending banks and the remission of the debt 
provided for by the agreement, the situation appears to be sustainable for Zucchi thus 
demonstrating a first phase of recovery. 
Comparing now the capital structure of the company with respect to Caleffi, it is interesting to 
observe, in particular, the path of the NFP/EBITDA (Figure 4.21). In fact, the trend of the 
interest coverage ratio (EBITDA/interest expenses) is of limited comparability since the interest 
on bank payables refers only to those accrued on self-liquidating credit lines governed by the 





Figure 4.21 – Zucchi: NFP/EBITDA and interest coverage ratio comparison. (Personal 
elaboration from AIDA database and Annual Financial Statements) 
As regards NFP/EBITDA, the Group performed a high but slightly declining ratio thanks to the 
modest increase of its EBITDA over the considered period. Thus, with respect to Caleffi, 
Zucchi seems less likely to be able to honor its debt burden if no debt waiver is provided. In 
fact, as the largest Italian company in home textiles, the Group has the potential to generate 
greater EBITDA volumes with respect to the competitor.  
 
4.2.5. Market capitalization 
The investigation of Zucchi’s performance from the overall market perspective fully reflects 
the downward spiral of the crisis (Figure 4.22). Into specifics, the data shows a decline in the 
company’s perceived value over the analysis period. Indeed, in 2015 Zucchi performed a 
market capitalization of €15.7 million which declined by -47% in the following year, reaching 
a value of €8.3 million. Instead, in 2019 the perceived value of the company further declined to 
€7.4 million. This declining pattern could reflect investors’ perception regarding the company’s 
stability but alone does not represent the firm’s actual worth. Furthermore, because of the 
negative volumes in shareholders’ equity in the whole time period of investigation, the 






































Figure 4.22 – Zucchi: market capitalization. (M€) (Personal elaboration from Thomson Reuters 
Eikon) 
 
4.2.6. Current developments 
2020 has not been included in the time period analyzed for two specific reasons: Zucchi’s 
annual financial statements as at 31.12 is not available yet and, furthermore, this year has been 
critical for almost all sectors of the market due to the outbreak of the covid-19 pandemic. In 
fact, restrictive measures have required the implementation of cost reductions and defensive 
strategies in order to stem, as in the case of Zucchi, already fragile business conditions. 
Nevertheless, despite the slowdown observed on both Italian and foreign markets, Zucchi 
managed to achieve good results and, above all, the early resolution of the 2015 debt 
restructuring agreement (ex art. 182-bis, l.f.). Indeed, the final expiry date of the agreement 
with the lending banks should have been on 31st December 2020, but the company reached a 
final refinancing agreement in October 2020, leading to the resolution of the restructuring deal. 
As part of this operation, Zucchi signed a contract for a medium-long term mortgage loan with 
DeA Capital Alternative Funds SGR and Illimity Bank, the so-called Facility Agreement. The 
refinancing transaction has provided for the disbursement in favor of Zucchi of a total amount 
of €10.4 million of which: 
• A tranche of €7.3 million to be repaid in half-yearly instalments from December 2020 


















• A tranche of €3.1 million to be repaid in a single solution after 5 years from the 
allocation. 
Furthermore, the amount of the Facility Agreement can be increased upon request of the 
company up to a maximum of €5 million and its obligations are guaranteed by a first-rank 
mortgage (ipoteca di primo grado) established on part of the properties allocated to separated 
assets (patrimonio destinato, ex art. 2447-bis, Italian Civil Code). 
Furthermore, the consensual termination of the agreement has made effective the waiver on the 
banks’ for approximately €49.6 million. 
Now, referring to the latest available financial statements, i.e. the interim financial statements 
of September 2020, it is interesting to proceed with a comparison with the results of the same 
period in 2019. As regards the operating performance, Zucchi achieved total revenues of €47.8 
million in 2020, with a decrease of just 0.7% compared to the previous year. On the other hand, 
both raw materials, consumables and good costs and structural costs registered a decline by - 
€4.7 million. Therefore, without considering the non-recurring financial income accrued from 
the debt waiver, the company delivered an EBITDA of €8.3 million, as compared with the €6.3 
million of the previous years. This is definitely a good result for the Group which, despite the 
obvious market difficulties, has managed to achieve for the fifth year in a row a result that is, 
not only, positive but also growing, compared to many years of negative EBITDA. 
Moreover, the positive impacts of the refinancing agreement and the early resolution of the debt 
restructuring agreement are evident when considering the net financial position of the company. 
In fact, Zucchi’s net debt amounted to €28.8 million in September 2020, as compared to €84.2 
million of the previous year. Finally, the Group’s shareholders’ equity, after several years of 
negative results, reached a positive €36.8 million, benefiting from the accounting of €49.6 
million of the proceeds of non-recurring financial nature, accrued from the waiver of the debt.  
For the sake of completeness, Figure 4.23 presents the market trend of Zucchi’s share price in 







Figure 4.23 – Zucchi: price per share from 2019 to date. (Morningstar)  
As highlighted, in March 2020 there was a reduction in the share price, which reached the value 
of €1 per share, due to the government announcement relative to the restrictive lockdown 
measures implemented throughout Italy in order to contain the covid-19 pandemic.  
Then, the following months are characterized by a mean price of €1.20, up to October 2020, 
when the share price positively increased up to €1.70 due to the early termination of the debt 
restructuring agreement and the refinancing agreement announcement, recording a positive 
response from investors. 
 
4.2.7. Considerations on the case study 
The case of Zucchi is very interesting due to the long phase of decline, first, and then the crisis, 
which hit the Group starting from the early 2000s. The company, in fact, found itself facing the 
consequences of its rigid cost structure deriving from acquisitions made in previous years which 
did not achieve efficient integrations into the corporate structure and, thus, the full exploitation 
of the synergies deriving from them was lacking. These structural issues, together with the 
delayed outsourcing of costly process phases as compared to its competitors, led to the 
manifestation of the first negative result in 2004. Furthermore, the slowdown of the household 











since 2005. As a consequence, when the global crisis hit the company, it was no longer possible 
to postpone radical interventions in terms of disposal of non-strategic assets and streamlining 
of the company’s cost structure.  
As regards the measures undertaken, the seriousness of the corporate conditions required the 
implementation of three different debt restructuring plans (ex art. 182-bis, l.f.). The first two, 
namely the 2011 and 2013 debt restructuring agreements, both accompanied by turnaround 
measures entailing the regaining of profitability, competitiveness and the reduction of the 
indebtedness level, failed because of a too myopic view of business prospects.  
The third debt restructuring agreement, namely the focus of the analysis conducted, brough to 
a successful conclusion. Into specifics, it was based on the 2015-2020 business plan entailing 
two phases: the turnaround phase (2015-2017) and the development phase (2017-2020).  
The business plan, in turn, was supported by an important financial manoeuvre entailing, among 
others:  
• The establishment of an SPV to which transferring the business branch constituted by 
€30 million debt and specific properties;  
• The debt waiver of €49.6 million by the lending banks;  
• A share capital increase of €10 million.  
Furthermore, a supplementary agreement undertaken in 2018 led to the renounce to the SPV 
establishment and the following constitution of separated assets to which the aforementioned 
business branch has been transferred.  
Finally, as previously mentioned, despite the objective difficulties that hit markets in 2020, 
Zucchi managed to early conclude the debt restructuring agreement in October 2020 thanks to 
a refinancing agreement undertaken by DeA Capital Alternative Funds SGR and Illimity Bank. 
Retracing the measures undertaken and the results obtained and, on the basis of the last five 
years of analysis, we can say that Zucchi has finally achieved a certain stability following the 
long path of the crisis: 
 Zucchi has managed to streamline its cost structure.  
Total costs of operating management amounted to €106.3 million in 2015, leading to a 
relevant reduction over the years up to an aggregate decline of -37.4% in 2019. The 
reductive trend has been further confirmed from the interim financial statements of 
September 2020. In particular, this reduction was possible because of (1) the closure of 
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18 stores operating with negative EBITDA margins, (2) the integration of the two 
brands, Zucchi and Bassetti, and the further cut of overlapping costs, (3) the 
simplification of the line of products offered.  
 Zucchi reached positive EBITDA values and positive net income. 
The absolute value of EBITDA, starting from - €10.8 million in 2015 and after several 
years of operating losses, finally reached positive volumes from 2016 onwards, 
achieving the greatest result in 2019, with €9.1 million. The disposal of non-strategic 
assets made it possible, in fact, to reduce the non-monetary costs incurred by the Group. 
Furthermore, it is important to highlight the achievement in 2016 of a positive net result 
after 12 years of losses. Specifically, because of the beneficial recognition of the 
proceeds of non-recurring financial nature, equal to €49,6 million, accrued from the 
waiver of the debt following the consensual termination of the Restructuring 
Agreement, Zucchi registered total net income for €52.5 million. In the previous 
accounting year, on the other hand, income accounted for €2.5 million (2019). 
 Zucchi reached a positive shareholders’ equity. 
Following negative shareholders’ equity starting from 2014 (- €26.5 million), which 
reached its minimum in 2015 (- €39.6 million), the Group has managed to reduce this 
negative path over the years relating to the business restructuring (2015-2020). This has 
been possible because of the contribution of €10 million (2010) in the form of a capital 
increase and positive, albeit limited in their amounts, net profits. The complete u-turn, 
however, has been achieved in the last years thanks to the refinancing operation and the 
termination of the debt restructuring agreement. In fact, from an absolute value of - 
€15.7 million (2019), the company finally reached a total shareholders’ equity of €36.8 
million (September 2020). 
 Zucchi managed to reduce its net financial position. 
Again, the reduction in the company’s net financial position was made possible as a 
consequence of the debt waiver of €49.6 million performed in 2020. Specifically, the 
net financial debt amounted to €28.8 million in September 2020, reduced by - €55.7 
million as compared to December 2019.  
 Zucchi strengthened its international position. 
During the analysis period, the Group has managed to strengthen its international 
position, with particular reference to the European market where its German subsidiary 
Bassetti has achieved a steady increase in turnover. 
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Overall, the analysis conducted on the basis of the operations undertaken by Zucchi in 2015 
and completed, in relation to the financial manoeuvre, in 2020, allows to assess the success of 
the turnaround process undertaken by the company. As it has been discussed so far, the crisis 
had a very long development over a period of more than 10 years and with the involvement of 
different financial measures which required numerous sacrifices to the company. Despite the 
failure of two restructuring agreements, it can be assumed with reasonable certainty that the last 
plan implemented in 2015 and concluded in 2020 has decreed a first glimmer of light for the 
company, but not the end of the difficulties. In fact, these first positive results require ulterior 
efforts in order not only to be maintained, but to carry in a reasonable future to the company’s 
growth. Indeed, Zucchi is positioned in the medium-high segment of the market and is also a 
leader in Italy but, despite its positioning, it is not exempt from a relevant competitive context. 
Therefore, Zucchi must be able to maintain a lean structure without forgetting innovation and 
















Beghelli, leader in the Italian lighting sector, has been subject to monthly additional reporting 
under the black list (2013-2014) as a consequence of liquidity constraints which severely 
affected company’s performance and, then, to quarterly reporting since 2015 thanks to the 
successful adoption of turnaround measures, which made it earn a shift into the grey list 
CONSOB. The investigation of Beghelli’s performance under the operating and structural point 
of view will cover the 5-year period 2015-2019, with an eye to current developments, in order 
to capture the specificities of its slightly improved results under the grey list. Into specifics, the 
analysis will refer to the reclassified financial statements reported in Appendix 3 and, to better 
appreciate results, a comparison with a competitor was implemented for comparable margins. 
The competitor selected over the lighting sector has been the Italian company Elemaster. 
Briefly, this operates in the lighting and mechatronic sectors, offering innovative high-tech 
electronic equipment. It represents a virtuous competitor thanks to the management of its cost 
structure and to its reduced indebtedness. Furthermore, Elemaster is strongly focused on 
continuous products innovation and, as well as Beghelli, operates in foreign markets such as 
US and Asia.  
 
4.3.1. Causes of distress and financial manoeuvre 
Decline  
Beghelli has distinguished itself in the emergency lighting market for its range of innovative 
products and the initiatives undertaken, also in favour of the territory in which it operates. 
Moreover, on the basis of important growth objectives, the company embarked on a phase of 
expansion abroad, between the end of the 90s and the beginning of the new century. This has 
led to the acquisition of different subsidiaries in Europe but also abroad, from the United States 
to China.  
Nevertheless, despite its great attention to the maintenance of a strong competitive position 
thanks to continuous investments in R&D, namely the company’s competitive advantage, 
which were directed at the satisfaction of an innovative market trend, Beghelli found itself 
facing several years of financial distress. In fact, the first timid signals of the business decline 
appeared around 2006, with the general contractions which affected economies, as a 
consequence of the loss of purchasing power due to the rise in raw material prices (especially 
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energy), the loss of competitiveness resulting from the revaluation of the Euro and the weakness 
of the US economy. In spite of this, the effects on the Group were limited and mainly manifested 
themselves in terms of contractions in sales volumes.  
Thereafter, Beghelli entered a more evident phase of decline in the two-year period 2008-2009, 
following the advent of a recession phase caused by the global financial crisis. In particular, the 
company has accounted for reduced turnover by -16.8% in 2009, as compared to the previous 
year. Despite the progressive market deterioration, the company decided to react by disposing 
non-strategic assets and, most importantly, by strengthening its overall sector positioning by 
further extending its presence in product sectors synergistic to the traditional emergency 
lighting. In fact, the Group has extended its scope of activity to the photovoltaic sector, initiating 
the project "Pianeta Sole Beghelli" through the supply of innovative solutions aimed at making 
the most of this great market opportunity. The supply of innovative lighting fixtures allowed 
Beghelli to remain competitive in the years of global crisis, thus managing to catch moderate 
signs of recovery of the electronic and electrical engineering macro sectors in 2010, accounting 
for an increase of sales by 34.9% with respect to 2009. However, the recovery of sales did not 
last long because, in 2011, the sovereign debt crisis dominated Europe and negatively affected, 
among others, the electronic macro sector. 
The slowdown of the company’s growth and the presence of the first signs of decline are 
discernible through the analysis of the course of its stock price (Figure 4.24). The company 
presented an average price per share of €1.60 between 2005 and 2006, to then face a boost in 
April 2007, reaching a peak of €1.70. These fluctuations are assumed to be transitory and caused 
by the announcement of a dividend distribution occurred over the period under consideration. 
Moreover, those same years are characterized by initiatives undertaken by the company in the 
field of renewable energy and the brand promotion through advertising campaigns. Thereafter, 
the decline is manifested through the reduction of the share price, up to the minimum point of 









Figure 4.24 – Beghelli: price per share (2005-2011). (Morningstar) 
 
Crisis  
The crisis hit Beghelli in 2012 to an amplified extent compared to the weak onset of the previous 
period of decline. In fact, the Group found itself in a condition of severe financial tension which 
determined uncertainties in relation to the business going concern.  
Indeed, according to the company’s report, the Group is facing liquidity constraint due to three 
concomitant factors: 
• The sudden and worsening changes in the regulatory framework of the photovoltaic 
sector, in particular the activation of the Fifth Conto Energia (August 2012) and the 
reduction of the incentive tariff previously received; 
• The contraction in volumes on all major markets, mainly due to the ongoing 
international crisis, had greatly reduced the Group’s ability to pursue effective 
economies of scale capable of absorbing structural costs and maintaining the necessary 










• The unforeseen contractual and bureaucratic problems related to the divestment strategy 
of Chinese subsidiary Byd Company, of which the Group held a minority interest. 
According to the original expectations, such divestment should have injected liquidity 
for a total amount of €10 million.  
Thus, these combined criticalities led to a worsening of Beghelli’s financial condition and 
affected its ability to honor its bank debt and trade payables. Furthermore, the company’s 
liquidity constraint has also negatively affected products’ potential development on foreign 
markets, leading to difficulties in providing the characteristic Beghelli’s technological solutions 
in Italy and abroad. As a consequence, the onset of the crisis made it necessary for the firm to 
be monitored by CONSOB, which required monthly information disclosure under the black list 
in 2013.  
Despite the serious financial distress, Beghelli promptly intervened by negotiating a debt 
rescheduling agreement (ex art. 67, co. 3, lett. d, l.f.) with the lending banks, which was 
supported by the implementation of a business plan over the period 2013-2017, further 
postponed up to 2018, aimed at the relaunch of the company in the domestic and international 
environment. In January 2014, the adhesion to the debt rescheduling agreement was completed 
by each bank and it has therefore acquired full effect. As it will be discussed and investigated 
in a while, the overperformance achieved by the Group in the two years following the adoption 
of the agreement led to the early termination of the latter in December 2016. In addition, the 
performance improvement provided for the shift of Beghelli into the grey list CONSOB in 
February 2015. To this regard, in July 2017 the company has been granted by an extended pool 
of financial institutions, an unsecured financing of the duration of 7 years and for a total of €40 
million, aiming at the restoration of the Group’s leverage structure.  
Again, the crisis path can be investigated also from a market perspective (Figure 4.25). Into 
specifics, the graph below highlights the outbreak of the crisis in 2012, as it its visible from the 
downward trend of Beghelli’s share price. In fact, from a value of €0.68 (2011), in 2012 it 
reached a minimum price of €0.35, when the corporate distress was already manifest. 
Afterwards, the adhesion to the debt rescheduling agreement in January 2014 has been 
positively perceived by investors, with a peak in the share price up to €0.53.  
The following two years have been characterized by several fluctuations in Beghelli’s share 
price, in line with the positive results obtained by the Group. Then, in December 2016 the 
announcement of the early resolution of the debt rescheduling agreement together with the 
negotiations of a financing operation from banks led the price to increase again, reaching the 
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maximum value of €0.51 in May 2017. Thereafter, 2018 and 2019 have been characterized by 
a declining pattern, reflecting the worsening of Beghelli’s performance and reaching the lowest 






Figure 4.25 – Beghelli: price per share (2011-2019). (Morningstar) 
 
As regards the restructuring measures undertaken, the guidelines of the business plan (2013-
2018) initially approved are based on very cautious development forecasts (average annual 
growth rate of revenues equal to 1.0%), as suggested by the company’s lending banks, and they 
concern: 
• The development focus on the core business of the lighting sector, with sales reduction 
in Italy and the maintenance of a slight growth on the international level; 
• The reduction of expectations on the photovoltaic sector, in relation to the recognition 
of the drastic market and subsidy contraction; 
• The reduction of the commercial offer in relation to lighting equipment and services to 
energy saving, with the introduction of an innovative proposal (Rivoluzione Luce) 
whose growth potential reported in the plan are decidedly contained with respect to 


















• Costs reduction with interventions targeted to: 
- the improvement of the saturation level and the downsizing of the industrial 
capacity together with the dismissal of non-strategic industrial assets, without 
prejudice to the continuity of production, 
- the reduction of labor costs, through the reduction of the workforce and the use 
of the Cassa Integrazione Guadagni, 
- the reduction of advertising costs and a better focus on the activities of the R&D, 
- the design optimization of the product range, with the consequent improvement 
of productive benefits and margins, 
- the improvement of the management of the sales-stocks-transformation-
purchase chain with a consequence on the relationship between service, profit 
margin and dedicated working capital. 
These turnaround actions have been integrated with a financial manoeuvre endorsed in the debt 
rescheduling agreement signed in January 2014 (ex art. 67, l.f.).  
The intervention of the lending banks and the leasing companies in support of Beghelli’s 
financial and operating performance provides: 
• The confirmation of short-term credit lines with restoration of the relative amount’s 
availability as at the beginning of the negotiations of the agreement, for a further period 
of 4 years, until December 2017; 
• The moratorium on medium/long-term loan capital instalments for a period of a further 
3 years (until December 2016), together with a revised depreciation plan; 
• The rescheduling of the real estate leases payments through the reformulation of the 
plan of depreciation over a duration increased by 4 years compared to that contractually 
expected. 
The implementation of the debt rescheduling plan not only had the desired effects, but also 
exceeded the expectations of Beghelli and the lending banks, thus leading to the early 
termination of the latter in December 2016. To this regard, in July 2017 the company has further 
received the support of a pool of lending banks through the subscription of an unsecured 
financing (finanziamento chirografario) amounting to €40 million, over a duration of 7 years. 
The main purpose of the financing is the reimbursement of short/medium term debt, and for the 




As it will be seen over the following analysis, the company has faced again a context of 
economic and financial distress in the period 2018-2019, carrying therefore to a reversal of 










Figure 4.26 – Beghelli: main provisions of the restructuring plan (2013-2018). (Personal 
elaboration from Beghelli website) 
 
Taking into account the overview of the turnaround initiatives undertaken, it will be possible to 
investigate in the following paragraphs the results obtained for a period which retrace the 
performance of the company between 2015 and 2019. This time period considers the entrance 
of Beghelli in the grey list (February 2015) in order to possibly assess what has gone wrong 
with respect to the positive trend achieved in 2015 and 2016, which led to the early termination 





• Focus on the core business of the 
lighting sector 
• Reduction of performance 
expectations on the photovoltaic 
sector 
• Reduction of the commercial 
offering 
• Costs reduction: 
- Dismissal of non-strategic 
industrial assets 
- Workforce reduction 
- Advertising costs reduction 




• Confirmation of short-term credit 
lines for further 4 years 
• Moratorium on medium/long-term 
capital instalments for further 3 
years 
• Rescheduling of the real estate 
leases payments over a duration 
increased by 4 years 
 
Business Plan (2013-2018) Debt Rescheduling Agreement (2014) 
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4.3.2. Sales trend and operating profitability 
As regards its operating profitability, the company has managed to achieve a significant 
increase in total revenues in the first three years of analysis (Figure 4.27), both in Italy and in 
foreign markets, but then it embarked on a negative reversing in 2018-2019.  
 
 
Figure 4.27 – Beghelli: total revenues (M€) and revenues growth rate. (Personal elaboration 
from AIDA database and Annual Financial Statements) 
Into specifics, the highest growth was recorded between 2014 and 2015, with a double-digit 
increase in turnover by 10.8%. As compared to the previous year, the performance improvement 
is attributable to the sales of light sources (light bulbs), emergency and ordinary lighting 
equipment, namely the lighting sector. In particular, the latter corresponds to the core business 
of Beghelli, which has accounted for a revenues growth rate of 13.2%, as compared to the 
negative result of “other business” sector22 (-15.5%).  Furthermore, both in 2016 and 2017, the 
Group's revenues growth did not arrest but, on the contrary, albeit slowed down, it led to the 
achievement of positive results, much higher than the expectations of the company as presented 
in the business plan. In fact, the Group has achieved an overperformance of the results 
compared to what has been cautiously scheduled.  
 
22 The “other business” segment includes consumer electronic devices, as well as systems electronic devices 
designed to meet the general need for security, both in the home and industrial context and, to a marginal extent, 
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Actually, from the investigation of the first three years (2015-2017), it can be reasonably 
assumed that the company has successfully implemented the measures planned to restore its 
profitability, thus managing to make the best out of the focus on its core business and also 
reducing the performance expectations over the photovoltaic sector. 
On the other hand, in the two-year period 2018-2019, there was a significant reversal of 
direction, first displayed by the -8.7% turnover reduction registered in 2018. In fact, Beghelli 
found itself facing the negative impact of few factors which hit its core business, namely: 
• The weak market demand related to the launch of new product ranges, settled at lower-
than-expected values; 
• The increasing competition in product prices; 
• The lengthening of the time needed to realize and introduce on the markets, both 
domestic and foreign, the new product ranges in Beghelli’s core lighting sectors; 
• The lengthening of execution time of few important orders in the area of lighting 
services. 
Therefore, the industrial margins were lower than budgeted in 2018 and 2019, mainly due to 
the impacts deriving from the longer time needed to complete the industrial reorganization 
within the Group's production facilities, aimed at reducing purchase costs, industrial and 
structural costs and the improvement of Beghelli's logistics system.  
As a consequence, in 2018 the company deemed necessary the implementation of a new 
business plan for the period 2019-2023, which has been further updated for the period 2020-
2024 in light of the unsatisfactory results achieved in 2019 and the unexpected advent of the 





Figure 4.28 – Beghelli: revenues growth rate comparison. (Personal elaboration from AIDA 
database and Annual Financial Statements) 
It is interesting to compare Beghelli’s revenue growth rate with the turnover path achieved by 
its competitor Elemaster. What can be observed is the similar trend with respect to the 
fluctuations in revenues achieved for the first three years. This implies that Beghelli has been 
able to recover from the distress condition recorded since 2012, thus returning to follow the 
market trends. On the other hand, in the two-year period 2018 and 2019 the company 
significantly deviated from the pattern followed by Elemaster. Since the latter is considered a 
company with a stable economic and financial position, the deviation accounted by Beghelli 
further highlights the difficulties encountered and confirms that these are due to factors within 
the Group, as stated earlier. 
As displayed in Figure 4.29, the investigation of the amount of total revenues per employee 
highlights a stable pattern for both companies. In fact, despite the lower profitability of Beghelli 
compared to the competitor, it is necessary to remember that, as planned, the company has 
undertaken a gradual reduction of the workforce with the aim of reducing operating costs. 
Therefore, the stability of the ratio together with the reduction in personnel implies a general 





























Figure 4.29 – Beghelli: revenues per employee comparison (T€). (Personal elaboration from 
AIDA database and Annual Financial Statements) 
Beghelli’s operating performance and corporate cost structure are then observable from its 
EBITDA and EBIT course (Figure 4.30 and 4.31). 
 
 
Figure 4.30 – Beghelli: EBITDA (M€) and EBITDA%. (Personal elaboration from AIDA 
database and Annual Financial Statements) 
The positive revenues trend achieved in the first three years of analysis is ulteriorly confirmed 
by the EBITDA results. Into specifics, operating cost dynamics remain rather stable in the 

















































and goods has naturally increased due to the rise in sales volumes and, contrary to expectations, 
Beghelli has also invested more in terms of advertising costs. In fact, according to the premises 
of its business plan for the period under analysis, advertising expenses should have been 
reduced also as a consequence of the reduction in new products launches. However, in 2016 the 
company has accounted an increase of €3.6 million in the item “advertising, fairs and other 
promotional charges”, attributable to the launch of a campaign on television networks that has 
affected a specific range of light sources (light bulbs). In fact, contrary to what provided for by 
the business plan, Beghelli has undertaken an increase in products offering, still related to its 
core business, also increasing the advertising costs as a reaction to the positive trend in sales 
volumes.  
On the other hand, the two-year period 2018-2019 saw a sharp reduction in operating 
profitability. Indeed, from €23.7 million in 2017, EBITDA declined to €4.1 million in 2018, 
registering a fall of -10.2% in the EBITDA margin. This negative result is due, first of all, to 
the high volumes of inventory and the considerable procurement costs incurred by Beghelli, 
with a view to launching new products on the market relating to both the lighting and other 
business divisions. The company, in fact, has faced lower volumes of sales due to the 
lengthening of the time needed to realize and introduce new products and to their weak market 
demand, totally not in line with the expectations.  
Despite the fall accounted in 2018, in 2019 Beghelli managed to restore an EBITDA level 
(€15.8 million) almost in line with the 2015 result, made possible by the retrenchment of 
operating and overhead costs, as envisaged by the new business plan 2019-2023. 
The EBIT pattern (Figure 4.31) further confirms the performance trend of Beghelli over the 
period under examination. In addition, the consideration of non-monetary items in 2018 led to 
a negative value of EBIT, which was not occurring since the financially distressed two-year 
period of 2012-2013. In fact, the already limited operating performance of the company has 
been further reduced by the value of the write-downs, amortization and depreciation by -€9.3 
million. Into specifics, the firm has encountered value reductions relating to the property owned 
by Beghelli Innovation China and extraordinary write-downs of photovoltaic systems, due to 





Figure 4.31 – Beghelli: EBIT (M€) and EBIT%. (Personal elaboration from AIDA database 
and Annual Financial Statements) 
From the EBITDA margin comparison between Beghelli and Elemaster (Figure 4.32), emerges 
a common path of the ratio with difficulties encountered by both companies in 2018 because of 
the increased competition in product prices. What jumps to the eye, however, is that Beghelli 
better performed as compared to the competitor, with an average EBITDA% of 9% vis-à-vis 
6.1% of Elemaster. What can be assumed is that, despite the greater sales volumes recorded by 
the competitor, Beghelli has a less rigid cost structure even if, as seen above, it still presents 
scope for improvement.  
 
Figure 4.32 – Beghelli: EBITDA% comparison. (Personal elaboration from AIDA database 






















































Considering the company’s performance under the net income point of view (Figure 4.33), it 
is possible to envisage the positive effect of the debt rescheduling agreement in the first three 
years of analysis, until its resolution in 2016. On the other hand, 2018 and 2019 reflected a net 
worsening of the Group's performance, not only due to an external factor, i.e. products price 
competition, but also as a consequence of the too optimistic choices of the group in the launch 
of new products and the consequent huge purchases made. In fact, the overall innovative 
attempt has received a weak demand as compared to the forecasted results (- €9.1 million in 
2018 and - €1.2 million in 2019). Again, this choice was not in line with the provisions defined 
in the business plan 2013-2018 and has required the implementation of a new plan for the period 
2019-2023 to face Beghelli’s difficulties.  
 
 
Figure 4.33 – Beghelli: net income (M€). (Personal elaboration from AIDA database and 























4.3.3. Invested capital 
The analysis will now deal with the main components resulting from the reclassification of 
Beghelli’s balance sheet. As results from the composition of total funds invested (Figure 4.34), 
there were no major fluctuations in the breakdown of net working capital, fixed assets and other 
operating and non-operating assets and liabilities. Specifically, there is a slight prevalence of 
fixed assets with respect to net working capital throughout the period under investigation.  
In the first three years, however, the percentage of fixed assets settled on average at 67%, 
reducing their weight to 56.2% in the last two years. In a first instance and as it will be analyzed 
in a while, this can be assumed as an effect of the distress faced by the company in 2018-2019.  
 
 
Figure 4.34 – Beghelli: composition of total funds invested. (Personal elaboration from AIDA 
database and Annual Financial Statements) 
The first component to be analyzed of the reorganized balance sheet is the net working capital, 
both in its composition (Figure 4.35) and in relation to the sales volume (Figure 4.36). 
The first three years of investigation present quite stable portions of inventory, current assets 
and liabilities with slight variations in 2017, which represents the turning point with respect to 
the deterioration of the company's performance in the following two years.  
Above all, in 2015 and 2016 the company has encountered the first positive performance 
impacts of the debt rescheduling agreement and the business plan introduction. In fact, it has 
registered a decline in net working capital by - €33.7 million as compared to 2014, due to two 
simultaneous factors. First, Beghelli has observed an increase in trade payables because of the 
65,6% 65,5% 69,9% 56,3% 56,2%
49,4% 49,9% 46,8%
50,9% 51,5%











2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Composition of total funds invested





boost in supplies of materials and products induced by the higher sales volumes and the positive 
market trend. In the second place, the company has completed an agreement for the pro soluto 
sale of certain receivables deriving from both contracts stipulated with private individuals and 
public administrations relative to the project “Un mondo di luce”. The generated flows of cash 
have been used in 2015 for the repayment of the financial debt related to the receivables already 
subject to previous guarantee in favor of credit institutions, resulting in an improvement in the 
net financial position, as will be seen in the following paragraph.   
In 2017, the company manages to maintain the same volume of net working capital (€123.6 
million) while presenting internal changes that offset each other. In fact, Beghelli accounted for 
a substantial reduction in inventories by - €8.5 million and, in turn, a decrease of - €4.6 million 
in trade payables due to the contraction in purchase volumes. This change is in line with the 
provisions of the Group’s business plan and is mainly attributable to an optimization of the 
procurement, management and recovery policy of stocks and to the disposal, through some 
promotional campaigns, of slow-moving stock. 
In the last two years of analysis, on the other hand, there has been a change of direction due to 
the unsatisfactory market response for the launch of new products and the increased competition 
in prices. Into specifics, in 2018 the company accounted for reduced net working capital by - 
€34.2 million, as compared to 2017, and few variations have occurred.  
Thus, contrary to 2017, Beghelli has accounted increased inventories by €11.2 million and 
higher trade payables for €9.5 million, induced by the initial forecasts of an upward trend in 
markets, which were then revised downwards following the uncertainties encountered in the 
reference sectors. Besides, the decline in net working capital was mainly made possible because 
of the securitization transactions and the pro soluto receivables disposal, leading to the 
derecognition of a great amount of credits. In 2019, on the other hand, a further reduction by - 
€4.2 million in net working capital has occurred. This was the consequence of the introduction 
of a new business plan (2019-2023) to cope with the business performance distress and saw the 
reduction of inventories mainly thanks to an optimization of logistics management and to an 
absorption of the volumes purchased in 2018 in view of the production and marketing of new 




Figure 4.35 – Beghelli: composition of net working capital (M€). (Personal elaboration from 
AIDA database and Annual Financial Statements) 
Figure 4.36 shows a slightly declining trend in net working capital margin, as a consequence 
of turnover reduction. In fact, over the five years of analysis the ratio maintained a mean value 
of 62.4% giving representation of the company’s capability to discreetly cope with the business 
without the need for additional funds.  
 
 
Figure 4.36 – Beghelli: net working capital. (M€) (Personal elaboration from AIDA database 
and Annual Financial Statements) 
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Considering now the comparison with the peer company Elemaster (Figure 4.37), a similar 
trend emerges but it is characterized by different volumes of net working capital. In the first 
three years, Beghelli displays an average net working capital of €125 million, as opposed to 
€71 million of Elemaster but, despite this, the turnover volumes of the two companies have 
been quite similar. This difference implies a greater ability of the competitor to manage its 
operations with lower amounts of current assets than Beghelli. In fact, this trend confirms the 
company’s analysis of the first three years, as just discussed, characterized by high inventories 
to cope with new products launches, contrary to the provisions of the business plan (2013-
2018).  
On the other side, the net working capital pattern of 2018 and 2019 is more similar to 
Elemaster’s performance thanks, above all, to the implementation of the new business plan 
which provided for an optimization of logistics management.  
 
 
Figure 4.37 – Beghelli: net working capital comparison. (M€) (Personal elaboration from 
AIDA database and Annual Financial Statements) 
As well, the course of the quick and current ratio (Figure 4.38) presents similarities between 
the two companies. Despite this, Elemaster displays a better solvency and capacity to cope with 
short-term liabilities as compared to Beghelli. In particular, the solvency condition of the Group 
does not show particular concerns, except for the last two years of analysis.  
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In fact, its quick ratio is below the threshold value of 0.8 and, analogously, the current ratio is 
lower than the limit value of 1.2. Despite this, the ratios are not towards an irrecoverable path 
but show the first signs of decline and call for prompt turnaround measures.  
 
 
Figure 4.38 – Beghelli: quick ratio and current ratio comparison. (Personal elaboration from 
AIDA database and Annual Financial Statements) 
As regards fixed capital, the amount of assets available to the company did not change 
significantly during the period under examination, except for tangible assets (Figure 4.39).  
 
 
Figure 4.39 – Beghelli: composition of fixed assets. (M€) (Personal elaboration from AIDA 
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As displayed in Figure 4.39, fixed assets volumes have remained quite stable during the first 
two years. However, there has been proportional changes with regard to tangible assets, both in 
terms of new investments and disposals. Thus, acquisitions were mainly attributable to 
equipment and molds used for innovative products manufacturing, referring to new launches in 
the lighting and other divisions. While disposals mainly concerned the sale of obsolete plants 
and molds used for products out of the production cycle. Therefore, the turnaround action 
provided for by the 2013-2018 business plan and referred to non-strategic assets dismissals has 
been implemented but its impact on total fixed assets has been counterbalanced by new 
investments in the name of innovation.  
In fact, the greatest tangible assets reduction has occurred in 2017, as part of the business plan 
activities, and has accounted for a decline of - €10.5 million as compared to 2016. In December 
2017, the company completed the sale to a real estate fund of primary standing in the Czech 
Republic of the non-strategic plant located in Brno owned by Beghelli Elplast for a total amount 
of €8.7 million, which cash flow generation occurred in both 2017 and 2018. Moreover, the 
contract provided for the utilization of the property on loan until December 2020. Thereafter, 
the slight reduction in total tangible assets took place in 2018 and 2019 too and referred to the 
disposal of non-strategic plants and machinery, compliant with the business plan provisions.  
As compared to Elemaster, Beghelli’s invested capital settles at higher values both in absolute 
terms and in relation to revenues generated (Figure 4.40).  
In fact, the company presents a mean of €172.8 million in capital invested vis-à-vis the lower 
volume of €91.4 million of Elemaster over the 5-year period of analysis. Therefore, it can 
reasonably be assumed that Beghelli has a more rigid corporate structure than its competitor, 
thus generating slightly lower revenues. Indeed, it appears evident that the Group has not fully 
adhered to the business plan for the period under examination. Actually, Beghelli did not 
properly managed to streamline its net working capital through the optimization of its supply 





Figure 4.40 – Beghelli: invested capital comparison (M€). (Personal elaboration from AIDA 
database and Annual Financial Statements) 
The ability of Beghelli to profit from the utilization of its total funds invested is now 
investigated through the analysis of ROA and ROIC, also in relation to Elemaster (Figure 4.41).  
Indeed, it is interesting to note how the two displayed, again, a similar path with respect to the 
considered ratios, while settling on two different levels. In fact, both Elemaster and Beghelli 
suffered a decline in performance in correspondence to 2018. In particular, the year was subject 
to difficulties in relation to the lighting sector, also due to the strong product prices competition. 
What can, therefore, be extrapolated from the graphs is the greater ability of the competitor to 
face uncertainties related to the external environment, thus maintaining a lower but positive 
profitability with a 1.5% ROA and 2.7% ROIC. On the contrary, Beghelli accounted for 
negative levels of both ROA (-2%) and ROIC (-2.8%). 
 
Figure 4.41 – Beghelli: ROA and ROIC comparison. (Personal elaboration from AIDA 
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4.3.4. Capital structure  
Beghelli’s capital structure, composed by shareholders’ equity and net financial position, is 
fairly stable in the 5-year period under investigation (Figure 4.42). In particular, equity 
accounted on average for 58.1% of total source of financing, as compare to 41.9% of net 
financial position. Actually, its capital structure reflects a certain balance, despite uncertainties 
which the company faced over the last two years. Therefore, the following paragraphs will 
deepen the changes that have taken place in the main items of the company as regards to its 
capital structure.  
 
 
Figure 4.42 – Beghelli: total source of financing composition. (Personal elaboration from 
AIDA database and Annual Financial Statements) 
Shareholders’ equity was subject to limited variations from one accounting year to another, 
between 2015 and 2019 (Table 4.3). Into specifics, changes in Beghelli’s capital structure did 
not affect the share capital, which remained stable at €9.96 million, but occurred in terms of net 
income, which fluctuated in the last two years of analysis. 
The first slight reduction is noticeable between 2016 and 2017 but, actually, it is the result of 
dividends distribution amounting to €4 million, for €0.02 per share, which took place after the 
previous distribution of 2012. Thus, as a consequence of the overperformance accounted in 
2016, the company decided to give a positive signal to investors with respect to its future 
forecasts. Beghelli’s future prospects, however, underwent a revision in the following year 
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because of the negative result of - €9.2 million, which led to a more important reduction in 
equity, followed by a further loss in 2019, albeit lower, amounting to - €1.3 million.  
 
 
Table 4.3 – Beghelli: composition of shareholders’ equity. (T€) (Personal elaboration from 
AIDA database and Annual Financial Statements) 
The analysis of Beghelli’s capital structure will now focus on the components of its net financial 
position, having regard to investigate its level of indebtedness in relation to the period 2015-
2019 (Figure 4.43 and 4.44).  
 
 
Figure 4.43 – Beghelli: net financial position composition. (M€) (Personal elaboration from 
AIDA database and Annual Financial Statements) 
('000€) 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Net income 494 3.831 3.509 -9.187 -1.333
Share capital 9.961 9.961 9.961 9.961 9.961
Reserves 93.336 92.312 92.288 93.306 84.322
Equity of non-controlling interests 452 241 186 133 222
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Figure 4.44 – Beghelli: net financial position. (M€) (Personal elaboration from AIDA database 
and Annual Financial Statements) 
The company's net financial position has undergone a slight but constant reduction during the 
years of analysis, accounting for -35.6% in its absolute value between 2015 and 2019. More 
specifically, net debt has been subject to internal movements especially in relation to its 
subdivision into long-term and short-term financing. 
Indeed, a first significant change is recorded in 2016 due to the simultaneous reduction of long-
term debt and increase of the short-term consideration for an amount equal to €13.7 million, 
mainly attributable to the classification in that section of the portion of loans and financing to 
be repaid within the next 12 months from the balance sheet date in response to the positive cash 
flow generation of Beghelli.   
On the other hand, the accounting year 2017 reflects the positive impact of the debt rescheduling 
agreement’s early termination, occurred in December 2016, and the simultaneous negotiations 
with a pool of banks for an unsecured financing for €40 million, subscribed in July 2017. The 
support obtained by the banks concerned is aimed at improving Beghelli’s indebtedness 
position, extending its average duration and encouraging the pursuit of its performance 
improvements, as stated in its business plan. The financing operation has reflected in the 
increase of the item “mortgages and loans” and it has been intended for the extinction of 
unsecured short and medium-term loans in place, for an amount equal to approximately €27.2 
million, and residually to the reduction of the utilization of ordinary short-term credit lines. 
The reality of the following two years, however, did not meet the expectations of the company. 































2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
NFP
Net financial position NFP/EBITDA
151 
 
NFP/EBITDA ratio which severely increased from 3.0x in 2017 up to 15.7x in 2018 (Figure 
4.44). Due to the company’s non-compliance with the covenants provided for in the agreement 
with the pool of banks, 2018 showed a reclassification of €53.3 million from long-term to short-
term loans and financing, which has been further confirmed in 2019.  
Then, in 2019 Beghelli managed to achieve a better NFP/EBITDA (3.7x) ratio thanks to the 
reduced impact of operating costs on turnover volumes, while still facing uncertainties in 
relation to its ability to cope with short-term obligations, as previously highlighted by the quick 
and current ratios (Figure 4.38).  
From the comparison of Beghelli with its competitor, it is possible to draw considerations in 
relation to its debt structure and its ability to manage its financial position (Figure 4.45).  
Thus, Beghelli presents an NFP/EBITDA ratio which, despite the slightly declining net 
financial position, is strongly influenced by its operating performance as reflected by the peak 
reached in 2018. Nevertheless, without considering the unpredictable performance of the 
market in 2018, the debt structure of the company does not seem to raise many concerns, 
although, compared to its competitor, there is room for improvement.  
Actually, what turns out to be worrying is Beghelli’s interest coverage ratio. The company 
presents a mean ratio of 3x, as compared to 37.8x of Elemaster. In fact, some accounting years, 
namely 2015 and 2018, the operating performance of the Group is sufficient only to meet its 
interest expenses, highlighting concern in relation to Beghelli’s ability to honor its debt burden.   
 
 
Figure 4.45 – Beghelli: NFP/EBITDA and interest coverage ratio comparison. (Personal 






































4.3.5. Market capitalization 
Considering now market’s perception in relation to Beghelli’s performance over the time period 
under investigation, the company’s decline path can be envisaged also from the pattern of its 
market capitalization and P/B ratio (Figure 4.46).  
Into specifics, the data shows a gradual decrease of the Group’s market capitalization which, 
from a result of €95.6 million in 2015, declined by -54.8%, up to €43.2 million in 2019. 
Contrary to this trend, in 2017 there was a slight increase in market capitalization due to the 
distribution of dividends, which was declared in March and took place in May, six years after 
the previous dividend payout occurred in 2012. The downward trend has been further endorsed 
as compared to the P/B ratio of Beghelli. Actually, the ratio always maintained a value below 
1, representing both the sector’s trend to which the Group belongs and the company’s future 
performance perspectives at the eyes of investors. In fact, a ratio below 1 indicates that the 
market is undervaluing Beghelli, compared to the intrinsic value of the company on the basis 
of its shareholders’ equity.  
 
 
Figure 4.46 – Beghelli: market capitalization (M€) and P/B comparison. (Personal elaboration 





































4.3.6. Current developments 
The past year, 2020, has been characterized by multiple uncertainties in almost each of the 
market’s sectors due to the covid-19 pandemic. As well as many companies, Beghelli had to 
face a strongly reduced market demand, further suffering the deterioration in its performance 
as compared to the already fragile business condition of 2019. In fact, the restrictive measures 
undertaken to stem the virus spread had direct effects on Beghelli’s production and supply 
chain. Indeed, since March and with reference to the Italian companies of the Group, there has 
been a slowdown in procurement of production departments and in the fulfilment of portfolio’s 
orders, as well as a decline in customers’ demand. Furthermore, with regard to the distribution 
chain, there were marginal requests for longer payment periods. 
As soon as Beghelli was faced with the aforementioned difficulties, it developed a revised 
business plan for the period 2020-2024, together with the 2020 budget. In particular, it provided 
for the further dismissal of non-strategic assets, a process of production reorganization through 
which achieving economies of scale and consequent structural costs savings, the workforce 
reduction and a further focus on its core business. Furthermore, with reference to revenues 
volumes, the current uncertainty characterizing the markets, both domestic and international, 
has led directors to foresee a growth rate substantially aligned with that of the sector, by revising 
downwards the commercial objectives set by the management, within a forecasting framework 
for revenues which, in any case, foresees within the year 2021 the almost total recovery of the 
reduction in 2020 revenues compared to 2019. 
From a financial point of view, the significant reduction in sales affecting the domestic market 
in which the parent company operates, has led to the adoption of measures aimed at liquidity 
improvements.  First, the company has obtained €9 million of financing deliberated according 
to art. 1 and 13 of Decreto Legge 23/2020, relative to urgent measures regarding access to credit 
by companies. Secondly, Beghelli has received a moratorium on specific medium/long-term 
financing granted by credit institutions, around €5.1 million. Lastly, to these provisions were 
added extraordinary state contributions, falling under support measures against covid-19 
received from few foreign subsidiaries.  
Referring now to the latest available financial statements, namely half-yearly statements, it is 
interesting to briefly compare the performance of Beghelli in 2020 with respect to the results 
of the same period of 2019. First, as regards sales results, the company faced a reduction in 
turnover by -26.9%, accounting for €57.35 million total revenues, with the greatest decline 
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evidenced on foreign markets. On the other hand, raw materials, consumables and goods costs 
reduced more than proportionally than sales volumes, experiencing a fall by -47.4%.  
EBITDA amounted to €3.75 million, reduced by -75% as compared to June 2019, and, on a 
like-for-like basis, its downward pattern is strictly correlated to the trend in revenues, in the 
presence of an improvement in industrial margins in relation to sales, a reduction in promotional 
costs and personnel costs. Finally, the company accounted for a negative net income amounting 
to - €5.6 million. 
As regards its total source of financing, Beghelli registered a limited fluctuation in net financial 
position which, thus, increased by €1.25 million and reduced shareholders’ equity as a result of 
the negative result achieved.  
 
Beghelli’s share price trend over 2020 reflected the performance deterioration faced by the 
company (Figure 4.47). With a price per share of €0.23 at the end of December 2019, the firm 
saw a significant decline to €0.15 the 10th of March, first day of lockdown in Italy. Then, the 
course of the price in the following months further confirmed performance difficulties with 
which the company had to deal.  
Surprisingly, in December 2020 up to January 2021, Beghelli’s share price began to increase 
because of a higher expected market demand for the new business line of air sanitizers and the 
recovery of the lighting sector, also supported by the trend of energy efficiency. In particular, 
Beghelli’s revenues are expected to reach €175 million in 2024, with a CAGR of 2.9%. In this 
regard, the positive pattern has been further supported by KT&Partners, namely an Italian 
financial advisor. The financial boutique started the coverage of the share with a fair value of 
€0.37, estimating a positive outlook on the company in the period 2020-2024.  









Figure 4.47 – Beghelli: price per share from 2019 to date. (Morningstar)  
 
4.3.7. Considerations on the case study 
The Beghelli case study presents interesting points of reflection in relation to its crisis progress, 
still ongoing, and measures undertaken to deal with the company’s turnaround, which were first 
effective and then suddenly followed by a performance deterioration.  
Taking a step back, Beghelli showed the first timid signs of decline shortly before the outbreak 
of the global crisis in 2008. Indeed, a general contraction affected economies and this, in turn, 
caused a loss of purchasing power due to the rise of raw material prices and the loss of 
competitiveness. Thereafter, the advent of the global financial crisis, as for most of the market’s 
companies, brough to the fore a general performance deterioration and a consequent declining 
demand. Nevertheless, Beghelli did not appear disarmed in the face of the crisis and decided to 
act promptly by adopting measures in line with its business, primarily linked to the maintenance 
of a strong position in the lighting sector, while streamlining its cost structure and exploiting 
its competitive advantage, namely the development of innovative products, by undertaking 










The first signs of recovery in the sector are found in 2010 but, shortly after, the sovereign debt 
crisis came to an end and Beghelli had to face a severe liquidity constraint in 2012, leading to 
its inclusion in the black list CONSOB in 2013. The causes that led to the company’s financial 
distress are not entirely accounted as internal and, in fact, they can be identified in three points: 
(1) changes in the regulatory framework of the photovoltaic sector, (2) sales contraction 
volumes, (3) unforeseen contractual and bureaucratic issues related to the divestment of its 
Chinese subsidiary.  
Again, Beghelli did not take long to intervene in the management of the crisis, approving a 
business plan for the period 2013-2018 and negotiating a debt rescheduling agreement (ex art. 
67, co. 3, let. d, l.f.), fully effective from 2014. The former, provided for the cost structure 
streamline, the focus on its core lighting sector, and the reduction of both commercial offering 
and photovoltaic sector’s expectations. On the other hand, the debt restructuring agreement 
entailed the confirmation of the short-term credit lines, the moratorium on medium/long-term 
loan capital instalments and the rescheduling of the real estate leases payments.  
Surprisingly, Beghelli managed to exceed expectations in the years soon after the 
implementation of the aforementioned turnaround measures, leading to its shift towards the 
grey list CONSOB in 2015 and the early resolution of the debt rescheduling agreement in 2016. 
Furthermore, a pool of banks guaranteed to the company an unsecured financing amounting to 
€40 million. 
On the contrary, what happened in the last two years of analysis until now, has been a strong 
deterioration of Beghelli’s performance, initiated in 2018 as a consequence of the unsatisfactory 
market response to its new products launches.  
Retracing the measures undertaken so far and taking into consideration results obtained over 
the last 5 years of analysis, we can reasonably assume that Beghelli has not overcome the 
financial distress yet, despite few improvements achieved over the years: 
 Beghelli managed to reduce its net financial position 
The company has achieved a reduction of its net debt position. In fact, as compared to 
2015, in 2019 Beghelli saw a reduction of -35.6% in net financial position due to the 
financial support received in 2017. Thus, the €40 million received by the pool of banks 
was intended for the improvement of its net indebtedness, the extension of its average 
duration and the encouragement for the pursuit of performance improvements, as stated 




/ Beghelli partially reorganized its cost structure  
Total costs for raw materials, consumables and goods amounted to €76.4 million in 
2015, succeeded by fluctuating values in the following years, to then reach €74.2 million 
in 2019, with a total variation of -2.8%. Analogously, personnel expenses remained 
quite stable, while a slightly greater reduction has been achieved for operating costs, 
which declined by -13.6% between 2015 and 2019. Therefore, Beghelli did not fully 
achieved its initial objectives, as stated in the 2013-2018 business plan. Thus, one of the 
reasons of sales reduction in 2018 was the lengthening of execution time of few 
important orders in the area of lighting services, due to its supply chain management.  
In this regard, the company has established the need of implementing a production 
reorganization, through which achieving economies of scale and consequent structural 
costs savings, further reiterated in its 2020-2024 business plan.   
 Beghelli excessively focused on new products launches  
According to the 2013-2018 business plan, Beghelli aimed to defend its competitive 
position in the lighting sector with the introduction of innovative proposals in its core 
business. To do so, the company should have reduced the implementation of new 
product launches and focus on product innovation, with the consequent reduction of 
advertising costs and the increase in R&D expenses. Actually, what happened has been 
an increase of advertising costs for new product launches. In a context of increased price 
competition as 2018, the company had to face a weak market demand, in the face of 
upfront high investments and numerous inventories relating to new launches. Therefore, 
the trigger of the new distress condition, after successful results in the first three years 
of analysis (2015-2017) has been the erroneous forecast of market demand and the 
excessive focus on new product ranges.  
 
Overall, the analysis of the Beghelli case over the 5-year period 2015-2019 showed a 
contrasting trend. Thus, in a first instance, the company proved a surprising performance 
recovery in 2015-5017 thanks to the implementation of the financial manoeuvre and the support 
of the 2013-2018 business plan. Actually, soon after the first two years of strong distress (2012-
2013), Beghelli improved its indebtedness position making it earn the shift into the grey list 
CONSOB in 2015 and managed to negotiate the early resolution of its debt rescheduling 
agreement in 2016. Indeed, what triggered the new distress phase has been a series of 
contributing causes. With hindsight, the company has not fully achieved the measures put in 
place by the 2013-2018 business plan. In fact, Beghelli was unable to reorganize its cost 
structure in order to achieve economies of scale, thus finding itself facing a slowdown in the 
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production of new launches in 2018. Moreover, it has placed excessive attention on the 
manufacturing of new products with the consequent increase in advertising costs and, under an 
erroneous market demand forecast, it found itself incurring disproportionate costs in relation to 
sales revenues. Despite no liquidity constraint has been pointed out and the company does not 
present concerns in facing its short-term liabilities with its current short-term assets, Beghelli 
needs to intervene on its production process in order to streamline its cost structure. 
Furthermore, the trigger of the new distress period seems to lie on the excessive optimist on its 
performance improvements subsequent to the turnaround period. In fact, despite its improved 
debt burden up to 2017, the company had placed excessive effort on new launches, neglecting 
its core business and losing focus on the innovation of existing products.  
In summary, Beghelli needs to pursue objectives set forth by the 2020-2024 business plan in 
order to maintain a lean structure, without overlooking its defendable market position and 
















Pininfarina, a company operative in the automotive sector characterized by a prestigious design, 
has been subject to quarterly additional reporting under the grey list for almost ten years. Thus, 
it has been surveilled under the CONSOB’s list since 2009, because of its debt burden 
deterioration, and was deemed restructured in 2019 thanks to the implementation of several 
business plans and debt rescheduling agreements but, most of all, to an investment agreement 
which provided substantial capital injection. 
To this regard, the investigation of Pininfarina’s performance will cover the 5-year period 2015-
2019 considering, therefore, the most recent turnaround measures adopted by the Group until 
its exit from the grey list. Into specifics, the analysis will refer to the reclassified financial 
statements reported in Appendix 4 and, to better appreciate results, a comparison with a 
competitor was implemented for comparable margins. To this end, Italdesign Giugiaro S.p.A. 
has been selected as the most suitable competitor from the automotive sector. Briefly, Italdesign 
covers all phases of automobiles development, from styling to the final production, with a 
particular attention to consultancy services, aiming at the proposal of an innovative product 
both in terms of engineering and design.  
 
4.4.1. Causes of distress and financial manoeuvre 
Decline  
The decline of Pininfarina’s performance dates back to the beginning of the 2000s. Thus, as an 
industrial company operating in the automotive sector, Pininfarina undertook a long period of 
international expansion aiming at the acquisition of foreign firms through which to develop 
strategic synergies. Therefore, with the objective of proposing as a global partner and in 
conjunction with its expansion abroad, Pininfarina also invested in the manufacturing of new 
car prototypes producing each year several designs. Therefore, when the market brought to the 
fore in the early 2000s the first uncertain trends due to macroeconomic factors, the automotive 
sector suffered the consequences and, in turn, Pininfarina showed the first signs of decline also 
by reason of its high indebtedness position.  
Actually, the company achieved its first negative results in 2005 when it accounted a reduction 
of -31.3% in turnover as compared to 2004, with the consequent net loss of - €8.3 million. In 
particular, this result was strongly influenced by the complete renewal of the production range, 
160 
 
the delay in few orders’ departure and the restructuring decided in Italy and Germany, which 
progressively burdened the cost structure and the net financial position.  
The first concrete interventions for the resolution of the company’s decline, however, came at 
the end of 2007 as a response to a further performance deterioration. Into specifics, Pininfarina’s 
net financial position amounted to €185.4 million, worsened by €64.5 million as compared to 
the previous accounting year, with a net income of - €114.5 million which reduced 
shareholders’ equity up to €38.9 million, from its 2006 initial value of €155 million.  
To this regard, from December 2007 Pininfarina was able to achieve a moratorium negotiated 
with the majority of its credit institutions through which the company ceased to pay principal 
amounts of the medium-long term debt, with expire date on the 30th of April 2008, to which an 
agreement must necessarily follow for its overall debt position. The latter agreement should 
have found the support of an ad hoc business plan for the definition of strategic guidelines 
designed for the Group’s turnaround, as will be seen in a while. Soon after in 2008, when the 
global financial crisis hit markets, the automotive sector was put on its knees and, in turn, 
Pininfarina fell into the downward spiral of the crisis.  
 
 
Referring now to the market performance over the business decline period, it can be noticed 
how Pininfarina’s price per share were subject to contained fluctuations until the outbreak of 
the crisis in 2008, which strongly affected company’s already fragile condition (Figure 4.48). 
From the initial value of €24 in 2000, Pininfarina’s share price declined up to €12 in 2002, due 
to uncertainties in the automotive sector. Indeed, the following years were characterized by a 
fluctuating trend, with the share price swinging between €14 and €17, until the crisis strongly 











The 2008 marks the worsening of Pininfarina's financial condition which has been aggravated, 
in the second half of the year, by the advent of a global crisis of epochal significance that has 
hit across all sectors of the economy. In particular, the automobile sector has been strongly 
affected, resulting in severe reductions in production volumes and, in addition, an even more 
marked distress hit the CVM sector (Contract Vehicle Manufacturers), in which Pininfarina 
was present in relation to its production activities. To this regard, the business condition made 
it necessary the company’s further entry into the grey list CONSOB in July 2009. 
Negotiations with the pool of banks finally led in December 2008 to the stipulation of the first 
financial manoeuvre provided for by the debt rescheduling agreement (ex art. 67, co. 3, lett. d., 
l.f.), which has received the support of a long-term business plan for the period 2008-2017.  
In particular, the financial manoeuvre concerned shareholders’ equity increase for €69.8 










As concerns the debt rescheduling agreement, fully effective since December 2008, it provided: 
• Leasing amounts and the long-term financing repayment to be intended from 2012, with 
the former having final maturity in 2014 and the latter in 2015, with interests maturing 
from 2012; 
• Pininfarina is expected to perform mandatory early repayments through (1) collections 
relating to assets disposals, (2) the allocation of 75% of the excess cash flows accounted 
by the company in the years 2009, 2010, 2011 and (3) the allocation of 40% of any 
excess cash flows registered starting from 2012. 
Moreover, as regards the 2008-2017 business plan on which the aforementioned agreement is 
based, Pininfarina followed three main guidelines: 
• A new business positioning through the development and production of the electric car, 
expected from 2011, to be achieved by means of the joint venture with Bollorè Group; 
• Continued growth in services; 
• The implementation of activities aimed at the decline of productive and structural costs, 
with a continuous improvement of production processes. To this regard, over the years 
the company undertook measures such as the workforce reduction, non-strategic assets 
and loss-making subsidiaries divestments.  
Thereafter, in 2011 Pininfarina observed a considerable delay in the development of the electric 
car market, a fundamental element of the 2008-2017 business plan, which, combined with the 
strong global competition in the provision of engineering and styling services for the 
automotive sector, have caused important negative effects on the Group’s performance. 
Therefore, it was deemed necessary to modify the business plan for the new period 2012-2018, 
providing for: (1) the strengthening the company's engineering and styling activities, with a 
particular attention to the Asian market, (2) the growth of the provision of engineering services 
on the E-Mobility market by leveraging on the skills and know-how, (3) the growth in the 
enhancement of traditional art direction activities by implementing dedicated resources and 
brand licensing. Moreover, in 2012 Pininfarina revised its agreement with the pool of banks by 
providing, among others, the further rescheduling of medium/long-term debt with a 2012-2018 
amortization plan and the substantial reduction of interest rates applied on total debt.  
Thanks to amendments made to the debt rescheduling agreement and the definition of the new 
strategic guidelines envisaged by the business plan 2012-2018, Pininfarina succeeded to 
achieve a performance improvement from 2012, both in terms of turnover and indebtedness 
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position. Nevertheless, the real turning point was possible in December 2015 because of the 
investment agreement stipulated between Pincar, controlling shareholder of Pininfarina, and 
Mahindra&Mahindra Group, Indian leader in the automotive sector.  
In execution of the agreement stipulated in December 2015, on the 30th of May 2016 the 
company Pincar in liquidation sold its entire stake held in Pininfarina (76.063%) to PF Holding, 
Dutch company owned by Mahindra&Mahindra Group. In addition, the agreement provided 
for a capital increase of a maximum amount of €26.5 million and a new debt rescheduling 
agreement between Pininfarina and its pool of banks, further supported by the 2016-2025 
business plan.  
With respect to the financial manoeuvre, the debt rescheduling agreement provided for: 
• The full and definitive payment at a discounted value, with the consequent write-off, of 
58% of the company’s debts nominal amount;  
• The rescheduling of the remaining debt portion for a total of €41 million from 2025, 
belonging to institutions which chose to remain creditors of Pininfarina. 
As regards the 2016-2025 business plan, the commercial strategies followed the business trend 
of the last three years, providing: 
• The strengthening of the specific technical skills currently possessed in order to provide 
an excellent supply of “Design to Delivery" engineering services in sectors other than 
automotive such as transport, aerospace, architecture, real estate and consumer goods; 
• The increase in available resources to constantly enhance the value of the Pininfarina 
brand in the automotive and non-automotive sectors, through branding or co-branding; 
• The increase in economic and financial flows through the signing of a trademark license 
agreement with Mahindra&Mahindra concerning the use of the brands owned by the 
companies of the Pininfarina Group for automotive products; 
• The streamlining of operational activities and their efficiency enhancement aimed at 
contributing significantly to the reduction of structural costs. 
In the following years, the measures implemented through the agreements concluded in 2015-
2016 have certainly had the desired effect, leading Pininfarina to improve both its operating 
performance, further reducing its debt burden. Moreover, in 2018 the company has undertaken 
a structural reorganization with the objective of centralizing resources management and 
efficiently conveying its value proposition in the two key businesses in which it operates: design 
and engineering services. Therefore, the Group established the Pininfarina Engineering to 
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which the engineering division has been conferred and, alongside, Pininfarina Extra merged by 
incorporation into the parent company, with the aim of fostering synergies between the 
automotive, transport and interior design sectors. In addition, the company’s successful 









Figure 4.49 – Pininfarina: main provisions of the restructuring plan (2016-2025). (Personal 
elaboration from Pininfarina website) 
 
Again, Pininfarina crisis evolution can be envisaged from its share price trend (Figure 4.50). 
The first relevant price decline is detected in the second half of 2008 as a consequence of the 
global financial crisis outbreak. Thus, the price declined from €9.2 at the beginning of the year, 
to €2 at the end of December. In 2009, shares’ value slightly increased up to €3.4 because of 
the first debt rescheduling agreement entry into force. Again, the Group deemed it necessary to 
revise the deals previously undertaken with the pool of banks in order to extend the effects of 
the debt rescheduling agreement, still supported by specific business strategies. Therefore, in 
2011 the price positively increased up to €4.4. In the following years, shares’ value fluctuated 
in a range between €2 and €4, until Pininfarina embarked on the investment agreement with 
Mahindra&Mahindra in 2015, which were positively welcomed by the market. The deal came 
together with the further Group’s restructuring, thanks to the implementation of the new debt 
rescheduling agreement in 2016, supported by the 2016-2025 business plan. Despite, share 
price seemed to decline again below the €2 value in 2016, due to the delayed capital increase. 
Thereafter, when the increase became fully effective, share value further increased until 
Restructuring Plan 
Turnaround measures 
• The streamlining of operational 
activities and efficiency 
enhancement 
• The strengthening of specific 
technical skills for the supply of 
Design to Delivery engineering 
services 
• Pininfarina’s brand value 
enhancement in the automotive 
and non-automotive sectors  
 
Financial manoeuvre 
• Full payment at a discounted value, 
with the consequent write-off, of 
58% of the company’s debt burden 
• Rescheduling of €41 mln debt from 
2025 
• Capital increase up to a maximum 
amount of €26.5 mln 
 
Business Plan (2016-2025) Debt Rescheduling Agreement (2016) 
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reaching again €2 in 2017. Finally, the following years were generally characterized by limited 
fluctuations, until the company’s performance deteriorated again in 2019 due to a substantial 






Figure 4.50 – Pininfarina: price per share (2008-2019). (Morningstar) 
As for the previous two case studies, the analysis will cover the time period 2015-2019 in order 
to fully capture the effects of the investment agreement occurred in 2015, followed by the last 



















4.4.2. Sales trend and operating profitability 
With respect to Pininfarina’s operating performance, its turnover pattern presents a fluctuating 
trend as a response to the automotive sector’s progress, in which the company operates with its 
engineering and design services (Figure 4.51).  
 
 
Figure 4.51 – Pininfarina: total revenues (M€) and revenues growth rate. (Personal elaboration 
from AIDA database and Annual Financial Statements) 
The first two years of analysis are subject to a severe decline in total revenues, with a particular 
reference to 2016 when the company accounted a growth rate of -15.9%. Thus, the downward 
dynamic was mainly due to the absence in 2015 of sales related to intellectual property of some 
concepts that had characterized the previous year, while as regards 2016, Pininfarina has been 
subject to the reduction in engineering services in the Italian and German sectors, with a decline 
also in the style and production activities of limited cars series, partially offset by the increase 
in license revenues of the brand. 
On the other hand, the company’s performance in the two-year period 2017-2018 represents a 
turning point compared to the previous years, showing the first positive impact of the 
restructuring plan undertaken for the period 2016-2025. Indeed, the Group accounted increased 
revenues by €17.6 million in 2017, followed by a further increase of €18.1 million in 2018. In 
2017, to the growth of turnover has contributed the collection of multi-year and large orders in 
the field of automobile engineering services. Their duration, greater than 36 months, allowed 
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the diversification of its target markets, increasing orders’ volume and customers portfolio in 
high growth markets such as the United States, China, Vietnam and India and decreasing 
percentage dependence on the European market already limited to less than 40% of the 
production value.  
The positive turnover trend has been slightly haltered in 2019 when Pininfarina registered a 
negative growth rate of -13.4%. The negative sales course has been primarily the effect of a 
substantial slowdown in the automotive sector, with a particular reference to the US and 
Chinese markets in which Pininfarina has strengthened its presence in the last years. Moreover, 
the market’s turbulence has negatively impacted on prices, resulting in increased 
competitiveness and a general reduction in margins for all operators and, in particular, for 
engineering service providers. Furthermore, as a consequence of specific macro-economic and 
political factors and due to some delays in the evolution of the orders relating to the Chinese 
market, few important contracts were interrupted, significantly impacting on total revenues. 
From the comparison of revenues growth rate, it emerges a common trend between Pininfarina 
and its competitor Italdesign despite, thus, the peer company have accounted higher absolute 
amounts over the whole period under investigation (Figure 4.52). Indeed, both companies 
registered a strong decline in 2016 and 2019 due to the development of specific markets in 
which both operate, with a particular reference to the Chinese automotive sector. Instead, the 
main turnover difference between the two is found in 2017 because of the first positive effects 
of the restructuring plan adopted by Pininfarina.   
 
Figure 4.52 – Pininfarina: revenues growth rate comparison. (Personal elaboration from AIDA 



























Furthermore, a performance comparison between the two companies is also possible in terms 
of revenues per employee trend (Figure 4.53). Thus, both companies performed quite stable 
ratios over the considered time period, with Italdesign accounting a mean value of €202.6 
thousand vis-a-vis the lower ratio of Pininfarina amounting to €138.5 thousands. Therefore, it 




Figure 4.53 – Pininfarina: revenues per employee comparison (T€). (Personal elaboration from 
AIDA database and Annual Financial Statements) 
The analysis of the EBITDA and EBIT pattern allows to investigate not only the company’s 
performance, but also the incidence of its cost structure over the 2015-2019 period (Figure 4.54 
and 4.55). With respect to EBITDA trend, the reduced results achieved in 2015, 2016 and 2019 
highlights the high costs incidence on total revenues. Into specifics, in the two-year period 
2015-2016, expenses contributing to the operational management amounted to €81.4 million 
and €68.9 million, respectively, against total revenues of €82.9 million and €69.7 million, 
representing the rigidity of Pininfarina’s cost structure in the very first years of finalization of 
the restructuring plan. Actually, the first two years of analysis are also burdened by high 
expenses incurred for the agreements of the debt rescheduling against financial institutions and 
the sale of the majority stake of Pininfarina to the Mahindra Group.  
Indeed, in 2017 and 2018 Pininfarina achieved a better performance in terms of EBITDA. In 
fact, rather than attributing these results to a refinement of the cost structure, the values are 




















Pininfarina accounted additional operational costs for €10.6 million and €23.8 million 
respectively, as compared to 2016. Likewise, in 2019 the operating costs burden of the company 
amounted to €92.1 million, leading to a negative EBITDA of - €0.8 million. Actually, 
Pininfarina has been severely penalized in the last year of analysis by a contraction of markets 




Figure 4.54 – Pininfarina: EBITDA (M€) and EBITDA%. (Personal elaboration from AIDA 
database and Annual Financial Statements) 
The results achieved in terms of EBIT confirm the negative performance of operations and, 
moreover, highlight an important impact of amortization and write-downs on profitability. As 
it is visible from Figure 4.55, the consideration of non-monetary costs led to the further results 
deterioration in the first two years of analysis and in 2019. In particular, in both 2015 and 2019 
Pininfarina has incurred in tangible assets devaluation accounting for €9.5 million and €9.2 
million respectively. In detail, in 2015 the company wrote down an industrial site which was 
put into a state of inactivity at the end of the year, in line with the provisions of the new 2016-
2025 business plan. While, in 2019 the parent company has identified the existence of a trigger 
event related to the early termination of an industrial site’s rental agreement with a potential 
impact on its book value and, therefore, in compliance with the dictates of IAS 36, the asset 
was subjected to an upfront impairment test.  
On the other hand, the positive EBITDA value of €12.7 million achieved in 2018 reached a 
volume even lower than in 2017 in terms of EBIT (€3.8 million). This result has been further 

































Chinese customer to whom mainly engineering services were provided, following his difficulty 
in dealing with the debt.  
 
 
Figure 4.55 – Pininfarina: EBIT (M€) and EBIT%. (Personal elaboration from AIDA database 
and Annual Financial Statements) 
 
From the comparison of the EBITDA margin, it further emerges the fluctuating performance of 
Pininfarina as compared to Italdesign (Figure 4.56). Thus, the competitor achieved a more 
stable trend over the 5-year time period because of its better operating performance and flexible 
cost structure which moves together with the production cycle in order to mitigate any potential 
demand shock. On the other hand, Pininfarina’s EBITDA margin appears to be particularly 
subject to the automotive sector’s demand, subsequently failing to adapt its cost structure to 
this trend. Furthermore, it can be reasonably assumed that Pininfarina did not successfully 
































Figure 4.56 – Pininfarina: EBITDA% comparison. (Personal elaboration from AIDA database 
and Annual Financial Statements) 
Net income further supports the wavering results performed by Pininfarina over the 5-year 
analysis period (Figure 4.57). However, in 2016 the company accounted for €20.5 net income. 
Actually, this positive result was due to the substantial change in the terms relating to financial 
liabilities that took place during the year, resulting in the extinction of the book value of the 
liabilities derived before the rescheduling agreement and the recognition of the rescheduled 
debt at fair value. The income from extinguishing financial liabilities is generated by the 
positive difference between the two values, accounting for €26.5 million non-recurring and 
extraordinary items. 
 
Figure 4.57 – Pininfarina: net income (M€). (Personal elaboration from AIDA database and 











































4.4.3. Invested capital 
From Pininfarina’s composition of total funds invested, a certain asymmetry emerges from the 
partition between fixed assets, net working capital and other operating and non-operating items 
(Figure 4.58). In particular, apart from 2015 in which the company totaled 14.8% of net 
working capital, its weight is negligible and below 2%, representing an aspect to be explored. 
Thus, fixed assets represent the main component of total funds invested, feature that 




Figure 4.58 – Pininfarina: composition of total funds invested. (Personal elaboration from 
AIDA database and Annual Financial Statements) 
 
From the investigation of Pininfarina’s net working capital, a clear prevalence of trade payables 
and receivables emerges, compared to a low inventory value which, consequently, results in 
very contained volumes of net working capital in the period under examination (Figure 4.59 
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Figure 4.59 – Pininfarina: composition of net working capital. (Personal elaboration from 
AIDA database and Annual Financial Statements) 
 
 
Figure 4.60 – Pininfarina: net working capital. (M€) (Personal elaboration from AIDA 
database and Annual Financial Statements) 
Thus, apart from the €8.5 million result accounted in 2015, Pininfarina registered a mean net 
working capital of €0.5 million over the period 2016-2019. In addition, to better understand the 
extent of this result, it was deemed necessary to calculate the average net working capital also 
for the years of greatest financial distress 2010-2014. To this regard, the company achieved a 
mean value of €8 million, higher as compared to the period under analysis and, furthermore, 
this makes the trend in net working capital of the last 5 years more understandable.  
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First, as regards inventory, Pininfarina registered a mean amount of €3.6 million, with the aim 
of maintaining a lean warehouse management.  
With respect to current assets, their increasing trend is influenced in particular by the 
performance of the reference automotive sector. Indeed, in 2017 the company accounted a first 
relevant increase in the line item. Into specifics, it concerned a €4.9 million increase in trade 
receivables as a result of the customers portfolio expansion and, actually, it is primarily referred 
to extra EU markets, with specific reference to the US and Chinese markets. Furthermore, 
current assets increase also included higher prepayments and accrued income for €5.8 million 
which had its counterpart in higher trade payables, mainly related to a consultancy contract 
signed as part of a multi-year engineering deal under the responsibility of the parent company, 
the effect of which also continued in the two subsequent financial years.  
Similarly, trade payables grew between 2015 and 2019 for a total value of €23.4 million due to 
higher volumes of sales and the expanded customers portfolio. 
Overall, it can be assumed Pininfarina’s reduced net working capital is an element of internal 
financing which appears to be strictly linked to the improvement of company’s processes, with 
specific reference to purchasing policies and the warehouse management, as is visible from the 
moderate amounts of inventory over the period under analysis. Thus, the lower the working 
capital, the lower the financial needs and cash absorption, and therefore a reduction in its 
volume can represent a real internal source of financing, allowing for a freeing up of liquid 
resources to be allocated to other activities. Moreover, this result is best appreciated from the 
analysis of the net financial position, which makes it possible to assess the sustainability of the 
corporate debt. 
The comparison with the competitor Italdesign highlights a similar trend in net working capital, 
albeit on two different trajectories (Figure 4.61). Indeed, the peer company’s structure of the 
short-term operational assets and liabilities is negative for each year of analysis, accounting for 
a mean value of - €42.7 million. Therefore, high volumes of trade payables are observable as 
compared to trade receivables and inventory. Under a distressed corporate circumstance, this 
represents a cause for concern since companies unable to obtain further access to debt resources 
are generally more prone to resort to other forms of indebtedness, namely trade payables. In 
fact, this is not the case of Italdesign which has a negative net financial position, as it will be 
seen in a while. Nevertheless, the competitor's position seems to be more uncertain than that of 
Pininfarina as, in the event of a performance shock, the company could risk to not fully honor 




Figure 4.61 – Pininfarina: net working capital comparison. (M€) (Personal elaboration from 
AIDA database and Annual Financial Statements) 
In addition, the path of the quick and current ratio further corroborates the thesis according to 
which both companies do not present issues in meeting their short-term debts, in relation to 
their respective current receivables (Figure 4.62). As regards the quick ratio, both Pininfarina 
and Italdesign presented a value above the critical threshold of 0.8. In particular, Pininfarina 
registered a mean ratio of 1.5, while the competitor accounted an average value of 1.1. 
Likewise, considering a critical current ratio of 1.2, both companies presented a good degree of 
solvency, with Pininfarina accounting for a mean ratio of 1.6 vis-à-vis the 1.2 of Italdesign. 
Overall, although fluctuating, Pininfarina displayed a better capacity in coping with short-term 
obligations as compared to the competitor.   
 
Figure 4.62 – Pininfarina: quick ratio and current ratio comparison. (Personal elaboration from 
AIDA database and Annual Financial Statements) 
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As it can be noticed from Table 4.4, the clear prevalence of tangible assets reduces the graphic 
comprehensibility and, therefore, it was deemed necessary to provide the composition of total 
fixed assets in the form of a table. 
 
 
Table 4.4 – Pininfarina: composition of total fixed assets. (T€) (Personal elaboration from 
AIDA database and Annual Financial Statements) 
In the first place, in 2015 total tangible assets reduced its volume by - €9.4 million as compared 
to 2014, due to the write-down of a facility deemed inactive at the end of the year, in line with 
the provisions of the new 2016-2025 business plan. This relevant initial change was followed 
in the subsequent years of analysis by further divestments of assets considered non-strategic, 
consistent with the objectives set forth by the business plan. Thus, the reduction in tangible 
assets appears to be contained in the period under review since, in parallel, Pininfarina has 
undertaken numerous strategic investments.  
Indeed, the company has further pursued the objective of efficiency enhancement of operating 
activities also through the modernization of its plants, aimed at an increasingly innovative offer. 
Into specifics, in the last two years of investigation the company has undertaken a structural 
reorganization aimed at centralizing the management of resources, creating an adequate critical 
mass and efficiently conveying the value proposition in the two key businesses in which it 
operates: design and engineering services. To accomplish this, the company has established in 
2018 Pininfarina Engineering, entirely controlled and coordinated by the parent company and 
to which the "Engineering" business unit and control of Pininfarina Deutschland have been 
conferred. Furthermore, in 2019 Pininfarina Extra has merged into the parent company with the 
aim of bringing together the Italian style activities in the automotive sector and those related to 
industrial design, architecture and more generally to brand extension into a single company, 
with expectations in terms of synergies and positive “contaminations” between services aimed 
at the various market segments. 
('000€) 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Goodwill 1.043 1.043 1.043 1.043 0
Intangible assets 1.208 765 629 6.283 6.092
Tangible assets 51.382 50.110 49.557 49.979 46.266
Equity investments 323 336 349 857 854
Total operating fixed capital 53.956 52.254 51.578 58.162 53.212
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To wrap up, it can be assumed that Pininfarina is effectively exploiting the synergies deriving 
from the investment agreement with Mahindra&Mahindra Group, as it is always looking for 
modern technological proposals in line with the trend of the automotive sector.  
In addition, as compared to Italdesign, Pininfarina presents higher volumes of invested capital, 
both in absolute and relative terms (Figure 4.63). Indeed, the comparability between the two 
companies fails because the competitor displays a limited or negative invested capital over the 
5-year period. Actually, this means Italdesign presented lower financial requirements and cash 
absorption. As regards Pininfarina, its structure appears more rigid than the competitor’s mainly 
due to relevant portions of fixed assets, which slightly reduced over the years of analysis thanks 
to the implementation of the 2016-2025 business plan turnaround measures. 
 
 
Figure 4.63 – Pininfarina: invested capital comparison (M€). (Personal elaboration from AIDA 
database and Annual Financial Statements) 
As regards Pininfarina’s operating profitability and efficiency in investments allocation, the 
ROA and ROIC trend has been analyzed also in relation to its competitor (Figure 4.64). At first 
glance, it is not possible to identify a stable trend or common to both companies as they 
performed fluctuating results over the 5-year period. Besides, as regards ROA, Italdesign 
achieved an average value of -2.7% as compared to Pininfarina which registered -4.7%. Again, 
as regards ROIC, the competitor performed better and, despite the negative EBIT achieved in 
2016 which made non-meaningful the calculation due to the simultaneous negativity of the 
denominator, it accounted a mean value of 4.4%. On the other hand, the performance of 
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Figure 4.64 – Pininfarina: ROA and ROIC comparison. (Personal elaboration from AIDA 
database and Annual Financial Statements) 
 
4.4.4. Capital structure  
Pininfarina’s capital structure appears asymmetric and variable in its partition between 
shareholders’ equity and net financial position over the 2015-2019 investigation period (Figure 
4.65). Thus, as will be discussed in a while, this trend is the result of the financial manoeuvre 
provided for in the debt rescheduling agreement (ex art. 67, co. 3, lett. d, l.f.) and the 
restructuring plan, which entered into force in 2016 and impacted both on the indebtedness 
level and share capital.   
 
Figure 4.65 – Pininfarina: total source of financing composition. (Personal elaboration from 
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The composition of shareholders’ equity has been mainly subject to the impact of Pininfarina’s 
performance, in terms of net income, the financial manoeuvre at the basis of the 2016-2025 
restructuring plan and the debt rescheduling agreement, the latter two fully effective since 2016 
(Table 4.5).  
At a first glance, 2016 displayed an increased equity by €20.6 million as a result of the net 
income, arising from extraordinary and non-recurring items derived from the first application 
of the debt rescheduling agreement. Afterwards, in July 2017 Pininfarina’s shareholders’ capital 
further raised reflecting the €26.5 million share capital increase, provided for by the financial 
manoeuvre. Into specifics, approximately 24 million shares were subscribed for a nominal value 
of €1.1, of which €0.1 in share premium. In this regard, PF Holdings (Dutch company owned 
by Mahindra&Mahindra Group) has contributed for €20.2 million, maintaining its position as 
a majority shareholder for 76.15%. Thus, in subsequent years, shareholders’ equity has been 
mainly influenced by the company’s performance in terms of net income and, as a result, the 
equity volume has been strongly reduced in 2019 by the considerable loss of - €23.1 million.  
 
 
Table 4.5 – Pininfarina: composition of shareholders’ equity. (T€) (Personal elaboration from 
AIDA database and Annual Financial Statements) 
As regards the composition of net financial position, it strongly reflected the impact of the debt 
rescheduling agreement which, effective from 2016, contributed to Pininfarina’s turnaround 
process together with the 2016-2025 business plan.  
As visible from Figure 4.66, from 2016 onwards there was an actual improvement in the net 
indebtedness position of the company and, furthermore, the composition of short-term debt, 
long-term debt and liquidity acquires greater balance in the period under review. Into specifics, 
in May 2016 the effectiveness of the aforementioned agreement entailed the write down of 
56.7% of exposures’ nominal value amounting to €32.1 million and relating to financial 
institutions which participated to the agreement’s provisions. Instead, the remaining debt 
portion has been rescheduled between 2016 and 2025. Therefore, the effects of the agreement 
led to the net financial position reduction from €47.9 million to €1.8 million in 2016.  
('000€) 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Net income -18.169 20.531 1.312 2.173 -23.075
Share capital 30.150 30.150 54.271 54.271 54.271
Reserves -2.153 -20.219 3.220 5.305 7.806
Shareholders' equity 9.828 30.462 58.803 61.749 39.002
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In addition, as displayed in Figure 4.67, the relevant decline occurred in terms of net financial 
position also had a visible impact in terms of NFP/EBITDA ratio. Thus, Pininfarina’s trend 
appears declining because of both the reduced level of indebtedness and the fluctuating pattern 
of EBITDA. Indeed, from an initial high ratio of 32.4x in 2015, the company registered strongly 
declined NFP/EBITDA values, until reaching the negative value of -15x due to the deterioration 
of Pininfarina’s operating performance.   
 
 
Figure 4.66 – Pininfarina: net financial position composition. (M€) (Personal elaboration from 
AIDA database and Annual Financial Statements) 
 
 
Figure 4.67 – Pininfarina: net financial position. (M€) (Personal elaboration from AIDA 
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Finally, from the comparison of Pininfarina with its competitor, it is possible to draw 
considerations in relation to its debt structure and its ability to manage its financial position 
(Figure 4.68). As regards NFP/EBITDA ratio, a common pattern can be envisaged between the 
two companies in relation to 2016-2018 period. In particular, Italdesign accounted for a 
negative mean ratio of -2.8x because of its net financial position, characterized by a limited 
amount of debt. On the other hand, without considering the outlier ratio of 2015, which was a 
feature of the pre-debt agreement period, Pininfarina achieved an improvement in its 
NFP/EBITDA which performed an average value of -5.7x in the period 2016-2019, strongly 
affected by the negative operating performance of the last year of investigation. 
Referring now to the interest coverage ratio, its comparability is limited because of the better 
performance of Italdesign both in terms of operating performance and interest expenses burden. 
Nevertheless, the interest coverage ratio turns out to be a matter of concern for Pininfarina. 
Thus, it displayed a mean value of 1.7x over the period under analysis, meaning that the 
EBITDA volume is almost enough to just cover the company’s interest burden. In fact, 
considering the two-year period 2017-2018, the performance of the company in terms of 
EBITDA/interest expenses seemed improved, accounting for 3.4x and 5.2x respectively, but in 
2019 the deterioration of the EBITDA result overturned this achievement.  
Therefore, it can be assumed that, despite the positive effect achieved through the 
implementation of the debt rescheduling agreement, Pininfarina could find itself in difficulty in 
the face of demand shocks, thus failing to fully honor the payment of financial charges. 
 
Figure 4.68 – Pininfarina: NFP/EBITDA and interest coverage ratio comparison. (Personal 
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4.4.5. Market capitalization 
The investigation of Pininfarina’s performance from the overall market perspective reflects the 
downward spiral of the crisis and its recovery path (Figure 4.69). In 2015, the company’s 
capitalization amounted to €111.6 million and was the result of investors’ positive perception 
in relation to the definition of different agreements which took place in the second half of the 
year, namely the investment agreement between Pininfarina and the Mahindra&Mahindra 
Group, the ongoing negotiations for the debt rescheduling agreement, the future capital increase 
and the business plan, already prepared in 2015 but relating to the period 2016- 2025. Thus, the 
positive trend is also visible from the high P/B ratio amounting to 11.4x. In fact, more than 
reflecting the actual value of the company, it is strongly influenced by the lower equity’s book 
value and, actually, incorporates future positive expectations on Pininfarina’s profitability and 
recovery. As visible, in 2016 the company’s market capitalization suffered a slight inflection 
because of both reduced volumes of affairs and the still not subscribed capital increase, reaching 
a lower P/B value of 1.7x. Afterwards, in 2017 and 2018 the dynamic of Pininfarina’s market 
capitalization reflected the positive impact of share capital increase, occurred in 2017, and the 
improvement of its operating profitability.  Finally, the company’s perceived value decreased 
again in 2019, up to €88.6 million, due to a deterioration in performance which, as seen, was 
the effect of the automotive sector’s slowdown, with a particular reference to the US and 
Chinese markets in which Pininfarina has strengthened its presence in the last years. The path 
is reflected also on the 2.3x P/B ratio which is the result of the reduced shareholders’ equity 
caused by the - €23.1 million income loss. 
 
Figure 4.69 – Pininfarina: market capitalization (M€) and P/B comparison. (Personal 





























4.4.6. Current developments  
2020 has been characterized by major uncertainties for almost each sector of the market but, 
among others, the automotive one has been severely affected by the outbreak of the covid-19 
pandemic. In particular, the first nine months of the year showed a negative market trend 
characterized by the decline in orders, prices and margins, and Pininfarina experienced different 
situations depending on the service rendered. Thus, while activities such as style, architecture 
or industrial design have substantially maintained the expected performance, Pininfarina 
Engineering has suffered the worst repercussions, showing a decrease in activities of more than 
30% compared to 2019, further confirming the difficulties of contracting initiatives with 
volumes and margins adequate to the cost structure and, following the progressive deterioration 
in the economic and financial performance of the company, future income prospects were 
lacking. In this regard, in October 2020 the shareholders' meeting approved the liquidation of 
the company and, in the following month, the collective dismissal procedure for termination of 
activity began involving 135 employees. Indeed, this decision is in line with the process of 
rationalization and simplification of the Pininfarina Group's corporate structure, necessary for 
the purpose of maintaining the business continuity. 
Furthermore, the company’s financial management is carefully monitored and does not seem 
critical at the moment but, in spite of this, Pininfarina has decided to strengthen its financial 
capacity by stipulating in February 2020 a financing agreement with the Mahindra&Mahindra 
Group, amounting to €20 million. To this regard, the company has continued and still continues, 
without particular cash strains, to meet its obligations including those relating to the ongoing 
debt rescheduling agreement (2016-2025) with some credit institutions.  
Subsequently, on the 13th of November 2020, PF Holdings expressed the commitment to (i) pay 
off the financial investment of €20 million granted to the company, which has not been used 
and (ii) provide financial resources to Pininfarina for an equivalent amount by way of payment 
for a future irrevocable capital increase, to carried out by the 27th of November 2020. 
Nonetheless, Pininfarina has prepared suitable turnaround measures for the limitation of 
operating cash flow absorption and costs containment such as: 
• The intensification of commercial contacts with current and potential customers, also 
exploiting the web potential; 
• The greater use of outsourcing, where possible, in all business segments, using external 
resources to cover the expected increase in volumes, with a significant reduction in 
average production costs; 
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• The contractual application of the down payment, in order to make the trend of financial 
inflows and outflows more balanced; 
• The cost structure reorganization and simplification of processes, also through the 
reduction of manpower (direct and indirect), considered in excess of the potential of the 
current market and in the medium-term. 
Referring now to the latest available financial statements, namely the interim statements of 
September, it is interesting to briefly compare the performance of Pininfarina in 2020 with 
respect to the results of the same period of 2019. As regards its operating performance, the 
overall production value decreased by -28%, compared to the data of September 2019, with a -
23% decrease in the style sector while the engineering sector decreased by -35%. In particular, 
Pininfarina achieved - €6.2 million in EBITDA, severely reduced as compared to the previous 
year’s result of €0.2 million.  
With respect to its net financial position, the company registered a worsening reaching the 
volume of €16.8 million, increased by €4.8 million as compared to the previous year, because 
of both reduced liquidity and increased indebtedness.   
Pininfarina’s price per share trend fully reflects the uncertainties of the last year (Figure 4.70). 
Into specifics, from the January 2020 price of €1.6 per share, the value dropped to a peak in 
March on the occasion of the Italian lockdown announcement. Thus, Pinifarina’s shares 
registered a price of €0.93, the lowest ever displayed in the history of the company.   
In the following months the price started to rise again, albeit in a very limited way, showing a 
first positive signal in June due to optimistic future outlooks, thus remaining in a range between 
€1.15 and €1.4, however, failing to go back to pre-covid levels. 
Furthermore, the announcement regarding the Pininfarina Engineering liquidation, which took 
place at the beginning of November, again negatively impacted the share price. In particular, it 
fell to a value of €0.94, except to recover in the days immediately following the commitment 
of PF Holdings to pay off the financial investment of €20 million, previously granted to 
Pininfarina, and provide financial resources for an equivalent amount by way of payment for a 
near future irrevocable capital increase. Indeed, this news was positively welcomed by the 








Figure 4.70 – Pininfarina: price per share 2019 to date. (Morningstar) 
 
4.4.7. Considerations on the case study 
The Pininfarina case study is quite interesting for its prolonged financial distress and the 
mechanisms which have been adopted for the crisis resolution which, actually, is still ongoing. 
The company’s decline begun just before the 2008 global crisis broke out and was the result of 
an uncertain macroeconomic trend which impacted on the automotive sector too. Actually, at 
the beginning of 2000s, Pininfarina pursued expansionary business initiatives and investments 
which, in turn, led it to suffer the slowdown of its reference sector due to the high indebtedness 
position. To this regard, the company achieved its first negative results in 2005 as a 
consequence of the delay in few orders’ departure, the complete renewal of the production 
range, which burdened the cost structure and the net financial position. 
Afterwards, when the global crisis hit, Pininfarina’s financial position severely deteriorated and 
the company underwent the CONSOB surveillance with the entrance into the grey list in July 
2009. To this regard, Pininfarina promptly intervened and negotiated with its reference pool of 
banks the stipulation of its first debt rescheduling agreement (ex art. 67, co. 3, lett. d., l.f.), fully 
effective since December 2008. Thus, the financial manoeuvre provided for, was further 











Briefly, it concerned shareholders’ equity increase for €69.8 million, followed by the 
medium/long-term bank debt reduction for a total of - €241.1 million and the repayment of 
leasing amounts and the long-term financing to be intended from 2012.  
As regards the 2008-2017 business plan, it entailed a new business positioning through the 
development and production of the electric car, a continued growth in services and the 
streamline of production processes, aiming at the reduction of operating and structural costs. 
When in 2011 Pininfarina observed a considerable delay in the electric car’s development 
together with a strong competition in the provision of engineering and styling services, it was 
deemed necessary to modify its business plan for the new period 2012-2018. Indeed, among 
others, the company decided to strengthen its presence abroad, with a particular attention to the 
US and Chinese automotive markets. In addition, the Group also revised the agreement with 
banks, providing for the further rescheduling of the medium/long-term debt. 
The following years have been characterized by gradual improvements for Pininfarina, which 
succeeded to achieve from 2012 better results both in terms of turnover and indebtedness 
position. Actually, the real turning point was possible in December 2015 because of the 
investment agreement stipulated between Pincar, controlling shareholder of Pininfarina, and 
Mahindra&Mahindra Group, Indian leader in the automotive sector. Into specifics, in May 
2016, the company Pincar in liquidation sold its entire stake held in Pininfarina (76.063%) to 
PF Holding, Dutch company owned by Mahindra&Mahindra Group and, in addition, the 
agreement provided for €26.5 million of capital increase and a new debt rescheduling 
agreement, further supported by the 2016-2025 business plan. With respect to the financial 
manoeuvre, the agreement with the pool of banks provided for the write down of 56.7% of 
exposures’ nominal value (€32.1 million) and the rescheduling of the remaining debt portion 
from 2025.  
In the following years, the turnaround measures implemented have certainly had the desired 
effect, improving Pininfarina’s operating performance and further reducing its debt burden, 
therefore managing to exit from the CONSOB’s surveillance in May 2019.  
Besides, its uncertain performance of 2019 further worsened in 2020 because of the covid-19 
pandemic outbreak, as previously discussed, which led PF Holdings to provide capital injection 




As regards turnaround measures undertaken so far and taking into consideration results obtained 
over the last 5 years of analysis, we can reasonably assume that Pininfarina has not overcome 
financial distress yet, despite few improvements have been achieved over the years: 
 Pininfarina managed to reduce its net financial position 
From the initial net financial position of €47.9 million accounted in 2015, the company 
has been able to strongly reduce its debt burden over the years, achieving a value of 
€12.6 in 2019. Into specifics, the debt rescheduling agreement undertaken in 2016 with 
the pool of banks has granted a noticeable improvement in Pininfarina’s net debt which 
has been written down by €32.1 million and rescheduled for the remaining portion. 
 Pininfarina managed to undertake a structural reorganization 
In 2018, the company has undertaken measures aimed at reorganizing its business 
structure in order to centralize the management of resources and to efficiently convey 
its value proposition in terms of design and engineering services. In this regard, 
Pininfarina Engineering has been established under the coordination of the parent 
company. Moreover, Pininfarina Extra has merged into the parent company with the 
aim of fostering synergies between the automotive, transport and interior design sectors, 
through the creation of a single creative department for the Pininfarina Group. 
/ Pininfarina did not actually reorganize its cost structure 
Thus, no real reduction in operating costs was found during the years of analysis. In 
particular, as regards personnel expenses, the company has registered a slight decline 
during the first three years of investigation (2015-2017), accounting for €47.7 million 
in 2015 as compared to the reduced volume of €44.6 in 2017. On the other hand, in 2018 
and 2019 Pininfarina displayed increased expenses amounting to €50 million and €54.9 
million respectively. Thus, the increase is to be considered due to the structural 
reorganization that took place during the period, as described above, which led to an 
expansion of the workforce. Furthermore, as regards raw materials, consumables and 
goods expenses and structural costs, their path registered a fluctuating trend which 
followed the customers demand movements, without showing a clear decline.  
Overall, the Pininfarina case study represents a distressed company which has not fully 
recovered yet. In particular, it has been through a prolonged period of crisis, which has extended 
approximately from 2008, year of its first debt rescheduling agreement, until to date. Besides, 
Pininfarina has not been exempt from periods characterized by better performance. Thus, a sign 
of slight improvement has been first detected in 2012 when the company, following few years 
of income losses, has accounted positive results in terms of net income, increased shareholders’ 
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equity and improved net financial position, as a consequence of the growing market demand. 
In fact, the apparent improvement did not last long because, soon after, Pininfarina found again 
in the position to deal with reduced revenue volumes and operating losses.  
Indeed, the actual turning point of this long story of crisis has been the investment agreement 
the company signed in December 2015 with the Mahindra Group. Thus, the two companies met 
halfway: Pininfarina was looking for a firm which could inject new resources in order to save 
it from the crisis, while the Mahindra Group agreed an acquisition that allowed it to have access 
to the prestigious made in Italy design, namely the competitive advantage of Pininfarina. On 
balance, this deal has been advantageous for both companies and has been an ideal condition 
for the generation of synergies. Into specifics, Pininfarina has managed not only to improve its 
performance both in terms of debt burden and operating results, but has also pursued an 
expansionary policy towards foreign markets, such as US and China.  
To wrap up, Pininarina’s overall condition appears anything but stable. Actually, over the 
period under investigation, it has achieved both a reduced net financial position and a business 
reorganization which has allowed the group to better focus on its core activities. Nevertheless, 
its cost structure is still rigid as, following a fluctuating demand such that of the automotive 
sector, does not seem to adapt to the orders’ volume change resulting, therefore, in negative 
operating results. Although Pininfarina can count on the financial support of the Mahindra 
Group, the company needs to set forth new strategic objectives in order to pursue a lean 
structure, without overlooking its defendable market position and competitive advantage, 
















SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Corporate financial distress and business restructuring process have become a familiar 
economic reality to many corporations worldwide, thus confronting companies’ management 
with the challenging task of defining a proper turnaround plan. Besides, an early identification 
of decline signals is key in avoiding the outbreak into the pathological stage of the crisis 
phenomenon. To this regard, many scholars have tried to investigate the facets of corporate 
distress, agreeing that it is generally possible to distinguish between an initial decline phase, 
which represents a relatively physiological passage of the life of a firm (Sirleo 2009), and the 
crisis stage, namely the degeneration of the corporate decay into a harmful economic value 
destruction. Indeed, distressed companies share common features such as stagnant revenues, 
shrinking margins and an overwhelming financial position (Damodaran 2009).  
Whenever the company’s decay is not promptly detected and the firm is not restored to health, 
the value of activities may appear insufficient to guarantee debt reimbursements and the initial 
decline could quickly escalate into a financial downturn condition. Either way, it is not an easy 
task to precisely understand which have been the underlying causes of distress manifestation. 
Although there is a common distinction between internal and external causes, in practice, a 
chain of interrelated multiple causal factors can be identified in most situations (Slatter & Lovett 
1999). Indeed, what is certain it that the firm’s analysis must be conducted adopting both a 
micro-economic and a macro-economic approach in light of the dialectic between the external 
and internal organizational environment.  
When the first imbalances occur, what discriminates a distressed company which survives from 
one which results in liquidation is flexibility, namely the ability of the governing body to detect 
the warning signs of decline or crisis and quickly adapt and reallocate resources in response to 
internal changes in efficiency (Fedele & Antenucci 2015). Into specifics, scholars identify four 
main methods and, thus, distinguish between methods based on intuition, ratio analysis, models 
and capital markets. Intuition relies on the external recognition of symptoms of decay and 
imbalances, visible in different degrees to the overall group of stakeholders, while ratio analysis 
has its roots in the investigation of the main measures of value of financial statements, generally 
carried out in the span of several years. On the other hand, methods based on models and capital 




By the time the corporate distress manifest itself in terms of performance and income 
deterioration, it becomes imperative to pinpoint and adopt the most suitable solution to deal 
with the crisis and preserve the business continuity. First, the choice standing in front of the 
company falls between corporate turnaround and liquidation. Thus, the enforcement of 
turnaround measures requires the firm’s going concern value to be substantially higher than its 
liquidation value, otherwise the business is not viable anymore and sell-off represents the 
optimal solution. Secondly, the corporate turnaround decision comes down to an out-of-court 
or an in-court restructuring. In particular, the latter entails the formal supervision of the 
bankruptcy court, while the former is also known as a private mechanism, lacking therefore of 
a formal monitoring. To this regard, the common content taxonomy adopted illustrates four 
main macro categories of out-of-court strategies: managerial, operational, portfolio and 
financial restructuring (Schweizer & Nienhaus 2017). Managerial restructuring entails the 
replacement of the top management team and/or the chief executive officer. Indeed, structural 
downsizing and layoffs represent an operational restructuring strategy. Portfolio restructuring 
encompasses strategic activities concerning the company’s portfolio reorganization with a view 
to better manage resources through divesture and acquisition transactions, while financial 
restructuring is characterized by capital injection, debt rescheduling or refinancing, and 
dividends cut or omission.  
Often times, when the company is in a context of severe financial distress, the juridical 
environment in which it operates should provide adequate tools to preserve the business going 
concern value and protect creditors. In this context, the Italian insolvency framework, based on 
the Royal Decree no. 267 of 16 March 1942, ensures a good level of completeness and detail, 
with instruments characterized by an increasing degree of intervention of the legislator, 
depending on the severity of each individual case (Stanghellini 2015). Indeed, alongside 
bankruptcy procedures, the Italian legislator has provided for the possibility of adopting more 
flexible tools with a lower level of procedural formalities, as long as the company is pre-
insolvent, namely contractual and quasi-contractual agreements: certificate plans (ex art. 67, 
co. 3, lett. d, l.f.), debt restructuring agreements (ex art. 182-bis, l. f.) and compositions with 
creditors (ex art. 160, l. f.). Thus, the priority of the Italian legislator seems to be the safeguard 
of business continuity and the simultaneous protection of creditors.  
To this regard, Banca d’Italia and CONSOB are the main institutions invested with the 
supervisory authority on markets and financial intermediaries, with the aim of ensuring a certain 
transparency of information. In particular, CONSOB carries out its role by making use of two 
specific tools: the black and the grey lists. The inclusion in these “watch lists” entails the 
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provision of periodical addition information, namely monthly or quarterly, which is triggered 
by the opinion of auditors based on financial statements of listed companies in distress (ex art. 
114, T.U.F.).  
In this context, the investigation preparatory to the empirical analysis starts from the overview 
of companies subject to CONSOB’s monitoring between 2009 and 2020. In this period, 88 
firms listed on the MTA of Borsa Italiana, of which 50 have left the black and the grey lists, 
have been subject to periodical additional information, either monthly or quarterly. Into 
specifics, 48% have been liquidated as a consequence of their inability to overcome the crisis, 
most of whom are concentrated in the period between 2013-2015. Actually, it can be reasonably 
assumed that these companies implemented inadequate or delayed turnaround measures with 
respect to the onset of the first signals of decline and the ongoing economic crisis. Furthermore, 
between 2009 up to date, 14 companies carried out winning turnaround strategies capable of 
improving their financial and economic condition, leaving the CONSOB supervision, while the 
remaining portion exited from surveillance lists due to their delisting from the regulated market. 
In addition, with regard to the main characteristics concerning the two “watch lists” at the time 
this dissertation has been elaborated, it emerges a worse performance in relation to blacklisted 
companies, both in terms of operating results and indebtedness position. Thus, although the 
sample is not large enough to detect a specific pattern, firms in the grey list reported generally 
positive EBITDA and, on average, better results in terms of quick ratio and total debt/EBITDA, 
denoting an higher ability to cope with short-term obligations as compared to blacklisted 
companies.  
At this point, the dissertation got to the heart of the empirical analysis by selecting three 
interesting case studies, namely one of the black list, one of the grey list and one currently 
recovered and out of surveillance, with the aim of investigating what unites and what 
distinguishes the turnaround measures adopted by the companies over a 5-year period (2015-
2019). Into specifics, each case has been separately investigated with respect to causes 
originating the company’s downturn and the respective restructuring plans adopted. To this 
regard, the focus was placed on the most recently introduced restructuring measures in order to 
highlight their impact in terms of profitability, characteristics of total funds invested and the 
firm’s capital structure evolution, all comparing the main measures of value with an adequate 
peer company.  
The first company to be investigated is Zucchi, Italian leader in the household linen sector. Its 
decline established its roots at the beginning of the 2000s, when Zucchi found itself facing the 
consequences of its rigid cost structure deriving from acquisitions previously made. Hence, the 
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firm’s structural issues together with delayed outsourcing of costly process phases, as compared 
to its competitors, and the slowdown of the household linen market led to the manifestation of 
the first negative result in 2004. Therefore, when the global crisis hit, the clear worsening of 
the firm’s condition and the financial difficulties in meeting its obligations, led to CONSOB’s 
intervention and the consequent Zucchi’s inclusion under the black list in 2010.  
As response, the company developed three debt restructuring agreements (ex art. 182-bis, l.f.), 
of which the first two, namely the 2011 and 2013 agreements, failed because of a too myopic 
view of business prospects. On the other hand, the third debt restructuring agreement, supported 
by the 2015-2020 business plan, led to a successful conclusion. In detail, the financial 
manoeuvre entailed: (1) the establishment of an SPV to which transferring the business branch 
constituted by €30 million debt and specific properties, (2) a debt waiver of €49.6 million by 
the lending banks and (3) a share capital increase of €10 million. Finally, despite the objective 
difficulties that hit the markets in 2020 because of the covid-19 pandemic, Zucchi managed to 
early conclude the debt restructuring deal in October 2020 thanks to a refinancing agreement 
undertaken by DeA Capital Alternative Funds SGR and Illimity Bank.  
On the basis of the last five years of analysis, it can be reasonably assumed Zucchi achieved a 
certain stability following more than ten years of distress. In particular, the company managed 
to streamline its cost structure, accounting total operating costs reduced by -37.4% in 2019, as 
compared to 2015, with a further net improvement in EBITDA. To this regard, Zucchi’s 
operating performance has been accomplished thanks to a proper implementation of the 2015-
2020 business plan, which led to the integration of its two main brands, the simplification of 
the line of products offered, the disposal of non-strategic assets and the closure of 18 stores 
operating at loss. As regards its shareholders’ equity, namely one of the company’s weak spot, 
the €10 million contribution received has helped the recovery, but the complete u-turn, 
however, has been achieved thanks to the refinancing operation and the termination of the debt 
restructuring agreement. In addition, its net financial position reduction was made possible by 
the debt waiver performed in 2020, which led to a - €55.6 million decline in September 2020 
as compared to December 2019. Overall, the analysis conducted on the basis of the operations 
undertaken by Zucchi in 2015 and completed, in relation to the financial manoeuvre, in 2020, 
allows to assess the success of the turnaround process undertaken by the company. Following 
the long crisis development, it can be assumed that these first positive results require ulterior 
efforts in order not only to be maintained, but to carry in a reasonable future to the company’s 
growth. Therefore, Zucchi must be able to maintain a lean structure without forgetting 
innovation and the strong push of the market towards online channels.  
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The second case under investigation has been that of Beghelli, a company operating in the 
lighting sector. Its first timid signs of decline showed shortly before 2008, following a general 
contraction in economies, which further deteriorated when the global financial crisis hit. 
Nevertheless, the company did not appear disarmed and decided to act promptly by adopting 
measures aimed at the maintenance of a strong position in its reference sector, while 
streamlining its cost structure. Actually, when the sovereign debt crisis came to an end, Beghelli 
had to face a severe liquidity constraint in 2012, leading to its inclusion in the black list a year 
later. In this respect, three have been the main causes: (1) changes in the regulatory framework 
of the photovoltaic sector, (2) sales contraction volumes, (3) unforeseen contractual and 
bureaucratic issues related to the divestment of its Chinese subsidiary. As a consequence, the 
company approved the 2013-2018 business plan together with a debt rescheduling agreement 
(ex art. 67, co. 3, let. d, l.f.), fully effective from 2014. It entailed the confirmation of the short-
term credit lines, the moratorium on medium/long-term loan capital instalments and 
rescheduling of the real estate leases payments. Indeed, when in 2015 Beghelli exceeded 
performance expectations, it shifted towards the grey list CONSOB and, the following year, the 
debt rescheduling agreement has been early resolute with the grant of €40 million in unsecured 
financing. Conversely, what happened in the last two years of analysis until now has been a 
strong deterioration of Beghelli’s performance, initiated in 2018 as a consequence of the 
unsatisfactory market response to its new products launches. 
According to the analysis conducted, it can be concluded that Beghelli has not overcome the 
distress yet. In fact, it has managed to reduce its net financial position by -35.6% in 2019, as 
compared to 2015, but its operating performance did not achieve the expected results. To this 
end, its cost structure still appears rigid, preventing the company to reach economies of scale. 
And, overall, this has negatively impacted on profitability volumes. Actually, what happened 
was an excessive focus on new products launches which led Beghelli to neglect the defense of 
its competitive position in the lighting sector and, under an erroneous market demand forecast, 
it found itself incurring disproportionate costs in relation to sales revenues. In summary, despite 
no liquidity constraint has been pointed out and the company does not present concerns in 
facing its short-term liabilities, Beghelli needs to reorganize its production process in order to 
streamline its cost structure. 
The third case study has been performed on Pininfarina, company operating in the automotive 
sector. Its distress begun just before the 2008 global crisis due to uncertain macroeconomic 
trend which, among others, impacted on the automotive sector. In fact, what triggered 
Pininfarina’s decline have been expansionary business initiatives and investments which, in 
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turn, led it to suffer the slowdown of its reference market due to its high indebtedness level. 
Therefore, when in 2008 the crisis hit, the company’s financial position severely deteriorated 
and it was deemed necessary its inclusion in the grey list in July 2009. To this regard, 
Pininfarina promptly implemented its first debt rescheduling agreement, together with a long-
term business plan for the period 2008-2017. When, again, its operating performance underwent 
a further arrest in 2011, the company revised both its debt agreement and business plan in order 
to handle the considerable delay in the electric car’s development together with a strong 
competition in the provision of engineering and styling services. The following years have been 
characterized by several improvements but, in fact, Pininfarina’s real turning point was possible 
in December 2015 when Pincar, its controlling shareholder, stipulated an investment agreement 
with Mahindra&Mahindra Group. This deal has been concluded together with a debt 
rescheduling agreement, further supported by the 2016-2025 business plan. Briefly, it provided 
for (1) €26.5 million of capital increase, (2) the write down of 56.7% of exposures’ nominal 
value and (3) the rescheduling of the remaining debt portion from 2025. An initial improvement 
in Pininfarina’s performance and debt burden reduction, made it earn the exit from CONSOB’s 
surveillance in May 2019 but, soon after, its results slightly deteriorated again and required a 
new capital injection in 2020, amounting to €20 million. In fact, it successfully managed to 
strongly reduce its net financial position because of the debt rescheduling agreement 
intervention and the financial support of the Mahindra Group. Furthermore, the company 
managed to undertake an efficient structural reorganization, with the aim of centralizing 
resources management and effectively convey its value proposition in terms of design and 
engineering services. Nevertheless, Pininfarina has failed to properly reorganize its cost 
structure, which results quite rigid and leads to the erosion of revenue volumes due to its lacking 
customer demand flexibility. Therefore, its investment agreement with the Mahindra Group is 
for sure a windfall since Pininfarina can count on a strong financial support and key player in 
foreign automotive sectors. Nevertheless, the company needs to set forth new strategic 
objectives in order to pursue a lean structure, without overlooking its defendable market 
position and competitive advantage, namely the luxury and design of the made in Italy. 
To wrap up, there is no universal recipe for restructuring a financially distressed company, since 
the most adequate turnaround measures result both entity-based and industry dependent. First, 
there is no doubt that a targeted and immediate intervention already represents an advantage in 
favor of business recovery and should lead to immediate negotiations with the main creditors. 
Indeed, often times new liquidity injection is the turning point in a distressed condition, such 
as in all case studies under investigation, since it gives a break to the debt burden. Despite, this 
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may not be enough if the company does not set up a strategic plan at the same time. In fact, it 
is necessary to define a proper business plan with short and long-term strategic objectives, in 
line with the company’s prospects and the reference sector direction. Finally, it is necessary to 
continuously take market trends into account, as in the case of Pininfarina, and to adapt the 
strategies initially implemented accordingly. Ultimately, corporate distress resolution 
represents a balance between quick fixes in terms of negotiations with the main creditors and 





Appendix 1 – The evolution of companies in the black list and grey list under the CONSOB supervision, 2009-2020. (Personal elaboration from 
CONSOB) 
COMPANIES SUBJECT TO ADDITIONAL 
INFORMATION DISCLOSURE (ex art. 114, T.U.F.) 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
A.S. ROMA S.p.A. GL GL GL GL GL GL GL GL GL GL GL BL 
ACOTEL S.p.A.        BL BL BL BL BL 
AEDES S.p.A. GL GL GL GL BL BL GL GL GL GL GL GL 
AICON S.p.A. GL GL GL BL BL F       
ALBA PRIVATE EQUITY S.p.A.   BL BL BL GL GL GL R    
ALGOWATT S.p.A. (ex TERNIENERGIA S.p.A.)         GL BL BL BL 
ANTICHI PELLETTIERI S.p.A. BL BL BL BL BL F       
ARENA S.p.A. BL BL BL BL BL BL BL F     
ASTALDI S.p.A.          GL GL GL 
ATLANTIA S.p.A.            GL 
AUTOSTRADE MERIDIONALI S.p.A.            GL 
BANCA CARIGE S.p.A.         GL GL GL GL 
BANCA INTERMOBILIARE DI INVESTIMENTI E 
GESTIONI S.p.A. 
        GL GL GL GL 
BANCA MONTE DEI PASCHI DI SIENA S.p.A.        GL GL GL GL GL 
BANCA PROFILO S.p.A. GL R           
BASTOGI S.p.A.     GL GL GL GL GL GL GL GL 
BEE TEAM S.p.A. BL GL GL GL GL R       
BEGHELLI S.p.A.     BL BL GL GL GL GL GL GL 
BIALETTI S.p.A. GL GL BL BL BL BL BL BL BL BL BL BL 
BIANCAMANO S.p.A.    GL BL BL BL BL BL BL BL BL 
BIOERA S.p.A.  BL BL GL GL R      BL 
BORGOSESIA S.p.A.         GL GL GL GL 
197 
 
BRIOSCHI SVILUPPO IMMOBILIARE S.p.A.     BL BL BL BL BL BL GL GL 
CARRARO S.p.A.        GL GL R   
CDC POINT S.p.A.    BL BL D       
CHL S.p.A.        BL BL BL BL S 
CICCOLELLA S.p.A.  GL GL BL BL BL F      
CLASS EDITORI S.p.A.            BL 
COBRA S.p.A. GL GL GL GL GL GL F      
COGEME SET S.p.A.   BL BL BL BL F      
COSE BELLE D'ITALIA S.p.A. (ex MEDIACONTECH 
S.p.A.) 
   GL BL BL BL BL BL BL F  
CRESPI S.p.A. BL BL BL BL BL F       
CTI BIOPHARMA S.p.A. BL BL BL BL BL BL BL BL BL D   
EEMS ITALIA S.p.A. GL R  BL BL BL BL BL BL BL BL BL 
EPRICE S.p.A.           GL BL 
EUKEDOS S.p.A. (ex ARKIMEDICA S.p.A.)   BL BL BL GL GL GL GL GL GL GL 
EUTELIA S.p.A. BL BL BL BL F        
EVEREL S.p.A. BL D           
FIDIA S.p.A.            BL 
FINARTE-SEMENZATO S.p.A. BL BL BL BL F        
FULLSIX S.p.A. BL BL GL GL GL GL GL GL GL GL BL BL 
GABETTI PROPERTY SOLUTIONS S.p.A. GL GL GL BL BL BL BL BL BL BL BL BL 
GEQUITY S.p.A. (ex INVESTIMENTI E SVILUPPO 
S.p.A.) 
 BL BL BL BL BL BL BL BL BL BL BL 
GRUPPO CERAMICHE RICCHETTI S.p.A.     GL GL GL GL GL GL D  
GRUPPO WASTE ITALIA S.p.A.        BL BL BL D  
IL SOLE 24 ORE S.p.A.        BL BL BL GL GL 
ITALIAONLINE S.p.A. (ex SEAT PAGINE GIALLE 
S.p.A.) 
  BL BL BL BL BL GL GL GL D  
ITWAY S.p.A.         GL BL BL BL 
KERSELF S.p.A.  GL BL BL BL F       
KINEXIA S.p.A. GL GL GL GL GL GL R      
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LVENTURE GROUP S.p.A.    BL GL GL GL GL GL GL GL GL 
MAIRE TECNIMONT S.p.A.     GL GL GL GL GL R   
MARIELLA BURANI FG S.p.A. BL BL F          
MERIDIANA FLY S.p.A. BL BL BL BL BL D       
MOLECULAR MEDICINE S.p.A. GL R           
MONDO HE MOVIEMAX S.p.A.  BL BL BL BL BL F      
MONTEFIBRE S.p.A. BL BL BL BL BL F       
MONTI ASCENSORI S.p.A.   BL BL F        
NETWEEK S.p.A. (ex DMAIL GROUP S.p.A.)    BL BL BL BL BL BL BL BL BL 
OLIDATA S.p.A.  BL BL BL BL BL BL BL BL BL BL BL 
OMNIA NETWORK S.p.A. BL BL F          
PIERREL S.p.A.    BL BL BL BL BL BL BL GL GL 
PININFARINA S.p.A. GL GL GL GL GL GL GL GL GL GL R  
PLC S.p.A. (ex INDUSTRIA E INNOVAZIONE S.p.A.)     GL GL BL BL BL GL GL GL 
PRAMAC S.p.A.  GL BL BL F        
PRELIOS S.p.A.    BL BL BL BL BL BL BL GL GL 
PREMAFIN FINANZIARIA S.p.A.     GL GL D      
PREMUDA S.p.A.      GL GL GL D    
RCS MEDIAGROUP S.p.A.     GL GL GL GL GL R   
RDB S.p.A.   GL BL F        
RICHARD GINORI S.p.A. GL GL GL BL F        
RISANAMENTO S.p.A. GL GL GL GL GL GL GL GL BL BL BL BL 
S.S. LAZIO S.p.A. GL GL GL R         
SAFILO S.p.A. GL R           
SCREEN SERVICE S.p.A.     BL BL F      
SERI INDUSTRIAL S.p.A. (ex KRENERGY S.p.A.) BL BL BL BL BL BL BL BL BL BL BL BL 
SNAITECH S.p.A. (ex SNAI S.p.A.) BL GL GL GL GL GL GL GL GL D   
SNIA S.p.A. BL BL F          
SOCOTHERM S.p.A. BL BL D          
SOPAF S.p.A.  GL GL BL BL F       
STEFANEL S.p.A. GL GL GL GL GL GL GL BL BL BL BL D 
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TAS S.p.A. BL BL BL BL BL BL BL BL GL GL GL R 
TISCALI S.p.A. BL BL BL BL BL BL BL BL BL BL BL BL 
TITANMET S.p.A. (ex SINTESI S.p.A.) GL GL BL BL BL BL BL BL BL BL BL BL 
TREVI S.p.A.         GL BL BL BL 
TREVISAN COMETAL S.p.A. BL F           
VIAGGI DEL VENTAGLIO S.p.A. BL F           
ZUCCHI S.p.A.  BL BL BL BL BL BL BL BL BL BL BL 
 
GL Company entered the Grey List 
BL Company entered the Black List 
F Company failed 
R Company recovered from distress 













Appendix 2 – Zucchi: reorganized financial statements. (Personal elaboration from AIDA database and Annual Financial Statements) 
 
 
Reorganized Income Statement ('000 €) 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Revenues 92.933 80.418 77.093 83.018 70.326
Var % -13,50% -4,10% 7,70% -15,30%
Other income 2.508 1.678 3.362 6.330 5.321
Total revenues 95.441 82.096 80.455 89.348 75.647
Raw materials, consumables and goods -41.200 -29.401 -26.607 -35.879 -27.425
% on total revenues 43,20% 35,80% 33,10% 40,20% 36,30%
Contribution margin 54.241 52.695 53.848 53.469 48.222
% on total revenues 56,80% 64,20% 66,90% 59,80% 63,70%
Personnel expenses -26.651 -19.572 -18.263 -17.439 -17.333
% on total revenues 27,90% 23,80% 22,70% 19,50% 22,90%
Other operating costs -38.376 -28.508 -28.814 -27.390 -21.779
% on total revenues 40,20% 34,70% 35,80% 30,70% 28,80%
EBITDA -10.786 4.615 6.771 8.640 9.110
EBITDA % -11,30% 5,60% 8,40% 9,70% 12,00%
Write-offs -2.454 -43 -168 -626 0
Amortization and depreciation -2.596 -1.690 -1.360 -1.259 -5.029
EBIT -15.836 2.882 5.243 6.755 4.081
EBIT % -16,60% 3,50% 6,50% 7,60% 5,40%
Interest income 40 154 196 290 295
Interest expenses -1.538 -223 -338 -608 -280
Exchange rate gains (losses) -1.032 -42 0 -1 -24
Non-recurring and extraordinary items 203 2.840 -18 0 406
EBT  -18.163 5.611 5.083 6.436 4.478
Taxes -1.368 -1.147 -1.528 -2.172 -2.006
Net income -19.531 4.464 3.555 4.264 2.472




Reorganized Balance Sheet ('000 €) 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Inventory 21.321 20.837 25.130 22.444 20.509
DIOH 186 255 340 225 269
Trade receivables 23.412 22.455 22.824 23.560 23.809
DSO 91 101 107 102 122
Trade payables -25.116 -11.670 -10.396 -10.979 -12.634
DPO 114 73 68 62 92
Trade working capital 19.617 31.622 37.558 35.025 31.684
Other operating current assets (liabilities) -12.252 -5.067 -3.611 -3.746 -2.532
Net working capital 7.365 26.555 33.947 31.279 29.152
Goodwill 0 0 0 0 0
Intangible assets 536 360 714 1.243 1.551
Tangible assets 34.478 32.919 31.910 56.219 49.167
Equity investments 114 114 114 114 114
Total operating fixed capital 35.128 33.393 32.738 57.576 50.832
Other non-current operating assets (liabilities) -12.633 -14.295 -13.110 -12.193 -11.658
Invested capital 29.860 45.653 53.575 76.662 68.326
Net intercompany position 131 829 2.397 0 0
Non-operating non-current assets 391 391 391 391 391
Total funds invested  30.382 46.873 56.363 77.053 68.717
Shareholders’ equity -39.604 -25.253 -21.759 -22.213 -15.735
Shareholders’ financing 0 0 0 0 0
Other financial debt 0 0 0 42.642 40.383
Bonds 0 0 0 0 0
Short-term bank debt 80.305 80.040 87.495 73.424 67.534
Long-term bank debt 0 0 0 0 0
Cash -10.319 -7.914 -9.373 -16.800 -23.465
Net financial position 69.986 72.126 78.122 99.266 84.452
Total source of financing 30.382 46.873 56.363 77.053 68.717
202 
 
Appendix 3 – Beghelli: reorganized financial statements. (Personal elaboration from AIDA database and Annual Financial Statements) 
 
Reorganized Income Statement ('000 €) 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Revenues 168.103 180.369 177.865 167.768 151.844
Var % 12,30% 7,30% -1,40% -5,70% -9,50%
Capitalized internal works 99 338 275 893 367
Other income 3.821 3.479 9.797 3.001 10.668
Total Revenues 172.023 184.186 187.937 171.662 162.879
Raw materials, consumables and goods -76.419 -80.809 -81.589 -75.119 -74.239
% on total revenues 44,40% 43,90% 43,40% 43,80% 45,60%
Contribution margin 95.604 103.377 106.348 96.543 88.640
% on total revenues 55,60% 56,10% 56,60% 56,20% 54,40%
Personnel expenses -36.537 -37.162 -37.719 -39.340 -36.180
% on total revenues 21,20% 20,20% 20,10% 22,90% 22,20%
Other operating costs -42.483 -46.416 -44.891 -53.097 -36.698
% on total revenues 24,70% 25,20% 23,90% 30,90% 22,50%
EBITDA 16.584 19.799 23.738 4.106 15.762
EBITDA % 9,60% 10,70% 12,60% 2,40% 9,70%
Write-offs -275 -1.500 -3.868 -2.446 -250
Provisions -453 -876 -1.037 -384 -406
Amortization and depreciation -6.732 -6.856 -7.105 -6.436 -8.922
EBIT 9.124 10.567 11.728 -5.160 6.184
EBIT % 5,30% 5,70% 6,20% -3,00% 3,80%
Interest income 6.377 1.557 1.012 1025 661
Interest expenses -15.830 -5.042 -4.288 -4.604 -4.342
Exchange rate gains (losses) -251 99 -844 356 -128
Non-recurring and extraordinary items 1.183 -2.031 -2.228 -970 -2.825
EBT 603 5.150 5.380 -9.353 -450
Taxes -24 -1.465 -1.825 262 -707
Net income 579 3.685 3.555 -9.091 -1.157




Reorganized Balance Sheet ('000 €) 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Inventory 54.971 54.275 45.803 56.955 48.018
DIOH 259 242 202 273 233
Trade receivables 38.358 38.329 34.053 34.265 30.918
DSO 82 77 69 74 73
Trade payables -40.952 -43.369 -38.798 -48.285 -35.279
DPO 124 123 110 136 114
Trade working capital 52.377 49.235 41.058 42.935 43.657
Other operating current assets  89.957 89.120 94.752 64.443 55.222
Other operating current liabilities -20.075 -20.374 -20.327 -18.210 -19.046
Accruals and deferred income 5.574 5.905 8.134 208 5.355
Net working capital 127.833 123.886 123.617 89.376 85.188
Goodwill 7.916 7.916 7.916 7.916 6.721
Intangible assets 9.704 8.954 8.108 9.052 9.799
Tangible assets 78.321 77.137 66.614 63.680 61.418
Equity investments 362 380 173 132 134
Total operating fixed capital 96.303 94.387 82.811 80.780 78.072
Other non-current operating assets (liabilities) -31.914 -31.211 -31.431 -11.621 -11.947
Invested capital 192.222 187.062 174.997 158.535 151.313
Net intercompany position 2.569 2.221 1.825 147 161
Total funds invested  194.791 189.283 176.822 158.682 151.474
Shareholders’ equity 104.243 106.345 105.944 94.213 93.172
Shareholders’ financing 0 0 0 0 0
Other financial debt 13.723 11.262 10.051 9.340 13.132
Bonds 0 0 0 0 0
Short-term bank debt 36.727 41.481 28.998 77.502 60.473
Long-term bank debt 66.687 50.131 59.093 2.400 2.949
Securities -1.365 -3.966 -3.017 -439 -1.155
Cash -25.224 -15.970 -24.247 -24.334 -17.097
Net financial position 90.548 82.938 70.878 64.469 58.302
Total source of financing 194.791 189.283 176.822 158.682 151.474
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Appendix 4 – Pininfarina: reorganized financial statements. (Personal elaboration from AIDA database and Annual Financial Statements) 
 
Reorganized Income Statement ('000 €) 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Revenues 75.126 62.660 79.642 97.528 81.325
Var % -10,80% -16,60% 27,10% 22,50% -16,60%
Changes to work in progress 2.028 -3.929 72 0 0
Other income 5.738 10.979 7.536 7.889 9.979
Total revenues 82.892 69.710 87.250 105.417 91.304
Raw materials, consumables and goods -8.450 -4.786 -8.360 -9.170 -9.159
% on total revenues 10,20% 6,90% 9,60% 8,70% 10,00%
Contribution margin 74.442 64.924 78.890 96.247 82.145
% on total revenues 89,80% 93,10% 90,40% 91,30% 90,00%
Personnel expenses -47.689 -43.932 -44.604 -50.082 -54.996
% on total revenues 57,50% 63,00% 51,10% 47,50% 60,20%
Other operating costs -25.274 -20.221 -26.649 -33.483 -27.985
% on total revenues 30,50% 29,00% 30,50% 31,80% 30,70%
EBITDA 1.479 771 7.637 12.682 -836
EBITDA % 1,80% 1,10% 8,80% 12,00% -0,90%
Write-offs -9.534 -682 -46 -5.298 -9.467
Provisions -1.075 -168 -269 -108 -4.205
Ammortization and depreciation -3.397 -3.143 -3.023 -3.433 -4.918
EBIT -12.527 -3.222 4.299 3.843 -19.426
EBIT % -15,10% -4,60% 4,90% 3,60% -21,30%
Interest income 412 191 130 15 744
Interest expenses -5.602 -3.095 -2.225 -2.431 -2.214
Exchange rate gains (losses) 74 -27 -144 -50 -28
Non-recurring and extraordinary items 50 26.672 73 0 84
EBT  -17.593 20.519 2.133 1.377 -20.840
Taxes -576 12 -821 796 -2.235
Net income -18.169 20.531 1.312 2.173 -23.075




Reorganized Balance Sheet ('000 €) 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Inventory 5.721 1.749 1.875 3.539 4.976
DIOH 244 132 81 139 196
Trade receivables 17.707 12.407 17.366 21.345 24.589
DSO 85 71 78 79 109
Trade payables -10.707 -12.924 -26.292 -29.667 -34.099
DPO 114 186 270 250 330
Trade working capital 12.721 1.232 -7.051 -4.783 -4.534
Other operating current assets 4.892 5.964 7.853 12.716 15.246
Other operating current liabilities -7.285 -6.003 -6.651 -7.512 -11.314
Accruals and deferred income -1.794 -788 5.781 400 1.819
Net working capital 8.534 405 -68 821 1.217
Goodwill 1.043 1.043 1.043 1.043 0
Intangible assets 1.208 765 629 6.283 6.092
Tangible assets 51.382 50.110 49.557 49.979 46.266
Equity investments 323 336 349 857 854
Total operating fixed capital 53.956 52.254 51.578 58.162 53.212
Other non-current operating assets (liabilities) -4.991 -4.928 -4.792 -4.778 -4.243
Invested capital 57.499 47.731 46.718 54.205 50.186
Net intercompany position 254 -15.493 230 2.886 1.394
Total funds invested  57.753 32.238 46.948 57.091 51.580
Shareholders’ equity 9.828 30.462 58.803 61.749 39.002
Shareholders’ financing 0 0 0 0 0
Other financial debt 52.427 0 0 0 9.926
Bonds 0 0 0 0 0
Short-term bank debt 7.236 3.428 3.554 4.363 2.368
Long-term bank debt 25.617 26.131 24.375 22.441 20.399
Securities -16.359 0 0 -13.106 0
Cash -20.996 -27.783 -39.784 -18.356 -20.115
Net financial position 47.925 1.776 -11.855 -4.658 12.578
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